

CURRENT HISTORY

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Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

MAY, 1986
VOLUME 85 NUMBER 511

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Current History

MAY, 1986

VOL. 85, NO. 511

The contrasting political and economic policies of the African states are discussed in this issue. Southern Africa remains a focal point, because the tensions in South Africa affect the entire region and United States policy toward the region. Our lead article notes that, in 1986, "there is a danger that the United States may find itself confronted with an Angolan crisis choice similar to the choice it faced in 1975. . . . One thing is certain. Angola has embarked on its second decade of independence still grimly locked in the debilitating grip of externally fueled civil war."

Angola: Twenty-Five Years of War

By JOHN A. MARCUM

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Cruz

A potentially rich country, Angola has been ravaged by a quarter century of war. In an August–September, 1985, offensive against antigovernment rebels, Soviet-equipped troops of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) attempted to end the war that has persisted in various forms since the outbreak of insurgency against Portuguese colonial rule in 1961.

Although they recaptured the Cazombo salient that projects into Zambia and inflicted heavy casualties on UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola), Angolan forces failed to capture UNIPA's southeastern strongholds of Mavinga and Jamba. Intervention by the South African air force and a South Africa-based and officered mercenary unit known as the 32 Battalion stemmed their advance. According to Roberto Ngongo, an Angolan military official, the government lost \$100-million worth of Soviet equipment (over 20 helicopters and MiG aircraft, and 150 tanks, jeeps and trucks)¹ out of an estimated \$2 billion in military equipment purchased by Angola from the Soviet Union over the past two years.

Meeting in Luanda in December, 1985, the second congress of Angola's ruling party, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola–Partido do Trabalho (MPLA-PT), had to confront the reality of a debilitating internal conflict that frustrated efforts to rebuild the country's economy. It also had to confront a growing likelihood that the United States would join South Africa and other "anti-Communist" countries like Morocco and Saudi Arabia in financing and equipping the UNITA insurgency against an avowedly Marxist–Leninist MPLA. The United States believed that the MPLA's

¹*The New York Times*, December 30, 1985.

accession to power after the collapse of Portuguese rule in 1974–1975 was engineered illegitimately by Soviet-armed Cuban troops. Thus, along with South Africa and others, the United States assisted the MPLA's rivals (UNITA and the Chinese-trained Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola [FNLA]), and it has never recognized the MPLA government of Angola.

The MPLA enjoyed a psychological and diplomatic boost in September, 1985, when it hosted the eighth ministerial meeting of Nonaligned Movement countries in Luanda—which was painted, cleaned and paved for the occasion. UNITA failed to disrupt the gathering. MPLA security held, and a fleet of newly imported autos transported delegates and journalists to their meetings in the taxi-less capital.

When the second party congress convened in December to assess the first decade of Angolan independence, however, it had little to celebrate beyond survival. Short of educated cadres, obliged to import 80 percent of its commercial food supply, and unable to restore the once flourishing production of coffee, diamonds and iron ore, Angola had become dependent on Western-developed and Western-consumed oil production to keep its economy afloat. Over half its oil revenues of \$2 billion a year were spent on counterinsurgency and defense, including the maintenance of about 30,000 Cuban soldiers.

Intraparty policy debates and elections at the local and provincial levels preceded what was to be a congress of critical reappraisal and change. The delegates elected a new Central Committee which, in turn, elected a new political bureau. The results were startling. The veteran MPLA ideologue, Lucio Lara, was ousted from the political bureau and the post of party administrative secretary.

Lara was apparently held responsible for deficiencies in party organization. Also eliminated from the top ranks of the MPLA were other veteran *mestiço* leaders, notably Paulo Jorge and Henrique "Iko" Carreira. Elevated were Foreign Minister Afonso Van-Dúnem "Mbinda" and other black political and military supporters of MPLA leader and President José Eduardo dos Santos.² President dos Santos, generally viewed as a political pragmatist despite his Soviet training and Marxist rhetoric, emerged from the congress with increased personal authority, and his party emerged no longer vulnerable to UNITA charges that it was *mestiço* dominated.

The second congress also served as a forum for venting widespread dissatisfaction with economic policies that had failed to restore Angola's agriculture. Coffee production, formerly a major source of foreign exchange, had fallen from 5.2 million sacks in 1974 to 283,000 sacks in 1983. Frank and open public debate at the local level had already pointed up the need for greater attention to peasant needs and opinions. The second congress called for less emphasis on costly heavy machinery and an accommodation with "all types of enterprise in rural areas, notably family types of enterprise and private initiatives in farming and livestock."³

ECONOMICS AND IDEOLOGY

Government officials, like Minister of Planning Lopo do Nascimento, have attached central importance to the need to increase the production and distribution of goods and services to the country's seven million mostly rural citizens. Blaming a lack of skilled personnel (Portuguese rule left the country 85 to 90 percent illiterate) and the brutal disruptions of insurgency for the drastic post-independence decline in agricultural and industrial production, these officials also acknowledge policy errors attributable to ideological rigidity.

Excessive mechanization and centralization that emulated Soviet models of "scientific socialism" and development stifled agriculture. Recently, the MPLA has come to accept a need for policies that are more "realistic." Hence there are moves to raise official prices and "legalize" private trading. A legalized "trading bourgeoisie" is now seen as less of a threat to Angola's "socialist option" than a (black-market) trading bourgeoisie operating "outside the law." And the small private enterprise that is "beginning to appear in agriculture," the MPLA now asserts, may be "to the country's advantage" and may

²Membership on the newly elected political bureau included President dos Santos; Afonso Van-Dúnem "Mbinda"; António dos Santos França "Ndula"; Francisco Magalhães Pina "Nvunda"; Julião Mateus Paulo "Dino Matross"; Kundi Payama; Manuel Alexandre Duarte Rodrigues "Kito"; Pascoal Luvualu; Pedro de Castro dos Santos Van-Dúnem "Loy"; Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedalé"; Roberto de Almeida. Alternative members were António Jacinto do Amaral Martins and Maria Mambo Café.

³Interview with MPLA-PT Secretary for Ideology Roberto de Almeida, *AfricaAsia*, no. 25 (January, 1986), p. xvi.

⁴Ibid.

even "develop in other sectors of low technology where the lack of initiative from the state as well as the private sector has often led [Angolans to resort] to foreign companies."⁴ It is hoped that regulated competition between private traders (nearly an extinct category after the exodus of some 300,000 resident Portuguese in 1975) and state outlets charging official prices will bring a fall in real prices. Such thinking contrasts sharply with the MPLA's earlier commitment to rigid state centralism.

Deputy Minister of Agriculture Joaquim Russo declared in 1985 that what Angolan agriculture really needed to increase production was 100,000 hoes and 50,000 ploughs. He noted that some inefficient state farms (only 20 out of several hundred qualified as efficient) had already been disbanded and turned over to local associations of farmers and smallholders. Private farmers who had emerged in recent years, Russo added, would benefit from the same government assistance as state farms.

The record of Western as against Soviet-bloc economic involvement in Angola may well have had some influence on the evolution of MPLA thinking. The revenue-generating roles of Gulf Oil (recently acquired by Chevron), Texaco and, prospectively a new partner, Conoco, as well as of West European and Brazilian oil companies have been instrumental in keeping the government afloat. These firms are pumping from reserves estimated at 1.7 billion barrels of high-grade petroleum. Chevron's Cabinda Gulf, with Angolan assets of some \$600 million, sells over half its production to the United States. Two-way trade between Angola and the United States totals over \$1 billion annually.

Western influence has grown in other economic sectors as well. A Louisiana sugar company recently took over the running of a sugar mill from Cuban technicians unable to operate it effectively. The Massachusetts-based Arthur D. Little Company serves as financial consultant to the Angolan government and runs training courses for its technocrats. A Swedish bank has helped train personnel of the National Bank of Angola in techniques of debt management, among other banking affairs.

Strident socialist rhetoric and a deep distrust of American government policy nonetheless persist. They serve as a brake on Angolan moves toward closer association with Western economic companies and models. The MPLA leadership rejects Western concepts of political pluralism and maintains tight state control over press, radio and television. The preponderance of foreign faculty at the formative University of Angola come from Communist countries. Cultural relations with Western countries are minimal; a circumstance only aggravated by the American diplomatic boycott.

In a report to the second party congress, President dos Santos invoked a need for greater party discipline, and he reopened an issue that had seemed largely resolved, religious tolerance. In the years following independence, the party had mounted a systematic attack on the country's churches, an attack that alienated religious "believers,"

all of whom are ascriptively barred from MPLA membership. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA and himself a product of Protestant mission schooling, exploited this antireligious policy, won sympathy among urban congregations and encouraged the creation of a Church of Christ in the Bush within areas under UNITA control. In 1982 the MPLA relaxed its antireligious policies. But President dos Santos later warned the second congress against religious sects with "counter-revolutionary designs" and called for "efficient control over religious activity."⁵

During 1985, dos Santos also urged MPLA audiences to fight against "liberalism" and "individualism,"⁶ and party statements during the year stressed the need for "centralized leadership" and "control." Such rhetoric, however, may be more reflective of government insecurity in the face of economic adversity, UNITA insurgency and incursions by South African military forces than it is of any rededication to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. American banks and corporations doing business with Angola continue to be impressed by the forthright, pragmatic manner in which Angolan officials interact with them. They view the MPLA's rhetorical commitment to "scientific socialism" as less than convincing and conclude that Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba for state security and defense prevents the MPLA from abandoning an increasingly nominal commitment to Marxism-Leninism in favor of a more rewarding, market-oriented economic system.

According to recent United States government statistics, persisting warfare in Angola has generated an outflow of 360,000 Angolan refugees, principally to Zaire and Zambia.⁷ As of late 1985, the International Red Cross was flying 400 tons of food weekly to tens of thousands of malnourished Angolans living in the country's fertile central highlands. *New York Times* correspondent James Brooke reported on December 28, 1985, that "Angola's hunger has largely gone unnoticed by the outside world because the government has closed the affected areas to foreign reporters." This "unknown disaster" is attributable not to drought, as hunger is elsewhere in Africa, but to UNITA insurgents, who have made it unsafe to cultivate the land or transport crops to market. Rebel forces have effectively shut down road transport, blocked rail traffic and progressively reduced the security radius around highland villages.

⁵Dos Santos report at MPLA-Labor party congress, Radio Luanda, 0935 GMT, December 2, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Southern Africa* (hereafter FBIS), December 5, 1985, p. U3.

⁶See dos Santos's speech to national party conference, Radio Luanda, 0930 GMT, January 14, 1985, in FBIS, January 15, 1985, p. U2.

⁷Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "African Refugees," *Gist*, December, 1985.

⁸*Le Monde*, September 3, 1985.

⁹John A. Marcum, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola," *CSIS Africa Notes*, no. 8 (February 18, 1983).

One of UNITA's tactics, according to Belarmino Van-Dúnem, the head of the Angolan Red Cross, is to let peasants sow their fields and then seize the harvests. The rich soils of the central highlands, whose Ovimbundu people constitute 35 to 40 percent of Angola's population, produced abundant crops of corn, coffee and beans before independence. Today, much of the countryside has been abandoned, and as of late 1985 the Red Cross was airlifting emergency food supplies to 200,000 people.

The consequences of war-related economic failure extend deeply into the fabric of Angolan society. The school system is underfunded and understaffed; many students sent to study abroad do not return or adjust poorly when they do. The human resources needed for national development remain crippling scarce. The circularity of the government's plight can be seen in the acknowledgment by Luanda officials that the "principal cause of the persistence of guerrilla insurgency is the inability of the government to provide Angolans with the goods and services that they need."⁸ It is precisely the persistence of the externally financed and supplied UNITA insurgency that renders the government unable to respond to pressing human needs.

The Ovimbundu and other central-southern peasant societies (Chokwe, Ganguela, Ambo) constitute the ethnic support base from which UNITA has drawn its leadership and cadres. (In contrast, the MPLA's core support has centered in urban areas [principally Luanda and its ethnic Mbundu hinterland]). To date, the Ovimbundu and other southern communities remain unrepresented on the MPLA's political bureau and underrepresented on its Central Committee. MPLA officials argue that this absence can be traced to the historically uneven development of social forces and political awareness under Portuguese rule; they denounce UNITA efforts to stir up "old prejudices" against the north, where Ovimbundu and other conscript workers were sent by colonial authorities to labor on coffee plantations and in Portuguese-owned factories. The colonial practices left a legacy of prejudice and mistrust between ethnic groups of the north and south. MPLA officials also acknowledge, however, that the government's excessive administrative centralization has delayed the spread of the MPLA outside of "detribalized" urban areas.

Influenced by a long-standing multiracial and Marxist disdain for racial and ethnic loyalties, and flush with their victory in 1975-1976, MPLA military commanders reportedly assured Angola's founding President, Agostinho Neto, that the remaining southern pockets of UNITA resistance would soon be eliminated. This assessment reflected an underestimation both of the strength of ethnic loyalties and of Jonas Savimbi's political skills—rhetorical, aggregative, manipulative.⁹ The MPLA also failed to predict South Africa's response when Angola allowed the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to establish training bases, supply routes, and logistical support bases and to mount guerrilla raids from

Angolan territory into South African-administered Namibia. The United Nations General Assembly "terminated" South Africa's mandate over Namibia in 1966 and the International Court of Justice held South Africa's continuing occupation of the territory to be "illegal." Nonetheless, South Africa has evaded international pressure as formulated in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) to withdraw its army and agree to externally monitored elections leading to independence. Accordingly, the MPLA has argued that it is legitimate for it to host SWAPO guerrillas. The cost of doing so, however, has been heavy.

Since August, 1981, the South African Defense Forces (SADF) have carried out devastating annual incursions deep into Angola. These incursions have mauled Angolan government forces, destroyed communications, economic infrastructure and entire southern towns, and provided hauls of Soviet weapons for UNITA, facilitating its efforts to expand the scope of its insurgency.

As the range of UNITA activity extended northward up the eastern half of the country, reaching with occasional sabotage and ambushes into the very hinterland of Luanda itself, the government of Angola turned to the Soviet Union and Cuba for an effective counter. It diverted oil revenues from development to military purposes. It acquired sophisticated Soviet weaponry, including MiG-23's, Mi-24 helicopter gunships, tanks, trucks and—of great importance to its evolving strategy—mobile radar units.

Luanda officials believe the key to a military victory over UNITA forces lies with the Angolan air force (now piloted mostly by Soviet-trained, Russian-speaking Angolans). The effective range of government air power must be extended to cover UNITA's southeastern bailiwick. In 1985, the closest government air base was located at Menongue, about 500 kilometers from UNITA's thatched hut "capital" of Jamba (itself within walking distance of the Caprivi Strip/Namibian border). In the battle for Mavinga in August–September, 1985, South African aircraft intervened rapidly from nearby Namibian airfields, catching Angolan aircraft just as they prepared to return to base. Accordingly, "reinforcement" of the Angolan air force became, in the words of its commander, Colonel "Iko" Carreira, "essential."¹⁰

It was widely anticipated that the Soviet Union would work with Angola during the December–April, 1986, rainy season to lay the groundwork for an extension of Angolan air power. To this end, the forward placement of mobile radar units will be crucial. The next battle for Mavinga and Jamba will thus apparently require greater

antiaircraft protection for UNITA's ground forces—unless UNITA gives up the conventional, externally dependent, fixed-position warfare adopted in recent years, and returns to the self-reliant, fluid, hit-and-run guerrilla warfare to which it has owed its success and survival since 1966.

As for the SADF, it was loath to commit the full measure of its air force against an increasingly effective Angolan air force. Because of the international arms embargo against it, at least in the short term South Africa would be unable to replace any aircraft losses. Already South African aircraft are handicapped by their advancing age,¹¹ and the South Africans must rely on a decreasing margin of pilot superiority. Consequently, in September, 1985, in the wake of UNITA's close-call victory at Mavinga, a delegation of South African officials flew to Washington to plead for United States intercession to save UNITA from being overwhelmed by an advancing tide of Soviet weaponry.

GLOBAL POLITICS

In July, 1985, the United States Congress repealed the Clark Amendment (1976), which had prohibited military assistance to Angolan political groups unless such aid was specifically authorized by legislative action.* By autumn, conservative groups who view foreign policy primarily in globalist East–West terms had mobilized enthusiasm behind the notion of a second American venture into Angola. These groups saw in Angola a revanchist opportunity to roll back one of the more dramatic projections of Soviet power in the third world. The advocates of United States intervention also saw in Angola an opportunity to act on a strong ideological commitment to what they portrayed as a "revolutionary tradition" of American support for people struggling for democracy.

Central to this mounting pressure for United States government assistance to UNITA was the thesis that the intrusive roles of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola could be reduced by means of low-cost, low-intensity and low-risk United States assistance to the "contras" of UNITA. To make this case to American conservatives, Jonas Savimbi downplayed his earlier military training in

(Continued on page 229)

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*Editor's note: The amendment was drafted by the late Senator Richard Clark (D., Io.).

¹⁰Interview in *Afrique-Asie*, no. 359 (October 21, 1985), pp. 31–32.

¹¹See Gérard Prunier, "La guerre aérienne sur la frontière Angola-Namibie," *Politique Africaine* (Paris), no. 17, March, 1985, pp. 143–145.

"One doubts that the government is prepared to legitimize its own demise. It is clear, however, that President Botha has been led to appreciate the need for dramatic political steps to end the [black] unrest. . . . Still, intimidation is the language of apartheid, and this regime is fluent in its use, at home and abroad."

Race Politics in South Africa: Change and Revolt

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University

THERE was bitter irony in South African police activities during Christmas, 1985. The bastion of "Western Christian civilization" banned caroling in Cape Town's black and "coloured" townships, required special permits for traditional candlelight services, and used violence to break up a multiracial candlelight sing and procession.

To the regime, candles, hymns and vigils have evidently become revolutionary symbols. The police action was no more harsh, no more repressive, than official behavior in hundreds of other circumstances throughout the year. But aimed as it was at Christmas celebrations involving black people, it accented the South African government's insecurity.¹

In the months since August, 1984, more than 1,000 blacks and just over 20 whites have been killed in political protests. Of late, the pace of violence aimed directly at the white community has quickened (land mines on roads near the borders with Botswana and Zimbabwe, and the bombing of a shopping center south of Durban). At its June, 1985, national conference held in Zambia, the African National Congress (ANC) decided to escalate armed struggle and to hit "soft" civilian targets as well as "hard" government facilities, especially security force targets.² This recent tactical shift that strikes randomly at white civilians has led whites to pressure the government to deal more fiercely with insurgents and with neighboring governments that allegedly provide sanctuary. One distraught farmer whose wife and two children died in a land-mine explosion, said "You can tell Oliver Tambo

[president of the ANC] to beware of awakening the tiger in the Afrikaner."³

Unlike past unrest, civil disobedience, protest and violence touch virtually every part of the black population today. Racial group interests, articulated by the most dynamic and powerful spokespersons, are irreconcilable. At this stage they cannot be negotiated away. Each successive episode of spasmodic protest (Sharpeville, Soweto, and the current violence beginning in the eastern Cape in 1984) lasted longer, was deeper, was geographically more extensive, involved more people, was harder for the authorities to cap, and had shorter "quiet" periods in between.

Despite the government's declaration of a state of emergency and its efforts to hide the realities through controls on the media, the unrest has taken on a momentum difficult to end. Deaths lead to funerals, which become political demonstrations that precipitate more violence. The very presence of police and soldiers triggers the outrage that ends in bloodshed.

Some two-thirds of the deaths and a higher proportion of the injuries are the direct result of police or army operations. The other third result from black murders and mob violence aimed at blacks regarded as associates of the authorities. Black policemen, police informants, town councillors, agents of the government and their families and those who fail to cooperate with the militants' calls for boycotts are the targets. To a lesser extent, conflict between various protest organizations and their supporters has added to the unrest—Inkatha (largely Zulu) against United Democratic Front (UDF), and UDF against various black consciousness groups.⁴ Sometimes these battles take place in the guise of ideological disputes, but they occasionally reflect tribal divisions.

There is another form of black-on-black violence that is potentially more disturbing—the horribly brutal inter-communal fights, some of which are fomented by police agents. Some involve migrant laborers against settled township residents. More serious are ethnic disputes, often involving Zulus as one of the parties. They may be known as "faction fights" when only a single ethnic group is involved. In Natal, such fights account for a high

¹A political cartoon in the *Cape Times* pictured sword-wielding Roman soldiers standing under a Christmas star and announcing to the three kings searching for Jesus: "This is an illegal gathering under the riotous assembly provision of the Internal Security Act. I'm giving you three minutes to disperse." Quoted in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, December 25, 1985, p. 1.

²Howard Barrell, "'All for the Front': The ANC Conference," *Work in Progress* (Johannesburg), no. 38 (August, 1985), pp. 9-13; and "Let Us Act Together," *Sechaba* (London), August, 1985, pp. 11-15.

³Quoted in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, January 14, 1986, p. 4.

⁴Richard de Villiers, "UDF under Attack: Inkatha and the State," *Work in Progress*, no. 39 (October, 1985), pp. 33-34.

proportion of the deaths. One such incident outside Durban in January, 1986, which involved Zulus and Pondos (a branch of the Xhosas), left at least 36 dead and over 40,000 homeless.⁵

At present black opinion seems to be badly divided. Moderate blacks favor negotiation, but are divided on tactics and policy choices. More militant blacks, especially members of the UDF and some covert supporters of the ANC, argue that it is too late for negotiation. South Africa must be made ungovernable, they say, and "sellouts" must be silenced. It is possible that as the government seems less and less secure, an embryonic civil war may begin within the black majority as black leaders insist that blacks cannot successfully confront white power unless all blacks support one particular strategy.

There is little sign of abatement. The protests touch all regions, all ages, all life-styles and all issues. They embody a number of strategies and tactics—from legal protest and petition, work stoppages and consumer boycotts, to sabotage and assassination. There is also a measure of anomic mob violence—the expression of frustrations difficult to vent legitimately. Although the revolutionary groups in exile, the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), have increased their direct involvement, much of the unrest is spontaneous and locally generated.

The parlous state of the South African economy compounds the problem. The economy has slowed; black unemployment is high; capital and skills flee the country; new investment, especially from abroad, is scarce; and a good part of the country's \$24-billion debt comes due shortly. The rand fell to an all-time low in August and September, 1985. The government's repressive policies fuel the economic malaise. Political instability and economic nonperformance feed on one another.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

Government policy has been indecisive and insensitive. A combination of vague promises, marginal reforms and rigid enforcement of existing security laws has failed to stem the protest. President P. W. Botha told a National party (NP) congress that the NP is "committed to the principle of a united South Africa, one citizenship and a universal franchise, *but within structures chosen by South Africans.*"⁶ In the idiom of the NP, that qualifying phrase means that racial separation will remain the root of whatever constitutional structures are devised under NP rule.

President Botha may say publicly that apartheid is "outdated" and inappropriate for South Africa, but government policy continues to be based on racial group identity. "Group" separation continues. New homelands are moved along to "independence." Each "group" is reputed to have control over its "own affairs" and to share in decisions on common affairs. Although Botha insists

that no one group will dominate the others, in effect and by intention the white "group" remains paramount.

Possible changes in policy satisfy no one but the President and his wing of the NP. The reactionary Conservative party (which broke away from the NP in 1982) and its electoral ally farther to the right, the Herstigte Nasionale party, continue to pose a threat to the NP by registering by-election and local and provincial election victories, and by demanding more stringent enforcement of racial apartheid and an end to concessions to blacks. Within the NP, its right wing resists compromise. NP moderates and, to their left, the official opposition in Parliament, the Progressive Federal party (PFP), sense that the government is not prepared to take significant steps to share power with popular, moderate blacks. To white liberals, the government's offer is too little too late, cosmetic change to defuse the tension. Blacks are virtually unanimous in their conviction that the government is not prepared to bring them into the central government in any meaningful fashion.

Although symbolically remarkable, the repeal of both the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and those provisions of the Immorality Act (1958) that apply to sexual relations across the color line says nothing to the issue of power. Likewise, the repeal of the law barring racially mixed political parties applies only to parties contesting elections within the system. It does not change the segregated and racist basis of Parliament, which totally excludes the black 73 percent of the population (68 percent if one excludes blacks in the "independent" homelands). The large-scale constitutional revision of 1983 does not speak to black political grievances and legal powerlessness.

In addition, the government has spoken vaguely of more important social and political changes (see most recently the speech by P. W. Botha at the opening of Parliament in January, 1986), but even if all of Botha's intimations were legislated they would still be unlikely to satisfy black militants or even black moderates, the latter fast becoming irrelevant to the struggle. For example, the government proposes improved property rights for urban blacks leading to freehold ownership (as against leasehold rights), but these rights would still apply only to segregated residential areas. The President promises black participation in government, but invariably he is referring to local or provincial positions or, if he refers to the central government, roles outside Parliament.

When the government claims it will negotiate with black leaders, it refers to "elected" black leaders, homeland leaders, or those who renounce violence. Even Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Allan Boesak, a UDF patron and president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, both of whom eschew violence, are too radical for Pretoria. The dilemma is that blacks reject any individuals the government will meet with and the government refuses to talk with credible black leaders.

⁵*The Star* (Johannesburg), Weekly Air Edition (WAE), January 27, 1986, p. 1.

⁶*Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), vol. 98, no. 1 (October 4, 1985), p. 60.

A recent survey among urban blacks asked an open question: "Which leader or organization would you most like to represent you in solving problems or grievances?" Over 60 percent identified with leaders or movements that call for black rule and universal suffrage in a unitary state.⁷ The ANC or its jailed leader, Nelson Mandela, garnered 31 percent support in the survey; 16 percent favored Bishop Tutu; and 14 percent, the UDF. Only 8 percent opted for KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi or his Inkatha party, and 8 percent mentioned government or pro-government organizations.

Fully 80 percent of the respondents agreed with the proposition that

compromise is no longer possible. . . . The next step must be a unitary arrangement in which all blacks and whites together vote for their leaders, to participate without regard to race or group in one central government.

Only 20 percent favored a transitional federal structure, an option still too "revolutionary" for the government to entertain. Any apparent middle ground for compromise is narrow or nonexistent.

Government leaders have also promised that influx control (the pass-law system) would be phased out, that a common identity document for South Africans of all races would be issued to replace the hated "passes" that blacks are currently required to carry at all times, that further constitutional amendments would accommodate urban blacks, that blacks residing in homelands not yet independent would retain their South African citizenship, and that a form of dual citizenship would be arranged for homeland citizens in so-called "independent national states" (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda). But these are promises grudgingly conceded. They do not mean a significant redistribution of power or wealth or opportunity. In the view of popular black leaders, there has been little real political change.

Blacks have grown accustomed to hearing government commissions, staffed by reformers in the NP, calling for elaborate change. Yet the government is fearful of its own less-reformist white constituency. The bogey of white backlash is trotted out before every election and party congress. So the NP elite waters down or ignores the recommendations of reformers, bending minimally to retain power. In September, 1985, in the latest such exercise, the President's council called for the abolition of influx control and the pass laws, an orderly urbanization policy not based on racial discrimination and developed in concert with blacks and uniform identity documents for all South Africans. Presumably the only restriction on urbanization would be housing availability.

The business magazine *Financial Mail* called this a "blueprint for a funeral." The "jugular" of apartheid has been "nicked," it went on, "in what could easily become the most important social change in SA's recent history."⁸ One doubts that the government is prepared to

legitimize its own demise. It is clear, however, that President Botha has been led to appreciate the need for dramatic political steps to end the unrest. Even if all his recommendations were implemented, the lack of political rights, the Group Areas Act (residential segregation), race classification, unequal education and employment opportunities and racist attitudes remain. To the ANC, nothing short of a complete transfer of power to "the people" in a "united, democratic and nonracial country" will suffice.

Some outspoken black critics call for a national forum to rewrite the ground rules for South African society. The black clergy, the UDF, liberal whites, and some homeland leaders (Buthelezi and KaNgwane's Chief Minister, Enos Mabuza) join the chorus. They do not agree on who should participate and the nature of their charge. More moderate are the PFP, Inkatha and perhaps the Solidarity party in the Indian House of Delegates. These are parties that function, albeit in protest, within the present legal structures of homelands and the Parliament. Missing, of course, are the real combatants, the government and the UDF. The ANC, the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), and the National Forum, the black consciousness-socialist body, reject the convention idea out of hand.

The government says that it is prepared to negotiate (the operative word should be consult) only with blacks who renounce violence and revolution. But the government's own policies virtually guarantee that no popular black voice would so qualify and that no popular black would risk sitting down with the government. The UDF, the South African Council of Churches, black clergy like Bishop Tutu and Anglican Bishop Suffragen of Johannesburg, Reverend Simeon Nkoane, moderate black trade unionists, even the Black Sash and the South African Institute of Race Relations, have renounced violence but have not abandoned their call for a revolution in power relationships. So the government is left with pliable homeland leaders, suspect "elected" town councillors, and a few others who have been, ipso facto, rejected by the people. The government refuses to admit that the vast majority of blacks see Botha's reforms as a re-formation of apartheid, not its abolition.

The government is also troubled by the ANC's Nelson Mandela, who poses an enormous threat, although he has been in prison for 23 years. If he should die in prison, the political consequences might be grave. He underwent prostate surgery late in 1985. The government sought to negotiate his release at that time, but it has insisted that he renounce violence and go into exile. Mandela has proudly refused those terms. Botha has even offered a prisoner trade with the Soviet Union and Angola. Meanwhile, Mandela's stature grows; he holds firm and the government's standing declines.

Dreading lost votes and a greater division in the white electorate because of concessions, the government has characteristically responded to unrest with force. One

⁷Ibid., vol. 97, no. 12 (September 20, 1985), p. 64.

⁸Ibid., pp. 42-43.

Cabinet minister offered this representative opinion:

In the short term, the priority must be to get the security situation under control. Kid-glove handling will do SA more international harm than the shock effect of the tough, hard but efficient approach.⁹

The use of force has been so insensitive and heavy-handed that commentators have begun to wonder if the police and the South African Defense Forces (SADF), or individuals within the forces, may be pushing the government along by a ferocity that the government feels it must vindicate and rationalize.¹⁰ Top UDF leaders, clergy and trade unionists have been detained. There have been deaths in detention and charges of widespread torture. Some detainees have been charged with treason, because the government tries to prove that there are links between UDF and the ANC. More recently, there has been a pattern of intimidation of political opponents by death squads allegedly answerable either to the authorities or to the political right wing. These death squads appear to be immune from apprehension and prosecution. Reverend Nkoane has twice been attacked. Victoria Mxenge, a lawyer who was defending UDF members being tried for treason, was assassinated in August; her husband had been assassinated earlier. Eastern Cape leaders Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata were found murdered. Winnie Mandela's house in Brandfort was torched. The list goes on.

In July, the government declared a state of emergency. Mass funerals were banned in specific magisterial districts, but that order has been impossible to enforce. All UDF meetings are banned. In some areas, schoolchildren who boycott classes are arrested, yet in other areas schools are regarded as hotbeds of trouble and have been closed by the authorities. Police violence is widespread, as trigger-happy, mean-spirited or just frightened police attack peaceful (but provocative) protesters. Much of this

⁹Ibid., vol. 97, no. 9 (August 30, 1985), p. 66.

¹⁰See Glenn Frankel, "Army's Repressive Role Alarms Black, White South Africans," *Washington Post*, October 23, 1985; and "Police Must Be Disciplined" and "Bring the Army Back in Line," *The Star*, October 1 and 2, 1985.

¹¹*The Star*, WAE, November 18, 1985, p. 11; and *The New York Times*, December 29, 1985.

¹²See Kenneth W. Grundy, "Pax Pretoriana: South Africa's Regional Policy," *Current History*, vol. 84, no. 501 (April, 1985), pp. 150-154.

¹³Richard Weisfelder, "'Peace' from the Barrel of a Gun: Nonaggression Pacts and State Terror in Southern Africa," in Michael Stohl and George Lopez, eds., *Foreign Policy and State Terror* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986).

¹⁴For a critique of the policy see "Hawks Ascendant," *Financial Mail*, vol. 97, no. 13 (September 27, 1985), pp. 36-41. It is defended by right-wing Member of Parliament Louis Stofberg in *The Star*, WAE, January 27, 1986, p. 14.

¹⁵"Angola: What South Africa Faces," *South Africa Digest*, October 4, 1985, p. 906; and "Minister Discloses Links with UNITA," *Paratus* (Pretoria), vol. 36, no. 10 (October, 1985), pp. 22-23.

¹⁶*Africa Research Bulletin* (political series), vol. 22, no. 10 (November, 1985), pp. 7825C-7827B.

violence is now hidden from scrutiny by censorship aimed mostly at foreign television crews.¹¹ Still, intimidation is the language of apartheid, and this regime is fluent in its use, at home and abroad.

REGIONAL POLICY

With the signing of the Nkomati Pact of Nonaggression with Mozambique early in 1984, it appeared that South Africa's relations with neighboring governments were about to enter a normal, more quiescent phase.¹² Having bullied neighboring governments, South Africa apparently intended to stabilize the region through force of arms and planned to institute a new, economically expansive order to complement its diplomatic and its earlier military offensives. But Nkomati unraveled.¹³

As the domestic situation deteriorated, Pretoria and particularly the hawks in the SADF and the State Security Council, the country's powerful inner cabinet, tried to eliminate any threat on South Africa's borders and to sever links between revolutionaries within South Africa and their support groups in neighboring states. Even if Pretoria failed to achieve these goals in the region, preemptive or retaliatory incursions would notify nearby capitals that they were vulnerable to South African military force. Hence, they had better abandon their assistance to revolutionaries, send the ANC packing or, even better, cooperate with Pretoria in its defense of the status quo.¹⁴

A list of just a few of the more important crossborder incursions illustrates the point. Repeated raids into Angola continue, ostensibly to attack South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) concentrations and bases. These military operations also include air and land support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola), the regionally based opposition to the Angolan government. In September, the SADF admitted for the first time since 1975 that it was providing "material, humanitarian and moral" to UNITA.¹⁵ When the Luanda government launched a massive attack in August against UNITA's stronghold in the southeast, direct SADF intervention was crucial to turning back the offensive.¹⁶

Earlier, on May 22, SADF special units were apprehended in Angola near Cabinda in the act of preparing to sabotage oil storage tanks at the Gulf Oil facility, fully 880 miles from the Namibian border. The operation was clearly not aimed at SWAPO or at collecting intelligence on the ANC, despite the official cover story.

Across the continent, South African aid to the Resistên-

(Continued on page 227)

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"The United States now relies on the strategic materials provided by a narrow range of foreign producers, increasing its vulnerability and, under specific conditions, influencing foreign policy decisions. But the United States is not a helpless giant. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that an administration commitment to a strategic minerals policy would ameliorate the serious problem of import vulnerability."

The United States and South Africa: The Strategic Connection

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SOUTHERN Africa is one of the world's most volatile regions, and one of the richest in terms of strategic minerals.* The issues are inflammatory; the stakes are high on all sides. The problems for United States policymakers do not yield to simple solutions. Indeed, the challenges a great nation encounters in international politics are nowhere more clearly outlined than in the United States relationship with South Africa.

President Ronald Reagan's policy of constructive engagement is based on the premise that the United States can help bring about democratic change, that American ideals and interests can prevail, and that we must "engage ourselves in the politics of the real world for moral and strategic reasons," dealing "with the difficult moral choices that the real world presents to us."¹ A debate has surrounded American-South African relations in recent decades. As tension and violence periodically escalate, the debate on South Africa's strategic significance to the United States has been rekindled along the following lines. On one side are those analysts who maintain that the United States is too dependent on Pretoria's resources for its national security needs to make any dramatic policy changes. Others have concluded that despite inconvenience, both economic and political, the United States can distance itself from South Africa without posing a significant threat to American national interests.² An analysis of the United States-South African strategic relationship can provide a clearer understanding of the political realities, policy choices and alternative strategies

available to the United States in this decade and beyond.

The 1974 oil embargo made clear the extent and the consequences of American dependence on foreign sources of supply and vulnerability to stoppages of strategic materials. Ironically, in the lexicon of strategic and critical materials, oil does not rank as high as manganese, chromium and the platinum group metals, because the United States is an oil-producing nation with abundant domestic reserves. In contrast, it possesses little or uneconomic resources of nonfuel materials. Yet the impact of the oil embargo on consumers and business in terms of across-the-board inflation, supply disruption, and inconvenience was overwhelming. In fact, it can be argued that the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) embargo set in motion dramatic economic and political changes across America. It raised the prospect of future interruptions, including strategic nonfuel materials, thereby widening the arena of American dependence on foreign suppliers and its vulnerability to political upheaval in producer countries like South Africa. By the late 1970's this situation had provoked enough concern in Congress to develop a nonfuel minerals policy that would reduce American vulnerability.

In the South African context, the term "strategic" can be conceptualized in two ways. First, a material is considered strategic to the United States because of the vulnerability of its supply to interruption, and because of the critical nature of its uses in applications essential to American national defense and the civilian economy.³ Second, in the East-West equation, "strategic" refers to South Africa's geopolitical significance to the United States in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. Without strategic materials like chromium, manganese and the platinum group metals (PGM's), "we really couldn't make a jet engine."⁴ The extent of American dependence is made clearer when one considers the fact that each engine that powers the F-15 fighter requires over 1,600 pounds of chromium, and "almost all of it comes from the Republic of South Africa and . . . the Soviet Union."⁵

The United States annually imports more than \$1 billion in chromium, manganese and platinum for the industrial economy and the national defense. Manganese

*An earlier version of this article appeared in *The American Foreign Policy Newsletter*, vol. 8, no. 6 (December, 1985). Reprinted by permission.

¹Speech by Secretary of State George Shultz to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, New York, October 2, 1985.

²"Don't Lose Sleep Over Strategic Metals," *Fortune*, September 30, 1985, p. 23.

³United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), *Strategic Materials: Technologies to Reduce U.S. Import Vulnerability* (Washington, D.C., June, 1985), pp. 11-12.

⁴Statement by William Owzarski, Pratt and Whitney Company in "Nova: The Cobalt Blues," PBS Television, November 23, 1982 (transcript).

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1.

Table 1: Outlook for the Development of Known Domestic Deposits of Strategic Resources

| | Chromium | Cobalt | Manganese | Platinum |
|------------------|----------|--------|-----------|----------|
| Alaska | — | — | — | 1-2 |
| Montana | 3 | — | — | 1-2 |
| Missouri | — | 2-3 | — | — |
| Idaho | — | 2-3 | — | — |
| California | 2-3 | 2-3 | — | — |
| Minnesota | — | 3 | — | 3 |
| Overall Domestic | — | — | 3 | — |

— Not applicable.

1 Economic at current prices.

2 Marginally economic to subeconomic; under consideration for exploitation.

3 Subeconomic—not considered for commercial exploitation at current metals prices.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

and the platinum metals are almost nonexistent in the United States, and where limited amounts of strategic materials like chromium exist, they are currently uneconomical to mine because of undesirable grade or potentially low yield. On the other hand, the vast South African strategic reserves include 74 percent of the world's reserves of chromite ore. Most of the world's manganese reserves are held by the Soviet Union and South Africa, and these two countries also own the world's platinum. Together, South Africa and the Soviet Union "hold some 95 percent of the world's vanadium reserves, 94 percent of its manganese, 90 percent of its platinum group metals, 84 percent of its chrome . . . and an important proportion of other strategic minerals."⁶

According to such statistics, there can be little doubt that South Africa is strategic to the United States economy and national security. In terms of American foreign policy, however, the operative questions are the following: Must we continue on the present course or is there a way out of the dilemma? Are there policy options that would free the United States from strategic dependence while protecting our national security? It is precisely the need to reduce strategic reliance and provide greater flexibility in our southern Africa policy that has generated congressional inquiries into alternative strategic minerals policy. Table 1 shows the outlook for the development of selected strategic resources in the United States.

In contrast to the United States, few countries have

⁶"Strategic Minerals in the 1980's (Paper presented by W. W. Malan, vice president of the South African Chamber of Mines; Rome, November 25, 1980). Chromite ore is the original ore from which chromium is produced after certain impurities have been removed. Manganese is a hardening agent used in steel making. Vanadium is used as an alloy to make high-strength, lightweight steel. Platinum is a noncorroding metal that is used as a catalyst in alloys. These metals are used to produce strategic materials, particularly jet engines, for the defense industry.

⁷The OTA study was requested by the House Committee on Science and Technology and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

been as inordinately endowed with such a concentration of the world's mineral wealth as the Republic of South Africa. In addition, South Africa's technological expertise and highly developed infrastructure have made it a very attractive trading partner for the United States. South Africa figures prominently as a producer of 11 of 27 of the world's critical minerals. Of these, manganese, chromite ore and the PGM's are of particular concern to United States defense and civilian industries.

Successive American administrations have hesitated to confront the fact that the United States relies on the critical materials of South Africa to satisfy its strategic and industrial needs. Without substantial evidence to challenge the prevailing view that the United States cannot do without South Africa's critical materials or that if it attempts to do so it will find itself at the mercy of the Soviet Union, little policy reevaluation can be expected. Since 1980, however, several congressional reports have focused on strategic minerals policy options. House and Senate studies have focused on alternatives to United States minerals dependence, and have tried to fashion a comprehensive, workable plan in place of the present ad hoc minerals policy. According to the most recent findings prepared by the United States Congress's Office of Technology Assessment, data that parallel the Senate Foreign Relations Committee findings, a national nonfuel minerals policy could significantly reduce reliance on South Africa and the Soviet Union, while maintaining the integrity of United States strategic interests.⁷

Thus, a key assumption of administration policy has come under congressional scrutiny. Although present minerals dependence is acknowledged, both congressional inquiries question the premise underlying the President's South Africa policy, that is, that we must continue on the current course, relying on existing foreign sources and technologies because they are cost-effective, reliable and abundantly available. This is not to suggest that dramatic changes in United States minerals procurement and supply can occur overnight, but that policy options are feasible and in the long run will be politically cost-effective.

Under present circumstances, the United States needs South Africa's critical minerals and metals. No single approach to the problem will reduce American dependence. Instead, a combination of technical and economic strategies, in conjunction with the political will to implement them, is the starting point for a minerals policy that can, over time, provide political leverage and strategic security.

The administration must set in motion a comprehensive national minerals policy based on the necessity to reduce United States vulnerability to potentially unstable sources of supply and, in cooperation with the private sector, to provide the economic incentives to overcome barriers and inconveniences that may lie in the way of a more favorable position.

Such a policy would not constitute an immediate deci-

sive break in American–South African trade relations, but it would mark a transition in the nature of that relationship. From the United States vantage point, that relationship would be less subject to the vicissitudes of continuing violence and upheaval. The United States must make advance preparations for the possible disruption of supplies. A comprehensive nonfuel minerals policy “formulated in cooperation with our allies should be a national priority. Failure to take prompt action will risk repeating in southern Africa the same mistakes we have made in the Middle East.”⁸ The most promising approaches include stockpiling, conservation, research and development of advanced technologies and a search for alternative suppliers. These policy alternatives should be adopted as soon as possible to enable Washington to deal with supply disruptions, should they occur, without jeopardizing vital American interests.

STOCKPILING

In the case of the four critical materials that the United States imports from South Africa—chromium, manganese, vanadium⁹ and the platinum group metals—stockpiling is an effective way to cushion dislocations caused by supply cutoffs and to provide the defense requirements of a protracted conflict. The United States stockpile is predicated on a three-year conventional war on several fronts. A comprehensive policy would raise the levels of these critical materials to a minimum three-year standard. (This is the recommendation of independent congressional research groups.) Enlarging the stockpile of platinum, for example, to a three-year supply level was suggested as a means to “ease the adjustment to any interruption in South African supplies. . . . Adaptation could be facilitated by a . . . policy of increasing stockpiles prior to any cutoff.”¹⁰

At present, a lower priority has been put on the stockpiling of critical materials. The Reagan administration has had on hand an approximately 2.5-year supply of chromium, an almost 2-year supply of manganese ore and an 8-month supply of ferromanganese. In 1985, it adopted as a policy “one year’s peacetime levels of imports for such materials. . . .”¹¹ The stockpile is being reduced despite the conclusion in 1978 of the United

States National Materials Advisory Board that “the United States is strategically more vulnerable to a long-term chromium embargo than to the embargo of any other natural resource including petroleum.”¹²

CONSERVATION TECHNOLOGIES

Conservation, in the form of the reduced consumption of strategic materials, recycling, substitution and design changes where applicable, provides another promising alternative. Present import levels can be significantly reduced through a variety of techniques. For example, “chromium consumption could be reduced by 35 percent . . . within 5 years and by 64 percent within 5–10 years,”¹³ by developing industrial processes that consume less chromium, and by recycling and substituting advanced materials like ceramics and composites. In addition, the recovery of chromium from steelmaking, industrial, and chemical waste has begun to rise in the past few years,¹⁴ partly because of the federally mandated cleanup of air and water, which has contributed to the knowledge of conservation technology.

The ability of the United States and the Western democracies to adjust to disruptions in the supply of platinum group metals from South Africa depends on reduced consumption and recycling. Under a comprehensive policy, nonessential uses of platinum could be diverted to defense and the industrial sector. Research and development in the automotive and petroleum industries—major civilian users of platinum—have already reduced consumption through alternative technologies for auto emissions control. More could be done. The petroleum industry currently uses platinum in the refining of high-octane gasoline to control auto pollution. The development of “lean-burn engines capable of using low-octane gasoline, and the possible substitution of non-platinum catalysts, could eliminate this use of platinum.”¹⁵ Finally, the demand for newly mined platinum group metals can be reduced because their major applications are catalytic. Since the platinum is not consumed, the potential for recovery from scrap is very great. It is estimated that “about 70 percent of platinum in the United States is used for catalytic purposes and that 70–80 percent of the platinum catalysts now scrapped are salvageable.”¹⁶

Despite these advances, the strategic minerals recycling industry is a new one. It needs updated information and government encouragement to continue developing recycling technology. Coordinated effort undertaken by government agencies and the private sector will be necessary in the areas of minerals exploration and research and development of other conservation technologies that are vital to the success of a strategic minerals policy.

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

Like other political and economic entities, private corporations act in their own interests as they perceive them. They cannot be expected to undertake the enor-

⁸United States Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the United States and the OECD Countries*, September, 1980, p. xii.

⁹Geological studies show that vanadium is plentiful in the United States, so it is not considered further in this article.

¹⁰*Imports of Minerals from South Africa*, p. 17.

¹¹The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *National Defense Stockpile Policy*, July 8, 1985, p. 2.

¹²*Imports of Minerals from South Africa*, p. 12.

¹³United States National Academy of Sciences, National Materials Advisory Board, *Contingency Plans for Chromium Utilization* (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 87.

¹⁴Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit.

¹⁵*Imports of Minerals from South Africa*, p. 16.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

mous costs of developing advanced minerals technologies to meet national security needs without economic incentives and administration guarantees of compensation for the risks involved. To this end, the administration can use fiscal policy as a stimulus for minerals research and development. Such stimulation would include tax advantages like depreciation and retrogressive taxes telescoping deductions into shorter time frames. In the area of risk compensation, the government can underwrite the bulk of new investment for conservation technologies and minerals exploration.

Guarantees for certain corporate ventures have been successfully used in the domestic economy and for targeted areas overseas. For example, OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, is a federal agency that encourages American business abroad by guaranteeing much of the risk of private investment considered important to United States foreign policy objectives. In addition, the administration can activate the provisions of existing legislation, like Title 3 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, which "authorizes direct Federal subsidies, purchase commitments, loan guarantees and other instruments to assure availability of essential defense materials and industrial processing capabilities."

Incentives could also be used to encourage investment in the infrastructures of targeted third world countries that need to upgrade productivity and make their current operations more efficient.

ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS

Although South Africa and the Soviet Union have a preponderance of the world reserves of strategic materials, the needs of America's defense industry and the economic well-being of its industrialized society can increasingly be satisfied through trade with alternative suppliers. There is no single approach to a comprehensive minerals policy, but the adoption of such a policy, in conjunction with other strategies, would signal a move away from dependence. A strategy of diversification and action to expand the range of foreign suppliers and domestic producers would give the United States greater control over strategic materials while ensuring a stable flow of goods.

Admittedly, minerals produced elsewhere may be less desirable than those processed by the technologically sophisticated industries that the South Africans have developed without peer. All things considered, however, American worry about strategic vulnerability in the South African context is overwrought. Manganese producers include Australia, Brazil, India and Gabon. All these countries are major suppliers to the United States.

In the case of chromium and the ferroalloy-processing industry, there is no long-term alternative to reliance on southern Africa, because Zimbabwe and South Africa possess about 99 percent of the world's known chromium

resources (about 35 billion tons of ore). If these supplies were unavailable, "chromium resources in the rest of the world would be exhausted in 21 years at 1975 rates of consumption."¹⁷ However, supply disruptions lasting that long are implausible, and it is unlikely that disruptions from Zimbabwe and Pretoria would occur simultaneously. By promoting increased trade with Zimbabwe and other producers like Turkey, and by assisting domestic producers to be more competitive, the United States can diminish, although it cannot entirely eliminate, its reliance on South Africa.

Despite Soviet and South African domination of the world's reserves of PGM's (the United States, Canada and Colombia combined have only about 1.3 percent of known quantities), there are reasonable prospects for some domestic production of platinum group metals. With advanced technologies, substitution and recycling, United States dependence on imported platinum can be significantly reduced.

The implications are clear. The United States now relies on the strategic materials provided by a narrow range of foreign producers, increasing its vulnerability and, under specific conditions, influencing foreign policy decisions. But the United States is not a helpless giant. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that an administration commitment to a strategic minerals policy would ameliorate the serious problem of import vulnerability.

BARRIERS TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Ironically, while emphasizing a strong America and increased defense expenditures, the Reagan administration has not yet carried out all the provisions of the 1980 materials act. Intended to give the executive branch greater control over managing the problem of import vulnerability, the act "requires the Executive Office of the President to assume a more active role in coordinating and formulating materials policy beginning with a . . . materials . . . plan to be submitted to Congress by the President on a one-time basis."¹⁸

A strong America requires independent national security policies based on specific goals and timetables. How can we account for the apparent discrepancy between administration words and action? Two possible explanations suggest themselves. First, despite years of civil unrest in South Africa, the volatility of the region and the implications of strategic supply disruptions, the administration does not envision a meaningful change in the politics of the status quo in South Africa. Even so, the assumption that revolutionary violence can be contained or that the policy of constructive engagement will produce a more stable environment for peaceful change should not preclude serious consideration of advance preparations to protect United States vital security interests.

Second, a prominent feature of President Reagan's political style and philosophy has been the call to reduce the size and role of the federal government. But in the

¹⁷National Materials Advisory Board, op. cit., p. 37.

¹⁸Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., p. 45.

area of strategic materials research and development, American national interests demand that the government be a critical player. How to reconcile this dilemma? Ideology and rhetoric must make way for the pragmatism of political reality.

In the past, President Reagan has exhibited a pragmatic side, moving from previously held ideological positions to a more flexible response to key advisers and congressional and world leaders. The same pragmatism must apply to the urgent issue of strategic materials, so that the United States can import more of these materials from countries other than South Africa and the Soviet Union.

Trade in critical materials is one aspect of the United States strategic relationship with Pretoria. The other strategic question deals with the geopolitics of the region, that is, South Africa's military significance for the West and the impact on American interests of a Soviet presence in southern Africa.

Pretoria's economic trade with the West belies the extent to which the political and military relationship has eroded in the postwar years. South Africa has no formal military arrangements with the United States or the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) nations that affect Western security. South Africa is not an equal partner. Even its historically close military relationship with the British no longer exists because, in 1975 (two years before the United Nations mandatory arms embargo), London unilaterally abrogated the 1955 Simonstown Agreement with Pretoria "that formalized long-standing imperial cooperation for South Atlantic naval defense. . . . The republic's few gains in its effort to become a legitimate Western defense partner have proved to be remarkably ephemeral."¹⁹

South Africa serves no significant military interest for the United States or its allies, despite the President's world view and his perception of the role the United States should play in world politics. Regardless of the lack of military interest, it can be argued that South Africa has traditional ties to the West, is strongly capitalist, staunchly anti-Communist, and a loyal and dependable trading partner, while the Soviet Union, influential in Angola, Mozambique and among guerrilla groups in southern Africa, presents the gravest danger to American interests.

Soviet moves to control the strategic minerals and trade routes of southern Africa cannot be foreseen with certainty because of the difficulty of separating Marxist-Leninist revolutionary doctrine from the caution and pragmatism of day-to-day Soviet foreign policy. But we do know how Soviet leaders have behaved in the past under given circumstances, and this can tell us something about future actions.

Since Stalin, Soviet interests have been the centerpiece of Moscow's foreign policy, and are likely to remain so

under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. During the period of United States-Soviet détente, for example, President Leonid Brezhnev was negotiating trade policy and most-favored-nation status with the United States while America was deeply involved in war with Soviet-supported North Vietnam. Despite the loss of American influence in the Persian Gulf after the fall of the Shah of Iran, Soviet leaders did not challenge American access to the Strait of Hormuz, which is much closer to their border than the Cape routes. It is unlikely that they would risk confronting the United States directly on any issue considered to be vital to American interests.

The fear of a Soviet stranglehold on the strategic resources of the West should be balanced by the realization that the United States and its allies have similar options on resources of strategic importance to Moscow, including the natural gas pipeline and American wheat shipments that are vital to the economy and stability of the Soviet system. Indeed, despite long-range ideological aims, Soviet foreign policy in southern Africa will probably be cautious in the next few years. Gorbachev must avoid being perceived in the West as adventuristic; instead, he must convey an image of prudent statesmanship in a bid to legitimize and consolidate his power.

A realistic approach to American foreign policy in South Africa suggests setting an agenda defined by American interests and recognizing the limits of United States influence and power. South Africa remains an area of strategic interest to the United States, but its significance will diminish over time as a strategic minerals policy is implemented.

The administration's policy of constructive engagement was designed to encourage incremental democratic change to dismantle the structure of apartheid. Despite the fact that this policy has proved ineffective, it is in the interest of regional stability that the United States continue to promote peaceful change. Clearly, in South Africa the environment is revolutionary. The United States cannot successfully pursue a policy that does not recognize this. While it serves no American interest to help topple the government of South Africa, it is not in the interest of the United States to intervene covertly or overtly to save Pretoria.

Despite our best intentions, the United States may not be able to stop what is in motion or to help Pretoria move more quickly toward institutional change. Americans must reflect realistically on the constraints imposed on United States foreign policy by the entrenched power and revolutionary challenge in South Africa. Nevertheless, United States policymakers must continue to seek just and workable solutions for all the people of South Africa, black and white, as they struggle for political power and survival. ■

¹⁹Chester A. Crocker, "Current and Projected Military Balances in Southern Africa," in Chester A. Crocker and Richard E. Bissell, eds., *South Africa in the Eighties* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 77.

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"While the administration retains many of its regional goals in southern Africa, the events of 1985 made them harder to achieve. . . . South African domestic and regional violence prompted widespread American criticism of [the United States policy of] constructive engagement, and the Reagan administration was forced to abandon this policy in the absence of significant South African reform. Administration policies toward Angola and Mozambique were also altered."

United States Policy in Southern Africa

BY HERBERT HOWE

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IN 1985, the United States lost control of its policies in southern Africa. The administration of President Ronald Reagan was pressured by a strong lobby critical of apartheid and by a conservative movement opposed to the Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique. Events in southern Africa and domestic pressure compelled the administration to bypass its policy of constructive engagement. Instead, it adopted an increasingly aggressive policy toward South Africa, supplied "covert" military aid to guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi in southern Angola, and withdrew its request for military assistance to Mozambique.

Chester Crocker, the United States assistant secretary of state for African affairs and author of the policy of constructive engagement, had hoped that quiet diplomacy, coupled with economic assistance, would help bring about peaceful changes in the states of southern Africa. These changes, in turn, would facilitate reform on the part of an increasingly pragmatic South African government.

The Reagan administration had planned to serve as an honest broker in Namibia and Angola. South Africa had refused to honor United Nations Resolution 435, which called for a cease-fire and internationally supervised elections in Namibia. SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization) troops based in Angola were infiltrating into Namibia to combat South African troops, which were defending a government established by South Africa.

The Reagan administration hoped that Cuba, the Soviet Union and South Africa would withdraw all troops and advisers from Angola, and that Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) would enter into a coalition with the Soviet-backed MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the party governing Angola.

A peaceful Angola would have at least two important effects on East-West relations. Communist influence in

¹Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy For Change," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1980-1981, p. 345.

²George Shultz, "Southern Africa: Toward An American Consensus" (Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1985).

³Crocker, op. cit., p. 345.

the region would diminish, because Angola would have less need for expensive Soviet military equipment and Cuban troops. In addition, a unified Angolan government would turn to the West to assist its economic development. In part to allay South African concern about Cuban troops in Angola, the Reagan administration pressed for the reciprocal removal of both South African and Cuban troops from Angola.

Constructive engagement also meant strengthening the stability of Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Despite the Marxist philosophies of Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Mozambique's President Samora Machel, Crocker proposed increased economic assistance to both these governments in the early days of the Reagan administration. The United States would not "operate on the basis of a Marxist/non-Marxist litmus test in the choice of regional partners" because of "a widening gap between rhetoric and performance."¹ Crocker also suggested that the United States might provide military aid for Zimbabwe and Mozambique if they were threatened by South African destabilization.

The administration hoped that regional stability would lay the groundwork for significant reform in South Africa. Thus, in April, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz told the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., that "a white government that no longer sees itself as besieged from outside its borders will be better able to take the steps it must to reform its own society."²

The United States encouraged the South African government to begin an "evolutionary change" that would lead to a nonracist and democratic government friendly to the United States. As part of its evenhandedness, in 1982 the administration permitted the export to South Africa of "dual-use" equipment that had military application, including computers and hospital airplanes. The State Department believed that economic pressure in the form of sanctions would be counterproductive.

Several assumptions governed constructive engagement. First, the Reagan administration would initially concentrate on regional stability. "Conflicts in Namibia and Angola," wrote Crocker at the end of 1980, "seem tantalizingly close to some resolution."³

Second, the South African government of President

Pieter W. Botha was regarded as pragmatic and amenable to reform. Third, in large part because of its coercive powers, the South African government would continue to hold the initiative. Fourth, in any event, United States policy could play only a limited role in the region. To dampen hopes for dramatic United States pressure on South Africa, Crocker suggested that the United States should "underpromise and overdeliver—for a change."⁴

THE END OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

Nineteen eighty-five sounded the knell for many of these hopes. South African domestic and regional violence prompted widespread American criticism of constructive engagement, and the Reagan administration was forced to abandon this policy in the absence of significant South African reform. Administration policies toward Angola and Mozambique were also altered.

South Africa's upsurge of violence began in the Vaal triangle near Johannesburg in August, 1984, and spread throughout most of the country during 1985. In July, 1985, the South African government declared a state of emergency, which granted increased powers to the police and the army.⁵ South Africa's security forces could not quiet the unrest, and by December the violence had claimed about 1,000 lives. Until the government imposed severe restrictions on foreign journalists, television and print media reported the violence almost every day.⁶

The violence in turn spurred the growth in the United States of an informal and ideologically diverse coalition that opposed United States policy in the region. The lobby's success stemmed from media coverage of South Africa's repression of its black opposition, and from the fusion, however paradoxical, of American black and conservative opposition to apartheid and to United States policy. The violence triggered substantial American antipathy toward the Pretoria government and publicized

such articulate black leaders as the Reverend Alan Boesak and Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu.⁷

The Free South Africa movement (FSA), established in Washington, D.C., in late 1984, opposed constructive engagement because it was "soft on apartheid." A loose coalition of groups and individuals, FSA sparked the interest of American blacks. In late 1984, FSA began its ongoing protests outside the South African embassy in Washington, D.C. Significant numbers of American blacks saw the struggle in South Africa as part of their struggle for equality in the United States, and they expressed deeper concern about United States policy. Some observers believe that the FSA, established less than a month after Ronald Reagan's overwhelming reelection, has worked as a "useful proxy" against the Reagan administration's domestic policies.⁸

American conservatives, traditional allies of South African governments, joined the coalition against administration policy in 1985. The Conservative Opportunity Society, with members like Congressman Vin Weber (R., Minn.), Newt Gingrich (R., Ga.), Robert Walker (R., Pa.) and Jack Kemp (R., N.Y.), saw South Africa as a "genuine moral issue"⁹ as well as a political issue that might give the moral high ground to the Democratic party. Along with other observers, they also worried about the anti-American sentiment spreading throughout the black townships of South Africa.¹⁰

Conservatives who continued to support Pretoria, notably Patrick Buchanan, expressed bitterness at this American intratribal conflict. Buchanan, later the administration's director of communications, labeled the COS the "turncoat of the year,"¹¹ while others termed the organization the Conservative Opportunist Society.

Increasingly pressed by the growing black and conservative coalition, Washington called for South African reforms, and asked the South African government to meet with respected South African black leaders, including Nelson Mandela, the jailed leader of the African National Congress (ANC). However, the government of President Botha followed promises of reform with verbal backpedaling and physical repression. In January, 1985, at the opening of the new Parliament, Botha spoke of opening new communication channels with black leaders, but he followed this with the arrest of leaders of the United Democratic Front and a police crackdown in the black township of Crossroads that left 16 dead. Commented the *Baltimore Sun*: "The world is left to wonder with whom Mr. Botha intends to consult."¹²

By midsummer, 1985, pressure was building for changes in South African policy. The decision by American banks not to roll over short-term loans spurred a financial crisis in South Africa,¹³ and Congress was discussing a sanctions package. Other Western nations were pressuring South Africa; Canada placed limited but muscular economic sanctions on South Africa, and France suspended new investment. But the Reagan administration,

⁴Crocker, op. cit., p. 351.

⁵The order was rescinded in early March, 1986.

⁶The *New York Times* reported that "South Africa's agony has become America's living room theater." "The Lost White Tribe," *The New York Times*, March 29, 1985.

⁷A *Washington Post*-ABC News poll showed overwhelming American support for South Africa's black majority. "American's Back S. Africa's Blacks," *Washington Post*, September 25, 1985.

⁸Simon Jenkins, "America and South Africa: Anti-apartheid without Tears," *The Economist* (London), March 30, 1985, p. 17.

⁹Weber was quoted in "South African: Sanctions Issue Divides U.S. Conservatives," *Washington Post*, August 22, 1985.

¹⁰They also worried that the South African government could be providing fertile ground for Soviet influence.

¹¹"South African Sanctions Issue Divides U.S. Conservatives," *Washington Post*, August 22, 1985. Buchanan made this comment on December 28, 1984.

¹²"Apartheid: At It Again," *Baltimore Sun*, February 21, 1985.

¹³Following Chase Manhattan's announcement that it would not roll over \$400 million in short-term loans, American banks refused to roll over about \$1 billion in short-term loans. Subsequently, the South African government froze all external loan repayments.

although it stepped up its verbal criticism of Pretoria,¹⁴ continued to insist on the correctness of its policy.

The growing Western reaction to South African policy left the United States in apparent isolation. The *Washington Post* suggested that "in defending its policy, [the United States] has too often seemed to be defending apartheid."¹⁵ This conclusion was strengthened when, on August 26, President Reagan characterized the Botha government as a "reformist administration" that had produced "substantial changes," including "[the elimination of] the segregation that we once had in our own country."¹⁶ However, the White House was embarrassed when the Reverend Jerry Falwell, a close ideological ally of the Reagan administration, denounced Bishop Desmond Tutu as "a phony."¹⁷

Early in August, top South African officials, including Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha, had predicted that "important decisions" would be announced when President Botha addressed Nationalist party members in Durban later that month. Faced with a sanctions package against South Africa that would clear both houses of Congress, the Reagan administration welcomed this news. National Security Council Adviser Robert McFarlane informed South African officials that the United States Congress would override a presidential veto on the sanctions package unless President Botha announced significant changes.

On August 15 Botha promised major change. "I feel that we are today crossing the Rubicon in South Africa"; "there can be no turning back."¹⁸ Yet Botha's Rubicon speech included few specific reforms, and it further weakened constructive engagement by maintaining South Africa's disregard for outside concern.¹⁹

Botha's speech was a bitter disappointment to the Reagan administration. Peaceful persuasion, a keynote of constructive engagement, was clearly limited in scope. Although in late August President Reagan had stated that he was "basically opposed to the idea of punitive sanctions," on September 9 he issued an executive order placing sanctions on South Africa.

Why the change? Administration officials realized that

¹⁴White House spokesman Larry Speakes said that "the South African government . . . is a basic cause of the violence South Africa is witnessing today." "U.S. Officials Bid SA Open Talks with Blacks," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1985.

¹⁵"Africa Policy: In the Shredder," *Washington Post*, July 15, 1985.

¹⁶"Reagan Portrays Pretoria's Rulers as Seeking Change," *The New York Times*, August 27, 1985.

¹⁷"Falwell Denounces Tutu as a 'Phony,'" *The New York Times*, August 21, 1985. The White House said Falwell had been "overenthusiastic." "Reagan Expected To Veto South African Sanctions," *Washington Post*, August 22, 1985.

¹⁸"Speed 'Pace Of Change,' U.S. Urges South Africa," *Washington Post*, August 16, 1985.

¹⁹Botha said, "We have never given in to outside demands and we are not about to do so." "Botha Rules Out Wide Concession To Black Demands," *The New York Times*, August 16, 1985.

the South African issue could prove politically harmful in the 1986 congressional elections. Congress would undoubtedly override a presidential veto of economic sanctions and create an impression of presidential weakness. In addition, a presidential veto followed by a congressional override would send a mixed rather than a clear message to South Africa. A veto followed by a congressional override could also affect administration programs on agriculture, trade and tax revision. Finally, President Reagan may have been influenced by the lack of South African reforms since Botha's ballyhooed August 15 speech.

The executive order banned computer exports to various South African government agencies, prohibited most exports of nuclear goods and technology, and banned the importation of Krugerrands and most bank loans to South Africa. But the order rejected the Senate's proposal to tie future sanctions to "significant progress" in eliminating apartheid.

The executive order was largely symbolic but it eliminated the threat of a more comprehensive sanctions package in 1985 and diminished the partisan appeal of the apartheid issue in the 1986 elections. The American debate would no longer divide over constructive engagement versus sanctions. Congressman Steven Solarz (D., N.Y.), a leading foe of apartheid, commented that "[President Reagan] has changed the nature of the whole debate over whether to impose sanctions." On the international level, the order probably influenced the September 10 decision of 11 West European nations to impose trade, cultural and military sanctions. The order may make it more difficult for the United States to oppose any proposed United Nations sanctions, and it has undoubtedly affected both white and black resolve in South Africa.

Ironically, by the end of 1985 an administration that had begun and in many ways remained one of the friendliest American administrations toward South Africa had gone further than any other administration in taking strong action against South Africa.

In 1986, Congress will probably defeat any bill that ties a threat of further sanctions to South African reforms. More likely of passage is legislation increasing educational aid to black South Africans or eliminating American landing rights for government-owned South African Airways. Following his September sanctions order, President Reagan characterized his policy as "active" constructive engagement. In line with this change of emphasis, the State Department will probably increase its criticism of South African policies while verbally supporting many of the goals and actions of black South Africans.

The Congress and the Reagan administration have increasingly criticized South Africa, but they have sent

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"Independence was won in Zimbabwe in 1980 after eight years of divisive guerrilla warfare . . . In some respects Zimbabwe is still a nation waiting to be born . . . [However,] Zimbabwe has the capacity to lead Africa toward a more genuine, longer lasting process of nation-building. Time has certainly not run out."

Zimbabwe's Elusive Quest for Unity

BY RICHARD W. HULL

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IN late 1985, Zimbabwe took another small step toward becoming a de jure one-party state. Discussions on unity between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) resumed in October after a hiatus of nearly three years. They followed a three-month postelection government crackdown on ZAPU party cadres.¹

The talks progressed in an atmosphere of extreme caution and mutual suspicion and by late February, 1986, they had reached another impasse. ZANU officials insisted that their party name remain unchanged, while ZAPU negotiators called for a break with the past and an entirely new party designation. ZAPU also demanded the lifting of the national state of emergency, in effect since Rhodesian days, because its powers allow detention without trial. Another precondition for a merger was the release from detention and jail of all political prisoners. Some top government officials called for ZAPU's total destruction, and hard-liners in ZAPU accused Nkomo of selling out his own Ndebele ethnic group, who make up approximately 17 percent of the country's 8.4 million citizens.² Indeed, the question of a ZANU-ZAPU merger has created considerable turmoil among the leaders of both parties.

For the first time, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo agreed, in somewhat ambiguous terms, to the goal of unity within a one-party system. But the big question remains: Will the Ndebele rank and file, who have suffered from several years of government harassment, and the so-called antigovernment dissidents in the bush accept a merger? The central government has done little to restore Ndebele confidence and trust.

ZAPU's bargaining position has steadily eroded since the country's independence in 1980. In 1982, when ZAPU's position was somewhat stronger, Nkomo rejected Mugabe's call for a merger; as a result the coalition government collapsed and Nkomo was dismissed from the government. Mugabe then purged ZAPU members from his Cabinet and from the army and security forces.

Today, there are few if any former ZAPU military officers either in the national army or in the now greatly strengthened and unified Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and Special Branch police.

Since the collapse of the coalition government, the regime's hated Fifth Brigade, together with the police and intelligence forces, have staged periodic raids in Matabeleland on the offices, homes and businesses of ZAPU officials, claiming that the party has been aiding antigovernment dissidents.

Human rights organizations, including the highly respected Amnesty International and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, have issued many reports accusing the police and ZANU party thugs of systematically abducting and torturing ZAPU loyalists and harassing their families. But ZANU hard-liner Enos Nkala, who oversees the police, is convinced that national unity cannot be achieved until ZAPU is totally eliminated, even if it requires extraconstitutional means.

ZAPU is not the only opposition party that has been attacked by ZANU. In February, 1985, five members of former Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) were assassinated and scores of other party functionaries simply disappeared during the first six months of 1985. Muzorewa, fearing for his own life, withdrew from politics altogether and went into voluntary exile overseas. But the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the founder of ZANU more than two decades ago (he lost control of the party before independence to the Mugabe wing), stayed in the election fray and won a lone seat.

In the last half of 1985, hundreds of ZAPU loyalists were arrested or detained, among them six members of Parliament (including the chief party whip) and seven Bulawayo city councillors. After the 1985 national elections, Mugabe sacked the last ZAPU Cabinet member and asserted that thenceforth his Cabinet would be made up of only ZANU card carriers.

In Matabeleland, where the Ndebele predominate, local government remains under ZAPU control. ZAPU won overwhelmingly in the Ndebele constituencies in the 1985 national elections. However, its influence in the central government and in the security forces has never been weaker. ZAPU holds 15 of the 30 black seats in the

¹*Africa News* (Durham, N.C.), October 7, 1985; *The Economist* (London), December 14, 1985, p. 38.

²*Africa Economic Digest* (London), July 6-12, 1985, p. 47.

National Assembly, but that body has lost much of its independence and legislative authority. These painful realities compelled Nkomo to initiate the new merger talks. Ideologically, 62-year-old Mugabe and 67-year-old Nkomo are committed socialists and have remarkably similar ideas about their country's future. But long-standing rivalry and mutual distrust, as well as fundamental differences in personality, make the quest for national unity frustratingly elusive. Some Zimbabweans argue that it will take another generation of leaders to achieve that goal. There is a growing fear of a Ugandanization of Zimbabwe, meaning a bifurcation of the country along ethno-geographical lines. Some Ndebele talk of an eventual independent Republic of Mtwakazi, a name derived from precolonial times. Many conservative whites in South Africa and some KwaNdebele homeland officials surely favor such a solution.³

Prime Minister Mugabe has repeatedly pledged that he will move toward national unity and a one-party system in a constitutional manner. In the process, he would like to abolish the 20 legislative seats reserved for whites under a constitutional mandate. A party merger would enable him to increase ZANU's 64 legislative seats to 79 of the 80 seats reserved for blacks. Subsequently, he could achieve enough votes to abolish this arrangement constitutionally. Many white Zimbabweans fear that such a move would exacerbate race relations and constitute a setback in the quest for national unity. Other whites maintain that politics should be left to the black majority and that the racially divided electoral rolls are an anachronistic holdover from colonial times.

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

In June and July, 1985, Zimbabwe held its first general elections since independence in an atmosphere of high tension between the Shona and Ndebele. Strong divisions of opinion among whites were also evident. The white electorate, voting separately, gave former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) party an upset victory, raising its parliamentary representation from 7 to 15 seats. But the results may not have shown the concerns of most whites. Political apathy is growing among white Zimbabweans and fewer than half the white population of approximately 140,000 even registered to vote. Of these, slightly more than half voted for the Conservative Alliance.

Smith's strength lies with the older, less affluent white commercial farmers in Matabeleland and with retired civil servants in provincial towns like Bulawayo. In Harare, where most of the better educated professional

whites are concentrated, the vote went strongly to candidates of the Independent Zimbabwe Group (IZG), which favors the present regime. However, the IZG secured only 4 seats, down from 13.

Chris Andersen, the only white remaining in Mugabe's Cabinet, won on his own independent ticket. Nevertheless, Mugabe angrily reacted to the Smith resurgence by sacking his extremely effective and popular white minister of agriculture, Denis Norman, whose policies were largely responsible for reviving the country's rural sector. Norman was replaced by Moven Mahachi, a man of considerable competence but with a reputation of having little sympathy for the white commercial farmers. Mugabe and Norman had been on excellent terms, but the Prime Minister took the opportunity to punish the farmers who voted for Ian Smith. The angry Mugabe also rushed through an act requiring adults holding dual citizenship to renounce all foreign allegiances or face denationalization. Surprisingly, most whites opted for Zimbabwean citizenship.

Despite the Smith electoral upset, race relations in Zimbabwe are remarkably good, especially among urban middle class blacks and whites. White flight from the country has slowed, and in 1985 there was a net immigration as more than 1,000 white farmer families returned to take advantage of improved economic conditions.⁴

In the second round of last year's elections, ZANU won 76 percent of the black vote, a 13 percent increase from the 1980 returns. ZAPU secured only 18.4 percent, down from 24 percent.⁵ Unfortunately, voting followed tribal lines, and ZAPU won all the votes in Ndebele constituencies. By all accounts, the elections were free and fair, and nearly 80 percent of the black electorate cast ballots. Mugabe, running unopposed, was reelected to a second five-year term as Prime Minister.

But for ZANU and Mugabe it was a kind of Pyrrhic victory. The party and Prime Minister had failed to win broad support from non-Shona populations and therefore could not claim national leadership. There was considerable communal urban violence in the election's immediate aftermath. Shona youth and women attacked Ndebele homes in a Harare suburb and in Midlands province. These events made it painfully clear to some Zimbabweans that national unity cannot be achieved through threats and strong-arm tactics.

Despite his stridently Marxist rhetoric, Prime Minister Mugabe's policies continue on a moderate, pragmatic course. He has purged, rusticated or deported many Trotskyites and Marxist hard-liners.⁶ With few exceptions, the government has refrained from forcibly nationalizing foreign and local companies. Instead, it has made every effort to increase its degree of ownership of key private enterprises. Maurice Nyagumbo, minister for political affairs and a leading Politburo member, has assured businessmen that "the private sector should be left alone to compete with the public sector . . . so the state gains technology and management experience."⁷

³Richard W. Hull et al., "Zimbabwe Country Report," *Country Political Risk Reports* (New York: Frost and Sullivan, 1985).

⁴*The Economist*, June 8, 1985, p. 87.

⁵Jan Raath, "Elections Bring Zimbabwe Closer to Single-Party Rule," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 9, 1985.

⁶Personal field notes, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 18, 1985.

⁷*Los Angeles Times*, April 1, 1985.

The private sector is still nourished by government subsidies, and the sanctity of private ownership of property has been assiduously maintained. The regime also winks at the growing involvement of its public servants in business enterprises, despite a leadership code that forbids it. Mugabe has not enforced his demand that Cabinet ministers sell their businesses and properties or resign. To avoid embarrassing themselves and the regime, many government officials have quietly transferred their assets to proxy owners, usually friends or distant relatives. At the same time, the Prime Minister is trying to stem the brain drain from government to the higher paying private sector. Staff losses have already had a deleterious effect on government efficiency.

A growing number of Africans are beginning to articulate a specifically capitalist ethic. While political and ideological constraints on indigenous capitalist ambition are increasing, the opportunities for private African enterprise as well as foreign investment are steadily growing. In late 1985, the government gave an enthusiastic nod to the largest private-sector investment since independence. A major British firm will invest in a 12,000-hectare palm-oil project that is expected to generate 10,000 jobs. Zimbabwe has strong, deeply rooted capitalist institutions, established by white entrepreneurs who are now bringing in black partners. Black and white nonpolitical organizations have begun to merge into single entities. Race relations are remarkably good among members of the now multiracial Zimbabwe Farmers' Union, the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, and the powerful Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries.

Zimbabwe could very well become a testing ground in Africa of the strength of private capitalism against state capitalism. John Iliffe may be correct in his view that "the future of Zimbabwe is absolutely vital to the future of capitalism in Africa."⁸ In many respects, grass-roots capitalism is alive, well and growing in the "Marxist" Republic of Zimbabwe. Capitalism is one of the few institutions that crosses racial and ethnic lines in Zimbabwe. Ironically, it seems to be doing more than anything else to maintain a sense of national unity and purpose within the indigenous economic community.

However, it is threatened by the growing inequality and maldistribution of wealth and by the relentless pressure on land resources. Mugabe has failed to fulfill his preindependence pledge of settling the landless in rural areas. The new land acquisition bill enables the government to expropriate "unproductive" land that is suitable for habitation. But Mugabe is reluctant to seize white lands that are producing food for the potentially volatile urban masses and earning vital foreign exchange from cash crops.⁹

⁸John Iliffe, *The Emergence of African Capitalism* (London: Macmillan, 1983).

⁹*African Business* (London), October, 1985, p. 56.

¹⁰*Economist Intelligence Unit*, Fourth Quarter, 1985.

¹¹*Africa Economic Digest*, December 7, 1985.

Still, one cannot avoid for long the distressing fact that the population growth rate of about 4 percent is one of the world's highest, and employment opportunities have not come close to matching it. More than 58 percent of Zimbabwe's population is less than 15 years old, and the economy needs to grow by 8 percent a year just to keep pace. ZANU will not be able to expand its popular base unless it can solve this dilemma.

Clearly, white lands that are not in production will have to be released for African cultivation and habitation in the very near future. If absentee white landowners do not become more flexible on this issue, expropriation may be unavoidable. Many white Zimbabweans have come to that realization. Whites also recognize that greater state participation in certain key sectors of the economy is a political imperative that is in keeping with ZANU ideology. The public sector has expanded since independence and is bound to grow more rapidly as the economy improves and as more revenue is available for greater state participation.

The recently passed minimum wage legislation, which raises the wage floor by 15 percent, cannot even match the inexorable pressure of inflation. But the law is not widely enforced, in part because white farmers and manufacturers argue that they need capital to rebuild inventories and to purchase the spare parts and the raw inputs required to boost production. Some economists argue that the minimum wage law will only slow the growth in employment and speed the transition to less labor-intensive instruments of production. They caution that more than 80,000 school-leavers are expected to enter the job market in 1986 alone.¹⁰ And there is also the problem of finding employment for army veterans. Mugabe is well aware that the unemployed veterans of World War II were first to join the nationalist movements aimed at overthrowing the colonial regimes.

AN OPENING TO THE EAST?

In 1986 Zimbabwe will host the annual summit of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and Mugabe will serve as NAM's chairman until 1989. To strengthen Zimbabwe's policy of "positive nonalignment," the Prime Minister made brief visits in 1985 to Communist nations, including North Korea, Rumania, Bulgaria, Cuba and the Soviet Union, as well as to key nonaligned countries like China and Yugoslavia. His itinerary also included the United States. This was Mugabe's first official state visit to the Soviet Union and it marked a détente with Moscow.¹¹ Significantly, Mugabe was accompanied by his defense minister, Ernest Kadungere, a Cabinet member who would like to see closer Soviet-Zimbabwean military cooperation.

As the nonaligned summit approaches, Mugabe wants to strengthen his image as a leader not tied to a single great power. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe continues to encourage Western investment, to favor Western imports, and to draw heavily on the West for technology and

expertise. The role of the World Bank and other Western financial institutions remains substantial and Western aid far exceeds any aid from Communist bloc countries. Official United States aid programs since 1981 exceed \$380 million (much is in outright grants).¹² Total American public and private assistance is estimated to surpass \$500 million.

Nevertheless, Soviet and East German military and technical assistance, minuscule in comparison to aid from the United States, is slowly expanding. Soviet leaders have put pressure on their old friend Joshua Nkomo to come to terms with Mugabe, who received most of his aid and training from the People's Republic of China during the struggle for national liberation. Zimbabwe has never completely trusted the Soviet Union. Thus it has severely circumscribed the activities of the African National Congress (ANC) because many of its executive members are officers in the Communist party of South Africa (CPSA), which, by its own admission, is directly linked to Moscow. Consequently, the ANC headquarters is located across the border in Lusaka, Zambia.

The ANC's rival, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), is an exclusively black liberation movement that is hostile to Soviet influence. Historically, the PAC has been close to ZANU. During Zimbabwe's struggle for liberation, PAC supported ZANU and helped train its guerrilla army. That crucial assistance has never been forgotten by the ZANU leadership. However, as official host to the Nonaligned Movement, Mugabe is trying to be more evenhanded with the two organizations. The ANC presence in Zimbabwe has grown dramatically over the last year. Recently, ANC guerrillas were allowed to infiltrate South Africa from Zimbabwe. The South Africans are now threatening to retaliate by destabilizing politically volatile Matabeleland, which could lead to a full-scale secessionist movement, not unlike the one in Angola.

THE ECONOMY: A FRAGILE REVIVAL

Zimbabwe is currently enjoying one of the fastest economic growth rates in Africa, and it has become the envy of the continent. The return of near normal rainfall in 1985 after the worst drought in a half century has been a major stimulant to this dramatic economic revival. The economy is growing at nearly 6 percent per year, agricultural production has increased by nearly 30 percent, and the country is again exporting maize and sorghum.¹³ Both white commercial farmers and African peasant producers have profited. Indeed, bold government incentives, including hefty rises in producer prices and low-cost seed and fertilizers have resulted in historically unprecedented food output from the peasant sector.

The new five year development plan, launched in January, 1986, will place much greater emphasis on

¹²*African Recorder* (New Delhi), July 2-15, 1985, pp. 211-212.

¹³*Africa News*, October 7, 1985, p. 4.

¹⁴Jan Raath, "Zimbabwe Peasants Reap Huge Harvest," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 17, 1985.

¹⁵*Africa Economic Digest*, November 2, 1985, p. 18.

peasant farming and small-scale industrial development in rural areas.¹⁴ Manufacturing and mining have fared less well than agriculture, though they have shown marked overall improvement. As a result, the country's balance of payments situation has improved, net currency reserves have grown, the current account has a surplus, and the inflation rate has fallen from 20 percent to 9 percent.¹⁵ Consumer demand is at its highest peak since independence.

The good news must be balanced against a number of gnawing realities. Some economists caution that the dramatic improvement in the trade balance in 1985 was largely the result of substantial reductions in vital imports. They also note that the high debt service ratio continues to limit Zimbabwe's ability to borrow in international capital markets. The budget deficit is presently about 10.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Rapidly spiraling inflation is also a serious threat. Recent deep cuts in consumer subsidies and the rising cost of bread, beer, coal and electricity, not to mention the projected rises in minimum wages, will surely fan the flames of inflation. So will the 22 percent and 27 percent hikes in gasoline and diesel prices, respectively, and the projected 18 percent rise in net government expenditures.

To moderate this anticipated inflationary spiral, the Central Bank recently introduced a series of stringent credit control measures. The bank has further warned that the credit squeeze will be tightened if the money supply continues its rapid rise. But defense expenditures alone are expected to rise by nearly 17 percent because of political turmoil in neighboring South Africa and Mozambique.

South Africa, Zimbabwe's major trading partner and the country through which more than 90 percent of Zimbabwe's trade passes, threatens the country's economic recovery. The weak South African currency has made Zimbabwe's exports less competitive. Moreover, to protect its own ailing industries, South Africa has slapped a

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One year after a military coup, Sudanese leaders "must balance the need for strong leadership with the desire for popular participation in politics. . . . The Sudanese have shown themselves willing to accept strong leaders if civilian leaders prove unable to resolve the great problems of creating a national consensus, integrating the southern region effectively and strengthening the Sudanese economy."

The Sudan after Nimeiry

By JOHN O. VOLL

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THE Sudanese revolution in April, 1985, overthrew the regime of President Gaafar Nimeiry. The current effort to create a new political system for the Sudan is the fifth since the formal structures of colonial rule were dismantled in the early 1950's, and it is a critical transition for the largest country in Africa. The Sudanese face choices that will determine the very survival of their country. Moreover, the size and the location of the Sudan give events there an international importance. The Sudan is part of Africa and the Middle East, and its political course reflects and affects the broader interactions of those two regions. The United States, the Soviet Union and the regional powers in the Middle East and Africa all have interests that are affected by the successes and failures of political leadership in the Sudan.

Nimeiry's regime fell after a period of mass demonstrations and strikes. At the time of the coup, Nimeiry was visiting the United States. When he tried to return, the head of the armed forces, General Abdul Rahman Siwar Dhahab, and a group of officers took control of the government. Their stated purpose was "to save the country and its independence, to avoid bloodshed and support the people."

A carefully structured transitional regime emerged. The military leaders formed a Transitional Military Council (TMC), which is the power center. A civilian Cabinet was created after vigorous negotiations. The new Prime Minister, Jazuli Dafallah, was a leader in the alliance of professional groups and political parties that had played a key role in organizing strikes and demonstrations in March and April. The Cabinet included people from almost all parts of the political spectrum. (The exception was the large, mainly southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement led by John Garang.) The TMC and the Cabinet set a goal of elections and a civilian government by April, 1986.

Nimeiry came to power in 1969, at a time when most Sudanese were disappointed with their political leadership. Initially, he had substantial support, and his ac-

tions raised hopes that major long-term problems facing the Sudan could be resolved. By the end of the 1970's there were grounds for guarded optimism. However, by early 1985 it was apparent that the "era of reconciliation had become the era of perpetual crisis" and that Nimeiry had "lost his capacity to survive" as the leader of the Sudan.¹ The failure of the Nimeiry regime was caused by problems that would have been difficult for any Sudanese leader to solve and by the difficulties created by the character of Nimeiry's leadership. The current leaders can change the style of leadership but they face the same basic problems.

Leadership style has always been an important political issue in the Sudan, with governments alternating between rule by a strong individual and by a more consensus-oriented form of politics. No strong leader emerged at independence, and parliamentary politicians were unable to create an effective national consensus. General Ibrahim Abboud took control of the government and ruled from 1958 to 1964, but his strong individual leadership was unable either to create a consensus or to impose conformity. He was overthrown and a second parliamentary period followed from 1964 to 1969. Again, political fragmentation created problems, and stronger executive leadership from the military was welcomed when Nimeiry took control in the May Revolution of 1969.

Nimeiry based his leadership more on the politics of survival than on ideological commitment. He dealt with allies and opponents alike with a continual mixture of attack and reconciliation. He survived by careful balancing rather than by developing effective political institutions. His willingness to accept compromises had the potential for effective leadership, but his manipulation of those compromises led to opposition and division.

The current Sudanese leaders must balance the need for strong leadership with the desire for popular participation in politics. Popular organizations are so strong that they can never be ignored for long, but the long-term problems facing the Sudan require policies that may not always please those groups. The Sudanese have shown themselves willing to accept strong leaders if civilians are unable to resolve the great problems of creating a national

¹Scott H. Jacobs, "The Sudan's Islamization," *Current History*, vol. 84, no. 502 (May, 1985), p. 205. The earlier optimism is shown in John O. Voll, "Reconciliation in the Sudan," *Current History*, vol. 80, no. 470 (December, 1981).

consensus, integrating the southern region effectively, and strengthening the Sudanese economy.

ISLAM AND CONSENSUS

Achieving a national consensus in a context of religious and ethnic pluralism is a continuing challenge to Sudanese leaders. There were disagreements even in the early days of nationalism. In most countries under imperial rule, nationalists had a common enemy and could agree on the goal of independence. In the Sudan, however, nationalism emerged in two competitive forms. One advocated unity with Egypt and received the support of the Khatmiyyah order, a major Islamic organization led by the Mirghani family. This order was represented politically by the National Union party (NUP), which was led by Ismail Azhari. The other nationalism called for a separate, independent Sudan and was supported by the Ansar, the organization of the followers of nineteenth-century Islamic leader Muhammad Ahmad Mahdi; the Ansar's political party was the Ummah.

Independence in 1956 came as a result of agreement between the leaders of the two nationalist groups. But the broader issue, the nature of the Sudanese state, was not resolved. For the most part, early nationalists came from the northern regions of the country and were Muslim. Islamic leaders and groups played major political roles in the independent Sudan. However, even among these Muslim politicians there was little agreement about the role of Islam. Although Sudanese politicians could not appear to reject Islam, they could not impose a particular interpretation on the whole Sudanese Muslim community, let alone the country as a whole, with its large non-Muslim population.

By the early 1980's, Nimeiry had begun to advocate a more specific Islamic program. In 1977, he created a committee to Islamize Sudanese laws, but this seemed at the time a token gesture because of the committee's relatively slow progress. However, in September, 1983, Nimeiry began a program of thorough and literalist Islamization in the Sudan. Specific interpretations of Islamic law were imposed, often on non-Muslims as well as Muslims. Nimeiry's program of Islamization aroused a wide range of opposition, even from those who had long advocated a more direct and active Islamic role in Sudanese politics. Sadiq Mahdi, a great-grandson of the Mahdi and the leader of the Ummah party, was jailed for his opposition to Nimeiry's program. Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, an Islamic intellectual reformer who had been a strong supporter of Nimeiry's, was executed for heresy in January, 1985, and his followers, the Republican Brothers, were suppressed. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist Islamic organization that had advocated a more literalist application of Islamic law and had cooperated with Nimeiry in the early days of the Islamization program, was suppressed early in 1985, and its leaders were jailed.

Nimeiry attempted to clarify the relationship between

Islam and the Sudanese state. Although this was a major subject of conflict and a major obstacle to political consensus, Nimeiry's methods were not appropriate for resolving the issue. Instead, because of Nimeiry's style, even strong advocates of an "Islamic state" became part of the opposition. As a result, there was open conflict over the role of Islam among the Sudanese Muslims and the non-Muslim communities. Although the tensions between the Khartoum government and the southern Sudanese had already led to a renewal of fighting, Nimeiry's Islamization program aroused the opposition of his long-standing southern supporters, Joseph Lagu and Abel Alier.

The new leaders of the Sudan face a difficult situation in dealing with the broad issue of Islam and national consensus as well as the narrower issue of coping with the heritage of Nimeiry's program. One important element in Nimeiry's overthrow was the widespread opposition to his Islamization program. However, united opposition to Nimeiry's program provides no basis for an effective consensus. Southern opponents of the program and some northern groups, like the Sudan Communist party (SCP), call for the full abrogation of the "September Laws" and the establishment of an essentially secular state. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic National Front (INF) advocates the continued application of Islamic law and opposes only those aspects of Nimeiry's Islamization program that are the mistaken products of Nimeiry's personalized approach. The Muslim Brotherhood argues that Nimeiry's program was not authentically Islamic and that a proper program of Islamization would benefit the Sudan.

Between these two positions, the more traditional political groups center around the Ansar's Ummah party and the parties associated with the Khatmiyyah and the political traditions of Azhari. These groups advocate Islamic influence in terms of general principles like consultation rather than a literal application of specific Islamic practices.

The Sudan's current leaders are subject to contradictory pressures. Nimeiry's program aroused the hopes and expectations of many believing Muslims while it raised real fears of a forcibly imposed religion in the minds of most non-Muslims and even some Muslims. The government must attempt what may be an impossible task: to balance these hopes and fears in order to create a more effective political consensus. This balance cannot appear to be a rejection of the idea of applying Islamic law and it cannot allow the imposition of specific Islamic regulations on non-Muslims or on Muslims with different interpretations of Islam.

NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

Several characteristics distinguish the southern third of the Sudan from the northern regions of the country. The description of the north as "Arab and Muslim" and

the south as "non-Arab and non-Muslim" ignores many important factors, but it is a simple guide to the north-south division, which has been accentuated by historical experience and imperialist policies.

The heritage of interregional mistrust and suspicion was an important problem for the leaders of the independent Sudan. These leaders came primarily from the north and they made matters worse. After the mutiny of southern soldiers in 1955, the Sudan experienced a long civil war between groups in the south and the central Sudanese government. One of Nimeiry's great achievements was a negotiated end to this conflict in 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement. The key to this settlement was recognition of southern regional autonomy; the agreement gave the south a separate regional parliament and cabinet. While there were continued tensions, the "southern problem" had apparently been solved.

Nimeiry's personalized style of rule made it difficult for him to maintain a significant area, like southern regional politics, in which he was not directly involved. There were openings because of the diversity of the south itself. In the late 1970's, southern politics became embroiled in political turmoil and confusion. In 1981, Nimeiry intervened directly, dissolved the southern regional government, and divided the south into three separate regions. Joseph Lagu and other non-Dinka leaders supported this action because it limited the political influence of the Dinka, the largest ethnic group in the south. However, many Sudanese regarded the move as an abrogation of the 1972 agreement, and fighting broke out in many areas. By 1983, Lagu had come to see Nimeiry's policies as a threat, since the policies diluted southern political influence.

The largest opposition group in the region, under the leadership of John Garang, was the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). By 1985, the SPLM was the major source of opposition in the south, although it is not a southern separatist or even a southern rights movement. Garang proclaims that the SPLM's goal is the liberation of the whole Sudan. The SPLM calls for all Sudanese to rise against the domination of what it calls the "ruling pseudo-Arab nationalist bourgeoisie in Khartoum."² The SPLM advocates a major restructuring of Sudanese society, not a simple restoration of southern regional autonomy. The group has received significant support from Nimeiry's enemies, particularly the governments in Libya and Ethiopia, and has won some sympathy among the northern Sudanese.

The SPLM is the major anti-Nimeiry group that did not participate in the political arrangements following Nimeiry's overthrow in April, 1985. A brief cease-fire was proclaimed by the SPLM, but Garang demanded the

withdrawal of the military from politics and the virtually immediate creation of a government along SPLM lines. Neither General Siwar Dhahab nor the more traditional political groups were willing to agree, so Garang did not participate either in the TMC or in the Cabinet. Both fighting and discussions continued. Late in 1985 Garang presented what he termed "five conditions for any serious and meaningful dialogue with the system in Khartoum."³ These were: 1) cancellation of the Islamization laws; 2) organization of a national conference to discuss the Sudan's problems; 3) resignation of the TMC and the current Cabinet; 4) lifting of the state of emergency; and 5) cancellation of all pacts with foreign countries.

These conditions were not accepted by the TMC, but the government in Khartoum planned to convene a national conference, with or without the SPLM. In addition, the TMC worked to establish better relations with Libya and Ethiopia, which might reduce their support for the SPLM. Although American policymakers disapprove of the Sudan's friendly relations with Libya and Ethiopia, they recognize the importance of stability in the Sudan for United States interests and they maintain a high level of aid to the Sudan.

North-south relations continue to be a source of conflict. The tensions created during the last years of Nimeiry's rule are not easily put to rest, and Nimeiry's overthrow did not end the revived civil war. However, the absolute positions of the SPLM should not obscure the involvement of many prominent southern leaders in the transitional regime and in all aspects of Sudanese politics. The conflict in the south remains, however, one of the Sudan's most pressing issues.

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

The Sudan is identified as a debtor nation; and debt-repayment problems surfaced during Nimeiry's last years. The domestic financial measures required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to insure the Sudan's international credit status caused a rapid rise in basic food prices in the Sudan; this contributed to unrest and led to a number of serious demonstrations.

The "debt problem" and Sudan's place in the international economy were made worse by Nimeiry's policies. However, the Sudanese had inherited an economy with serious problems from the colonial era. The transportation system was limited, and other basic economic structures could not support a real improvement in the country's standard of living. The modern sectors of the economy depended to a significant extent on the export of cotton and the success of agricultural development, but both exports and development frequently posed problems. In 1958, 1964, 1969 and 1985, opposition to the government was fueled by the belief that the leaders had seriously mismanaged the Sudanese economy. The magnitude of the debt in 1985 added to the Sudan's problems.

Class differences had long been a cause for some discontent; there had been charges of corruption, and for

²"Stated Position of the Rebels," *Horn of Africa*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1985), p. 40.

³United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* January 2, 1986, p. Q6.

decades there were calls for "the poor masses" to rise up against the rich. However, it was not until the late 1970's that a conspicuously wealthy class began to emerge. In the "old days," even the relatively wealthy were not easy to distinguish from other Sudanese; visitors to the Sudan in the 1950's and 1960's frequently commented on the lack of a vigorous class consciousness among the Sudanese. By the 1980's, there was a much more visible contrast between the living conditions of the residents of the large houses in the growing southern part of Khartoum and the living conditions of the thousands of refugees from the famine areas of the western Sudan.

By 1985, the economic problems of the Sudan had become much more than balance-of-payments problems or no new loans from international banks. The distribution of wealth was creating a real and visible gap between the rich, who seemed to be benefiting despite all the problems, and the poor, who were apparently increasing in numbers and misery.

Current leaders must make significant progress in both these problem areas. For reasons of stability, the government must quickly and visibly improve the conditions of the poor. This means significant action not just in the central cities but also in the provinces, where little has been invested. Southerners complain that little borrowed money found its way into the south; the same complaint is heard in the western province of Dar Fur and the eastern rural areas.

As long as the government is seen as ignoring the needs of these areas, it will be difficult to establish a significant sense of national consensus or stability. However, the government will not be able to make significant progress in improving living conditions if, at the same time, it must impose economic austerity measures required by the IMF and creditor banks. To balance these two, the Sudan will need continued large-scale support from the United States; without that aid, the situation in the Sudan could easily become anarchic.

CURRENT POLITICS

The fall of the authoritarian Nimeiry regime was followed by a year of intense political activity. There was a high level of free expression, and many political groups emerged to help define a new political system to succeed Nimeiry's. Looking at this political activity, a potentially dominant grouping or individual is hard to find. There are several strong individuals, but none seems to be in a position to assume a role like Nimeiry's, because of the lack of political consensus and because most Sudanese do not want someone like Nimeiry. They hope to create a more consensual system and, for the foreseeable future, are likely to be wary of a strong leader.

In the year following the overthrow of Nimeiry, the political arena was a mixture of old and new political elements. The traditional political parties reemerged. The impact of almost 16 years of nonparty politics was not clear. However, the parties are not as strong as they

were in the days when "the Sayyids"—Sayyid Abdul Rahman Mahdi (1885–1959) and Sayyid Ali Mirghani (1878–1968)—dominated the political scene through the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah.

The Ansar was a cohesive group in Sudanese politics under Sayyid Abdul Rahman, and its Ummah party was a major political force. The death of Abdul Rahman in 1959 and the death of his son and successor, Sadiq, in 1961, left the Mahdist leadership unprepared. Hadi, a son of Abdul Rahman's, became the imam or leader of the Ansar, and Sadiq, a grandson of Abdul Rahman's, was named leader of the Ummah party. In the late 1960's, Imam Hadi and Sadiq disagreed on a number of issues, which divided the Mahdists. The two factions rejoined to oppose Nimeiry, but the imam was killed in 1970 when the Ansar revolted and Sadiq fled into exile, where he continued to lead opposition forces. In 1977–1978, Sadiq took part in negotiations with Nimeiry and participated in a national reconciliation. However, he never fully agreed with Nimeiry and was jailed for his opposition to the Islamization program in 1983.

The Ummah party is clearly a major force in the Sudan today, but it is not united. A son of Imam Hadi's represents one group, whose major goal is to avenge the death of the imam. Ahmad, an uncle of Sadiq's and a manager of Ansar resources, maintained at least formal relations with Nimeiry even after Sadiq was jailed. Ahmad is the major figure in a second Ummah grouping, while Sadiq leads the third. Sadiq was a Prime Minister in the 1960's and is the most visible of the three Ansar political figures. He was mentioned as a possible leader of the new civilian Cabinet in April, 1985. He has made major efforts to expand the Ummah party beyond its Ansar base but has not had much success. His power depends on the ability of the Ansar to unite behind his leadership, just as the influence of the Ansar in general depends on its ability to overcome internal divisions.

The second cluster of "traditional" political forces is a continuation of the old National Union party (NUP). The NUP was a combination of nationalist intellectuals under the leadership of Ismail Azhari and the Khatmiyyah. Soon after independence that alliance broke up, with the Khatmiyyah forming their own People's Democratic party (PDP). The NUP and PDP were active rivals until 1967. At that time, they formally united to form the Democratic Unionist party (DUP), although they maintained separate identities after the deaths of Azhari (1969) and Ali Mirghani (1968) and the revolution in 1969. Following Nimeiry's fall, both factions formed separate political parties that later merged in January, 1986. Potential factionalism within party structures has always

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John O. Voll is the author of *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982) and, with Sarah P. Voll, of *The Sudan* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).

"In 1986, the Ethiopian government appears to have a clear economic policy, although it is more likely to lead to disaster than to development, at least in the short run. It has made significant progress in creating political institutions and in increasing its political control. However, it has made no progress and has not even formulated a policy with regard to the so-called problem of the nationalities. . . ."

Drought and Development in Ethiopia

BY MARINA OTTAWAY

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FOOD shortages and the concomitant political issues have been the central problems in Ethiopia during 1985, and they are likely to remain for many years to come. The 1984 crop in northeast Ethiopia failed because of a severe drought. Rain fell in 1985, but the crop was not normal because many peasants were still in famine relief camps or had neither seed nor tools. The 1986 crop may also be poor because the government of Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam has launched a policy of villagization and collectivization in rural areas. Moreover, it has begun a massive resettlement of population from the drought-affected regions, which will undoubtedly cause much disruption. These policies have been criticized by the United States government and by some voluntary organizations working on the famine relief program. But the criticism is unlikely to have much effect on the Ethiopian regime, which appears to be trapped by the perverse logic of its own ideological approach and by the problems it faces.

The 1984 drought was probably Ethiopia's worst in this century; the closely monitored Nile River, which receives 85 percent of its water from the Ethiopian plateau, was at its lowest level since 1913. Crops failed in large parts of northeastern Ethiopia and many people died despite the relief effort mounted by the Ethiopian government and foreign donors. Although it has continued to criticize the Mengistu regime, the United States was the largest donor, providing 382,000 metric tons of food and \$37.5 million in nonfood aid by early 1985.¹

But the food problems of Ethiopia include more than the effects of drought. Like much of Africa, Ethiopia is caught in a vicious circle of growing population and sluggish or decreasing agricultural production. The World Bank estimated in 1984 that during the previous decade agricultural production had grown by only 1.1 percent a year, while the population had increased by 2.5 percent.² Many of the obstacles to increased food production long antedate the revolution. Population pressure in northern Ethiopia has led to very serious problems of

deforestation and soil erosion, which are exacerbated by the area's irregular rainfall. Southwestern Ethiopia enjoys more regular rains and is less densely populated. However, disease, particularly malaria and sleeping sickness, affects the population of potentially fertile lowland areas and is thus an obstacle to lowland exploitation.

Paradoxically, the 1975 land reform has added new obstacles to agricultural development, while trying to remove obstacles inherited from the imperial regime. Before 1975, the overwhelming majority of the peasants cultivating the land had to give a landlord part of their crop either as feudal dues or as rent. Additionally, tenant farmers had no security of tenure, which was a major disincentive to investment. All development agencies recognized these problems as major obstacles to growth.

The 1975 land reform nationalized all land, abolished feudal dues and rents, and imposed a low tax on land. However, it also destroyed the few mechanisms for agricultural growth that had developed during the preceding decade and it created a potentially serious problem of land fragmentation. Present policies can be better understood against the background of these problems.

In the decade preceding the land reform, agricultural development was marked by the creation of some modern commercial farms, especially in the areas around Addis Ababa. "Modernizing" landlords were turning from sharecropping to commercial cultivation with the help of fertilizer, selected seed and machinery. While the yields per hectare were much higher on the commercial farms than on the peasant holdings, there were negative social repercussions, because tenants were being expelled from the land. These expulsions were one of the factors that created agitation for agrarian reform.

The land reform halted the development of commercial farms. With the land nationalized, the government limited the size of a family farm to 10 hectares and banned the hiring of agricultural laborers. The government entrusted implementation of the reform to newly created peasant associations. There was an ideological bias behind the formation of these associations—they represented an extreme case of peasant self-government that appealed to the radical officials in the Ministry of Land Reform, but there was also a practical need. Ethiopia did not possess a bureaucratic agency that could implement the land re-

¹United States, General Accounting Office, *The United States' Response to the Ethiopian Food Crisis*, Report no. GAO/NSIAD-85-65 (Washington, D.C., April 8, 1985), p. 10.

²*Ethiopia, Recent Economic Development and Future Prospects*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, May 31, 1984), p. 3.

form, and it had neither the time nor the resources to create such an agency. The peasants were thus put in charge. By the end of 1975, there were about 18,000 peasant associations in the country; the peasants were pleased to organize to prevent the return of the landlords.³

Although the government owned all the land, each association was allowed to decide how to use the land in its area. It could redistribute the land among its members in equal plots, form a collective farm, or allow each family to cultivate the land it had used before, up to the 10-hectare limit. Collective cultivation was very rarely chosen. The status quo was difficult to maintain, because of the pressure for redistribution from the large number of poor peasants. Redistribution appears to have been very common, although there is little information concerning the extent of land redistribution within the peasant associations. Since the decision to redistribute land was left to the individual peasant associations, there was probably considerable variation.⁴

There is some evidence that the peasant associations not only redistributed land, but also fragmented individual holdings into small plots in an attempt to give families land of comparable quality. A study conducted near Addis Ababa in 1979 shows that individual holdings in the area were very small, ranging from 1 hectare to 1.6 hectares. The small holdings were fragmented into an average of three separate parcels for each family. Not surprisingly, almost 48 percent of all parcels were less than one-fourth of a hectare in size.⁵ The study indicated that fragmentation of holdings would continue because the peasant associations were constantly redistributing land in an attempt to maintain equality (e.g., providing additional parcels to members with growing families or taking parcels from those with diminishing households).

Land redistribution may have created a serious development problem by removing those farmers who had in the past responded most promptly to price incentives

and who had more quickly adopted modern inputs. Two foreign-funded agricultural development programs set up a few years before the revolution to help small producers had great difficulty in aiding sharecroppers and peasants with small land-holdings. The sharecroppers were reluctant to carry the entire burden of the investment when they had to share the profits with the landlord.⁶ The land reform has eliminated sharecropping, but it has greatly increased the number of small land-holding peasants. If the lessons of the past are valid, the fragmentation of property is harmful to agricultural development. The government must create new mechanisms for growth. The solutions it has chosen—collectivization, development of state farms, villagization and resettlement of the population from the northeast to the southwest—are ideologically conditioned attempts to overcome these problems.

The formation of peasant collectives and state farms has been government policy for some years. Collectivization was first discussed in 1975; four years later the government issued a decree regulating the formation of peasant collectives, known as producers cooperatives. These cooperatives were to be formed within the peasant associations, with no more than one cooperative for each association. Everyone did not have to join the cooperative at first; a few peasants could start a cooperative while the others continued to cultivate individually. However, the government expected that all the members of the peasants associations would eventually join their collective.

Initially, each family would retain private ownership of its animals and tools. But eventually all property would be held collectively; all work would be carried out jointly; and several producers cooperatives would join together to form a giant organization. The inspiration for this system, despite the strong Soviet presence in Ethiopia at the time the decree was issued, seems to have been the Chinese commune system before China's modernization program.

The government originally said that peasants would not be forced to join the producers cooperatives and strong coercion was evidently not used until recently. As a result, the process has been slow. There were only 89 producers cooperatives in March, 1980; in September, 1984, there were 1,275, most of them at the lowest, least collective stage of development. The distribution of the cooperatives over the national territory has been uneven. In 1984 there were eight cooperatives in Eritrea and four in Tigray, but there were many cooperatives in Shoa, Arusi, Gojjam and Bale. Only 82,979 people belonged to these cooperatives,⁷ and the land cultivated by the producers cooperatives was only about one percent of the total land under cultivation.⁸

It is clear that collectivization in Ethiopia has just begun, but some characteristics are beginning to emerge. Perhaps the most interesting is that the best-developed cooperatives—the 491 that have been judged advanced

³According to the Ethiopian government, in 1984 there were 19,267 peasant associations including 5.5 million families.

⁴For example, refugees interviewed in the Sudan reported that their peasant associations had been redistributing land and that the individual plots were shrinking because of population growth. See Jason W. Clay and Bonnie K. Holcomb, *Politics and Famine in Ethiopia*, Occasional Paper no. 20 (Cultural Survival Inc., 1985).

⁵Fassil Gebre Kiros, "Agricultural Land Fragmentation: A Problem of Land Distribution Observed in Some Ethiopian Peasant Associations," *Ethiopian Journal of Development Research*, vol. 4, no. 2 (October, 1980), pp. 1-12.

⁶The two programs were the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), a Swedish project, and the Minimum Package Program, funded mainly by the World Bank. CADU has published a large number of reports, some detailing the difficulty of reaching sharecroppers and small farmers.

⁷Ministry of Agriculture figures in *Meskerem*, no. 18 (1984), pp. 40-42. *Meskerem* is the party's ideological journal.

⁸Workers' Party of Ethiopia, *Guidelines on the Economic and Social Development of Ethiopia, 1984/85-1993/94. Draft* (Addis Ababa, September, 1984), p. 34.

enough to be granted a legal personality—not only receive the most government aid, but are also subject to the tightest government control. These cooperatives are eligible for government loans, but their production plans have to be “coordinated” with the country’s overall development plan, which means that they have to submit all their plans to the Ministry of Agriculture for approval. They must market their produce through the government’s Agricultural Marketing Corporation.

The 1979 decree also allowed the formation of service cooperatives. These are clearly regarded as inferior organizations that are useful until the producers cooperatives are better developed. The service cooperatives are supposed to make seed and fertilizer available to their members, sell their produce, rent out tractors and other farm machinery and distribute better breeds of farm animals. Peasants can join the service cooperatives through their associations, but it is not clear whether it is the peasants or the associations that join. It is clear that the cooperatives do not go out of their way to provide services to individual farmers, but favor the producers cooperatives. This is not surprising, because the service cooperatives are not regarded as an alternative for peasants who do not want to engage in collective farming.

In late 1984, there were 3,815 service cooperatives, but only 967 of these were fully developed and registered organizations.⁹ A few were very active, providing a great variety of services to their members, but most were barely able to help in the distribution of basic inputs.

STATE FARMS

In the immediate aftermath of the land reform, state farms were set up to run the nationalized foreign plantations and the large commercial farms. The state farms were thus created for practical rather than ideological reasons. The plantations, particularly those producing sugar and cotton in the Awash Valley, were large-scale operations that could not be turned over to the peasant associations without a total change in the plantations’ organization. The commercial grain farms could have been returned to the peasant sector without disruptions, but they provided the government with the only reliable source of grain for the urban market.

After 1978, the government created new state farms for ideological reasons. The Soviet union was then Ethiopia’s major ally and, together with the East European countries, it had an unmistakable influence on this policy, providing funds, farm machinery and technicians. State farms expanded in size from about 67,000 hectares in 1977 to over 200,000 hectares in mid-1984.¹⁰

⁹Meskerem, no. 18 (1984), p. 42.

¹⁰“Ministry of State Farms Development: Its Role, Organization and Future Activities” (Addis Ababa, June, 1984), pp. 3 and 33.

¹¹Ibid., p. 38. The publication does not acknowledge the decrease in productivity, but this can be easily calculated from the acreage and production figures it provides.

¹²Ibid., p. 33.

¹³Ethiopia, *Recent Economic Development*, p. 24.

The performance of the state farms has been disappointing even to the government; productivity has steadily fallen for all crops, although this probably reflects in part the lower productivity of the newly established farms, and not just the decline in the performance of the old farms.¹¹ The state farms account for only about four percent of the land under cultivation in Ethiopia and for six percent of total crop production. These modest results have been obtained at a very high cost. For example, in 1983–1984, the government invested 175 million birr in the state farms.¹² By comparison, the government’s 1984 ten year economic plan called for a total agricultural investment of 1.1 billion birr during 1984.

The state farms have thus absorbed the largest share of capital investment in agricultural development and the returns have been poor. In fact, many state farms produce at a loss. This is particularly true of the grain farms, despite the fact that the government’s Agricultural Marketing Corporation buys their grain at prices 20 to 50 percent higher than those paid to individual farmers and producers cooperatives.¹³ For the government, these high production costs may be offset by the political advantage of having grain available for the urban market, for famine relief and for the military.

State farms and producers cooperatives have grown slowly, but the 1984 ten year plan calls for doubling the state farm acreage to almost half a million hectares and for organizing 50 percent of the peasants in producers cooperatives. Organizing this many peasants will undoubtedly require coercion, and the potential for massive disruption is great.

The first sign that the government intended to push hard for collectivization came in late 1985, when it launched a “villagization” campaign to move peasants from their scattered homesteads into villages. Villagization efforts are not new to Africa. They were undertaken in Tanzania in the early 1970’s and in Mozambique after independence. Governments defend villagization on the ground that schools, clinics, clean water and other health and social services can be provided more efficiently if the population is concentrated in villages rather than scattered in isolated homesteads. This is undoubtedly true, but villagization has an additional effect: it facilitates government control of the population. In Ethiopia, villagization helps to force the pace of collectivization.

Little information is available about the conduct of the villagization campaign, but it is clearly stirring considerable opposition. Some refugees arriving in the Sudan and Somalia claim to have fled from Ethiopia because of villagization, and they report that many peasants who have stayed behind are refusing to plant crops. While refugee reports paint a negative picture by definition (and it is too early in the season to know how much land has been left fallow), there is no doubt that villagization is causing considerable disruption and discontent, as it has in other countries.

The resettlement program has significant political im-

plications because it is also part of the government's program to restructure agricultural production and social organization in rural areas (the government says it is only an economic measure to increase food production and avoid another famine). People are being taken from drought-affected areas, particularly Tigray and Wallo, and are being flown or bused long distances to available land. Resettlement began in late 1984 when the government announced that between 1 million and 1.5 million people would be moved. About half a million had been moved by March, 1986.

RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

The resettlement program has been extensively criticized. In the United States, it has been attacked as a gross violation of human rights, because the people being resettled are apparently relocated forcefully by the government, and families are often separated in the process. Furthermore, the United States claims that the peasants are taken to new areas without adequate site preparations; the lack of clinics, schools and water systems is usually cited, although such amenities are rarely found in rural Ethiopia.

Ethiopian opposition groups have concentrated their criticism on the political and ethnic aspects of the resettlement program. The Relief Society of Tigray and the Eritrean Relief Committee, organizations closely linked to the liberation movements in those areas, have charged that the government wants to depopulate Tigray in order to deprive the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) of support. They also claim that the resettlement areas are not uninhabited, but that the peasants living there are being taken from their land to make room for the relocated peasants.

Although a few European governments have provided food, the famine relief agencies in Ethiopia have kept aloof from the resettlement program. One voluntary organization, the French Doctors without Borders, has repeatedly denounced the program as a monstrous violation of human rights that has caused the deaths of thousands of those being relocated; in late 1985, the organization was banned from Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has denied all accusations, but in early 1986 it called a temporary halt to the establishment of new settlements.

It is difficult to separate facts from politically motivated allegations concerning the resettlement program. Coercion is undoubtedly being used; some families are being separated; and people are dying—but all this is true in the famine relief camps and in the drought-affected areas. The preparations made to receive the relocated peasants are undoubtedly minimal, given the lack of resources and the rapid pace of the program, and it is all too likely that food is in short supply. On the other hand, it is difficult to determine what would constitute adequate preparation in a country like Ethiopia. Finally, it is not clear whether the resettlement program will provide the peasant

population with a better livelihood than did their old farms or whether they will remain chronically dependent on government subsidies.

Whatever the outcome, however, the resettlement program is much more than an attempt to thin out the population of the drought-affected areas and relocate them where they can more easily support themselves. The program's political goals are clear. First, it helps collectivization. The settlers are not given individual farms but must spend their time working in communal fields, with few hours left for their own small plots. Second, the program makes it clear that all land belongs to all Ethiopians, not to individual ethnic groups or "nationalities," and that no group has a right to control any area of the country. This suggests that when the government issues a new policy on the nationalities, it will not give much if any power to a regional government (if such governments eventually come into existence). It is this rejection of the rights of the nationalities that is the major political implication of the resettlement program. Charges that the government is trying to depopulate Tigray in order to weaken the TPLF, on the other hand, appear unsubstantiated.

Villagization, collectivization, expansion of state farms and resettlement will probably worsen the country's economic problems by disrupting production. Why does the government continue to pursue these policies (even accelerating their pace) when the country already faces the consequences of a serious drought? It is clear that it is trying to solve the very pressing problems of economic development and political control within a Marxist-Leninist ideological framework. From the government's point of view there is a logic, albeit a perverse logic, to these policies.

However, the government has to create mechanisms for economic development; it cannot allow the processes of redistribution and fragmentation to continue unchecked because these are obstacles to development (witness the experience of the pre-land reform programs). Given the ideology chosen by the Mengistu regime, collectivization and the creation of state farms are the only ways the government can check and reverse fragmentation.

Since 1975, the government has made considerable progress in establishing its control over the country. The peasant associations have been brought into an All-Ethiopian Peasant Association. Their power to make policy has been limited by the 1979 collectivization decrees, which specified the agricultural policies favored by the government. The formation of the Workers' party of Ethiopia (WPE) and its associated youth and women's

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"Kenya's agrarian economy is the envy of its immediate neighbors and a model for other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. . . . In 1986, Kenya gives every indication of a society about to enjoy economic prosperity and political stability."

Kenya's Agricultural Success

BY MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE

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KENYA is an African success story, featuring perhaps the most advanced agricultural sector of any independent African country. Since its independence in December, 1963, it has achieved a record of consistent agricultural growth; today it is one of the world's leading exporters of such basic commodities as coffee and tea.¹ During the decade following independence, Kenya's agricultural sector grew at the buoyant rate of more than 4.5 percent per year, and it was able to achieve steady and substantial increases in the volume and the value of its agricultural exports. Earnings from these exports helped fund the development of a sizable manufacturing sector. Since the mid-1970's, Kenya's agricultural growth rate has slowed slightly, but it has continued to average about 3 percent per year during the past decade.²

Kenya's record of agricultural achievement is doubly impressive when it is compared with the dismal economic performance of most African countries. It is all the more remarkable considering the fact that Kenya has had to cope with serious economic constraints. Only about one-fifth of Kenya's total land area of about 225,000 square miles is reasonably fertile, and Kenya has one of the highest ratios of population to arable area of any African country.³ Kenya has also coped with an international environment that is adverse to countries dependent on the export of primary agricultural commodities and with a series of droughts, including the extraordinarily severe drought of 1984, considered by many observers to be the worst in Kenya this century.

Kenya's economic accomplishments have been accompanied by impressive political accomplishments. Kenya has had civilian rule since its independence. President Daniel arap Moi came to power through a constitutional presidential succession in 1978, and the country's political system, though it is based on a single party, the Kenya

African National Union (KANU), is pluralistic and highly competitive. Elections to party office and to the National Assembly are vigorously contested, with a very high rate of nonreturn to incumbency (approximately 50 percent). There is lively and searching parliamentary debate over the country's most pressing political issues. And the country's economic and political affairs are extensively reported by the national press.

Kenya's political stability was a hard-won achievement. When President Moi assumed power in November, 1978, he faced powerful political opposition from within KANU. He had been a member of the party since 1964 and had been Vice President for 11 years; yet he was not considered a member of the close-knit political establishment that had governed the country under President Jomo Kenyatta. Certain members of this establishment were so opposed to Moi that they proposed changes in the constitution to make it more difficult for the Vice President to assume presidential office. And it was widely reported that some KANU members tried unsuccessfully to organize a coup to prevent Moi from assuming the presidency.

The early years of the Moi regime were marked by severe economic difficulties. After a brief period of high prices for coffee and tea exports in 1977-1978, the world market for these commodities plummeted abruptly in 1979, sharply reducing Kenya's foreign exchange earnings. This drop coincided with the second round of price increases for oil and with the sharp rise in the costs of imported manufactured goods because of higher oil prices. To make matters worse, there was a serious drought in 1979, which forced Kenya to spend a great deal of money to import food during 1980. As a result, Kenya began to suffer severe inflation, and the cost of food and other basic consumer goods rose dramatically. Because of falling revenues and severe budgetary pressures, the government was compelled to curtail expenditures on vital public services like education.

From 1980 to 1982, Kenya suffered extreme political instability. Student demonstrations at the University of Nairobi forced the temporary closure of the campus during the spring of 1980, and there was a visible increase in political opposition for ethnic and regional reasons. In 1981, political opposition became so widespread that the government banned ethnically based political organizations. By early 1982, it was clear that the economic

¹In 1984, for example, Kenya exported about 119,000 tons of coffee and about 116,000 tons of tea. The 1984 earnings from each commodity were \$285 million and \$266 million, respectively.

²*Kenya: Growth and Structural Change*, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983), p. 325.

³Kenya has approximately 240 persons per square kilometer of cultivable land. The average for independent sub-Saharan Africa is about 40. Even such densely populated countries as Malawi and Uganda have fewer than 125 persons per square kilometer of cultivable land.

downturn had undermined the fragile coalition on which the Moi administration was based and was posing a severe threat to Moi's political survival. This threat became acute in early August, when units of Kenya's air force organized a military coup to overthrow the government. The coup momentarily gained the support of dissident students and other radicalized elements of the population. Kenya's civilian government was saved, however, when army units loyal to President Moi suppressed the rebellion.

Since the coup attempt, the Moi government has tried to achieve greater political unity among the top leaders of KANU, a process that has involved purging some high-ranking political leaders, including the former minister for constitutional affairs, Charles Njonjo. The government has also tried to ameliorate some of the country's most glaring socioeconomic disparities, particularly regional disparities. Kenya has long experienced considerable differentials in wealth and personal income between Central province, where most of its high-value agricultural exports are grown, and other regions of the country, which are far less prosperous. To achieve greater regional equality, the government has begun a modified program of affirmative action that provides special educational and employment opportunities for the ethnic communities that live in the more peripheral districts.

Although the 1982 coup attempt came perilously close to terminating Kenya's tradition of constitutional government, it may, in retrospect, have had important political benefits. It exposed the inherent political instability of government institutions in a society characterized by deep socioeconomic fissures; thus it called attention to the need for social reform. Perhaps more important, the coup attempt brought to the surface a powerful sense of consensus. Kenyans of all ethnic groups and social strata are united in their commitment to the value of civilian government by elected political leaders and in their belief that Kenya's long-term economic interests are best advanced by the liberal capitalist policies that have been pursued by the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. In the economic sphere, the coup attempt led to an increased awareness of the difficulty of achieving sustained economic development in an agricultural society and a heightened appreciation of the need for policies conducive to the growth of the agricultural sector.

But there is reason for concern about Kenya's political and economic future. Kenya's overall economic growth has failed to keep pace with its annual population increase, currently estimated at approximately four percent per year. Despite a growing gross domestic product (GDP), Kenya may be experiencing a decline in per capita GDP. And there is evidence that the impact of falling income per capita continues to be unevenly distributed, pressing most heavily on those at the bottom of

the socioeconomic scale.⁴ As a result, Kenya has begun to face a variety of serious social problems, including rural landlessness, rising urban unemployment and a heightened incidence of urban crime.

With population increases pressing against the limits of the country's fertile land, new agricultural settlements have been created in previously uncultivated areas, like the semiarid regions. Since these areas are costly to develop and intrinsically less productive, their use threatens Kenya's high rate of agricultural growth. Unless Kenya can reduce the rate of its population increase, economic growth may not bring any improvement in the material conditions of life for most Kenyans.

EARLY AGRICULTURAL GROWTH

Many developmentally oriented aid organizations like the World Bank have expressed serious doubts that Kenya can continue its high rate of growth. In this judgment, Kenya's extraordinarily rapid pace of agricultural development from 1963 to 1973 was attained largely by implementing a set of agricultural policies that are sometimes referred to euphemistically as the "soft options." These included: 1) the expansion of land under cultivation in reasonably fertile areas; 2) the removal of restrictions that prevented African farmers from growing export crops; and 3) the introduction of scientifically advanced methods of production.⁵

Between the period 1961–1965 and 1971, the land area devoted to agricultural purposes increased by more than 20 percent. Most of this increase was brought about by converting pasture land to farming purposes. Until the late colonial period, African farmers had been legally forbidden to cultivate coffee or tea. When independence approached, this restriction was removed and, as a result, coffee and tea production grew rapidly. Between 1955 and 1977, tea production increased about 11 percent per year while coffee production increased by about 9.8 percent per year.

As for new methods of production, Kenya's land area is so limited that large increases in production can be effected only by improved methods of cultivation. Kenya was enormously successful in this regard during the 20-year period from 1955 to 1975. The greatest success came with maize, the country's principal food crop. The introduction of a new, high-yielding variety of maize in the late 1960's enabled Kenya's food production to keep pace with the population increase for about a decade.

THE "HARD OPTIONS"

By the mid-1970's, however, these options had been exhausted. Between 1975 and 1985, when innumerable African countries experienced a disastrous downturn in the performance of their agricultural sectors, Kenya continued to achieve a positive rate of growth in agriculture. Its success in implementing policies conducive to agricultural growth differentiates it fundamentally from countries where agricultural policies have been based on

⁴See Norman N. Miller, *Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 71–78.

⁵See Kenya: *Growth and Structural Change*, pp. 325–329.

the political pressures of urban interest groups and where urban bias in agricultural policy has discouraged agricultural production. Indeed, as a result of its rigorous attention to the requirements of agriculture, Kenya has achieved important socioeconomic objectives.

First, it has generated increased economic opportunity for a rapidly growing population. Kenya's total population in 1948 was only about 5.4 million. As recently as 1969, the population was less than 11 million. It now stands at over 20 million. Thus, the country's population has nearly quadrupled in less than 40 years and has nearly doubled in the last 16 years. Although today Kenya confronts problems of landlessness and unemployment, all but a very small proportion of this population increase has been successfully absorbed into the agricultural sector, either into traditional peasant farming or into smallholder cash crop production. Kenya has been able to achieve this (despite extremely limited land resources) while maintaining a positive rate of economic growth in the agricultural sector.

The second major agricultural achievement has been a high degree of food self-sufficiency. Kenya is not among Africa's chronic food-deficit countries; it is generally able to provide for virtually all its domestic food needs, including basic food staples like maize, and beef, poultry and dairy products as well. Large food imports tend to be a rare exception and occur only during especially severe drought years (as in 1984), when drought causes a severe and largely unpredictable drop in the country's supply of grains. Kenya is also food self-sufficient in the sense that its foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports generally permit it to purchase the foods it needs on the open market rather than depending on food aid.⁶

The third objective of agricultural growth in Kenya is a high level of foreign exchange earnings. By the early 1980's, Kenya was earning approximately \$700 million annually from agricultural exports. About 80 percent of these earnings were generated by coffee and tea. But Kenya was also a significant exporter of other agricultural goods, including horticultural products, pyrethrum and tobacco. One of the critically important side effects of the country's agricultural performance is that it has sustained a high rate of industrial growth. Because of the country's fairly high level of foreign exchange reserves, Kenya's industries have not experienced the crippling shortages of imported capital goods, spare parts and raw materials that have been so pronounced elsewhere on the continent.

Kenya's ability to achieve major socioeconomic goals

⁶United Nations, Food and Agricultural Organization, *Food Situation in African Countries Affected by Emergencies: Special Report* (December, 1985), p. 31. According to this estimate, Kenya in 1984–1985 acquired about 60 percent of its imported grain at commercial rates.

⁷For a full discussion of the colonial agricultural economy see Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 68–117.

after the soft options were exhausted reflects the government's ongoing commitment to policies that promote the agricultural sector. These include its land policy, its pricing policy and its exchange rate policy.

At independence, Kenya inherited a dualistic agricultural system. Between one-fourth and one-fifth of its most fertile and fairly fertile land, nearly 12,000 square miles (7.5 million acres), was held by a European settler community of about 3,000 families, principally of British descent. Known as the "white highlands," this area was subdivided into about 3 million acres of farms that produced a combination of export and food crops; about 2 million acres of large-scale plantations devoted principally to tea; and about 2.5 million acres devoted to cattle raising. The remaining three-fourths of Kenya's reasonably fertile land area was farmed by African peasants. Since Africans were forbidden by law to cultivate export commodities, African peasants usually grew food crops like maize, peas, beans, millet, sorghum and yams.

The contrasts between the European and the African farmers were striking. European farms were large in scale, held on the basis of individual title, well served by physical infrastructure and extension services, and farmed on the basis of advanced agricultural methods. European farms were financially buoyed by a variety of colonial policies, including the Europeans' legal monopoly of export crops and their access to cheap African labor and subsidized transportation. European farmers often owned lavish homes and enjoyed a life-style comparable to that of the most affluent landowning classes in England.

On the other hand, African farms were extremely small, were generally held on the basis of tenure that emphasized communal rather than individual ownership and, for the most part, were poorly served by the country's physical and service infrastructure. The African farm sector was generally neglected by the colonial administration and was made to bear the brunt of a tax system that effectively subsidized European agriculture.⁷ Overcrowding in the African areas was severe; most Africans lived under conditions of extreme poverty, and a large proportion of African families had to supplement their farm income by sending one or more family members to work on the European farms.

As a result of this dualism, the newly independent government of Kenya faced enormous political pressure to undertake a massive program of land redistribution. There was widespread and bitter resentment of the fact that Europeans owned so much of the country's arable land, a resentment that fueled the land freedom movement between 1952 and 1956. Prominent politicians demanded that the government expropriate the European farms and distribute them to poor African families. By early 1966, a vocal opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), had emerged, and one of its major political demands was the "distribution of free land to the needies [sic], including squatters and those who lost their

lands in the struggle for independence. . . .⁸ This sentiment was echoed at the time by radical members of the governing party, the Kenya African National Union, and it has since been given occasional voice by populist political leaders.

Despite these pressures, the government has officially maintained that large-scale land redistribution programs that would fragment landholdings in the highlands areas would be economically damaging. Its land policy favors minimum changes in the highly productive agricultural economy developed by the settler community. Policymakers believe that, insofar as possible, the basic structure of the agricultural sector should be maintained while land should be gradually transferred from European to African farmers. Since independence, the government has stressed the importance of arranging land transfers on the basis of economically viable, individually owned farms so that newly created African landholdings are large enough to produce marketable surpluses of export and food crops.

The government's skepticism toward redistribution has resulted in a program of very limited scope. The major redistribution project of any significance, the "million-acre scheme," was implemented between independence and the mid-1960's.⁹ Between 1961 and 1965, the government, assisted principally by funding from the government of Britain and the World Bank, purchased about 1,100 settler farms totaling about 1.4 million acres. These farms were subdivided into small plots distributed to about 35,000 African families. Because the central portions of these farms, including farm buildings and access roads, were sometimes retained for direct sale to prospective African purchasers, the total land area redistributed on a subsidized basis was only about 1.25 million acres, or about one-fifth the original white highlands. By 1965, after this process had been largely completed, the redistribution of the former European areas ceased to be a high government priority.¹⁰

Kenya's principal land policy since independence has

⁸K.P.U. *Manifesto* (Nairobi: Pan-African Press, n.d.), p. 15.

⁹The best discussion of this project is in Christopher Leo, *Land and Class in Kenya* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 87-170.

¹⁰The government's official statement on this is reprinted in Kenya, *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*, Sessional Paper no. 10 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 28. The government has sometimes given legal recognition to farms that have been de facto subdivided (by squatters, for example).

¹¹See Kenya, *Development Plans: 1984-1988* (Nairobi: Government Printer, n.d.), p. 187.

¹²The outstanding example of this viewpoint is Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). Urban bias is also a central hypothesis in the classic World Bank study, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981).

¹³See the argument by Cathy L. Jabara, "Agricultural Pricing Policy in Kenya," *World Development*, vol. 13, no. 5 May, 1985, pp. 623-624.

been to encourage the privatization of landholdings in the roughly four-fifths of the arable land areas that had always been farmed by Africans. This policy had its origins in the late colonial period, when it was known as land consolidation and registration. It was intended to transform ownership in the African areas from traditional forms of communal or group tenure to private ownership. The original program called for the consolidation of fragmented parcels of land into a single viable unit before title deeds could be awarded. However, the government has taken the position that land transfers should be handled by the marketplace and that the most efficient way to advance the privatization process is to award title deeds to individuals who can demonstrate valid claims to land parcels.

This program has proved popular and successful. By 1984, approximately 6 million hectares (13.2 million acres), a land area almost double the area of the former European highlands and representing most of the country's high-potential land area, had been registered under individual title to more than 1.5 million households, about 50 times as many as were reached by the original resettlement program. The government's commitment to this policy reflects its conviction that a free market in land is essential to the growth of the agricultural sector, because it permits successful farmers to acquire additional land.¹¹ Officials believe that the individual ownership of land encourages landowners to invest in the development of their farms and that it facilitates private lending for agricultural development, because land titles can be used as collateral for loans.

The second cornerstone of Kenya's agricultural success is the government's system of producer pricing. Independent African countries have been widely criticized for their tendency to suppress producer prices below levels that provide farmers with adequate production incentives, usually because of urban bias. According to this criticism, the desire of urban consumers for cheap food leads African governments to lower the prices of food staples, causing production shortfalls.¹² Similarly, the desire of urban populations for expanded government services and for increased job opportunities in the public and private sectors can apparently be satisfied only by raising the level of effective taxation on agricultural production, which is a further economic disincentive for the producers of agricultural commodities.

Kenya may well be Africa's major exception to these generalizations.¹³ Producer welfare has been a more important consideration than the welfare of urban interest groups in the determination of the prices of almost all of Kenya's export crops and food crops.

Kenya's pricing policy toward export commodities differs from that of virtually every other independent African country in that the government does not set official producer prices. Rather, it allows the world market to determine the prices of its two major agricultural exports, coffee and tea. Its export pricing policy has been referred

to as a "throughput" system; that is, the world market prices of these products are passed on directly to the producers after a modest percentage has been deducted to cover the operating costs of the parastatal corporations that handle purchasing, transportation and marketing. Because these costs are kept at an absolute minimum, Kenya's coffee and tea farmers have consistently received a high percentage of the international price.

Generalizations about pricing policy are hazardous because the international prices of agricultural commodities are susceptible to abrupt fluctuations. But research economists in Kenya's Ministry of Agriculture have calculated that, on average, Kenya's smallholder tea producers receive more than 90 percent of the world market price, and coffee producers about 70 percent.¹⁴ Favorable pricing for these products has resulted in a steady growth in the volume of exports. Between the mid-1960's and the mid-1970's, for example, coffee production nearly doubled, increasing from between 35,000 and 40,000 metric tons per year to between 70,000 and 80,000 metric tons per year. Tea production nearly tripled during this period, growing from about 20,000 tons per year to about 55,000 tons per year.¹⁵ By the mid-1980's, coffee and tea exports had registered another quantum leap; each of these crops was rapidly approaching a level of 120,000 metric tons per year.

The most remarkable feature of Kenya's emergence as one of the world's leading tea exporters has been the rapid development of smallholder production. This is the most visible by-product of the government's deep commitment to the promotion of the private landownership of African farmers. In 1963, smallholders were responsible for less than 2 percent of total production, with the remainder produced on large estates owned principally by foreign corporations. By 1982, Kenya's parastatal corporation for tea, the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), had encouraged the development of more than 135,000 smallholder tea farms that accounted for about 42 percent of total tea production.¹⁶

Maize is by far the most important food crop grown in Kenya. It is generally estimated to provide between 50 percent and 70 percent of the caloric intake of the population and probably accounts for between 35 percent and 40 percent of Kenya's total cultivated land area. If the value of maize grown for home consumption is added to that

purchased in the marketplace, it is also the country's most valuable agricultural commodity. Maize is also the country's least well understood agricultural good, since very little is known about precisely what proportion of the total maize crop is consumed directly by peasant households and what percentage is marketed informally rather than through the country's official grain parastatal, the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB).

Kenya's pricing policy for maize differs fundamentally from its policy with regard to export crops. The government strictly regulates the price of maize at all levels, not only the price paid to the producer but the prices that can be legally charged at the processing and retail levels as well. To understand Kenya's commitment to an official pricing system for maize, it is important to remember that Kenya seeks not to maximize production but rather to become self-sufficient in the country's principal food staple. To achieve a careful calibration of domestic supply and demand, Kenyans have generally chosen to set maize prices at or slightly below import parity; that is, the price level at which maize could be imported from overseas. This policy should lead to an adequate domestic supply without generating surplus production that might need to be exported.

Kenya's pricing policy has proved to be remarkably effective in making Kenya self-sufficient in food. Indeed, Kenya represents a major exception to the proposition that food deficits in African countries are a long-term structural problem caused by faulty pricing policies. Kenya is a food-importing country only in exceptional years. During the past decade, for example, Kenya has been compelled to import significant volumes of maize only in 1980 and again in 1984. On both occasions, drought was a far more important factor in generating food shortages than deficiencies in the pricing system. On both occasions, the country returned quickly to self-sufficiency once the drought ended.

Conventional wisdom holds that African countries overvalue their exchange rates to suppress the real value of producer prices for both export crops and domestically consumed food staples. Overvaluation tends to cheapen the cost of imported goods favored by urban consumers while indirectly increasing the cost of agricultural inputs required by rural producers. By shifting the internal terms of trade of African countries against the country-side, currency overvaluation functions as a major economic disincentive to agricultural production.

Kenya represents a significant exception to the general

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¹⁴The difference between these figures probably results from the greater difficulty of marketing coffee. Tea is sold fairly easily through a periodic auction at the port city of Mombasa, but Kenya must market a portion of its coffee crop at low price levels to countries that do not participate in the International Coffee Agreement.

¹⁵John C. de Wilde, *Agriculture, Marketing and Pricing in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Los Angeles: Crossroads Press, 1984), table 2.1, p. 14.

¹⁶For a full account of this development, see Geoffrey Lamb and Linda Muller, *Control, Accountability, and Incentives in a Successful Development Institution: The Kenya Tea Development Authority* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

By Virginia C. Knight
Consulting Editor, *Current History*

THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND: A PROFILE. By Robert H. Davies, Dan O'Meara and Sipho Dlamini. (London: Zed Press, 1986. 82 pages and notes, \$21.75, cloth; \$7.50, paper.)

This is an up-to-date account of the political and economic situation in Swaziland since the death of King Sobhuza II in 1982. An independent state within South Africa, Swaziland is important to the struggle for freedom in South Africa. The authors set the current political upheavals in perspective and take the reader up to the secret 1982 accord between the South African and the Swazi governments. This is a helpful and important profile of Swaziland's politics and economics.

PRETORIA'S PRAETORIANS: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Philip H. Frankel. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 215 pages, tables, notes, bibliography and index, \$44.50.)

Has South Africa become a military state? The author, a senior lecturer in political science at the University of Witwatersrand, sees the South African military as a racially heterogeneous agent of the white state. He traces the breakdown of the British civil-military heritage in contemporary South Africa and the emergence of the garrison state, with its siege mentality and the formulation of its so-called total strategy program for counterrevolution.

For the student of South Africa, *Pretoria's Praetorians* documents the transition of the military from an arm of the state to its dynamic position today. The author sounds a final warning: "Militarization is positively dangerous in the South African context and can only become more harmful to the real national interests of the country. . . ."

AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. 364 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$29.95.)

In commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the independence of Ghana, the first sub-Saharan African state to gain independence, the editors commissioned a series of lectures in 1983-1984, now reprinted here.

The essays are concerned with such concepts as the role of the military in African politics, the role of the

United Nations, urbanization, foreign aid, technology and ideology, among others.

UP AGAINST THE FENCES: POVERTY, PASSES AND PRIVILEGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 365 pages, tables, notes and references, \$29.95.)

The editors are eminent professors of politics and social sciences in South Africa. They have brought together a series of essays, some previously published, to discuss the South African government's policy of influx control and its effects.

The first section presents theoretical and analytical studies of the dynamics of rural poverty and the government's homeland policies. The second section deals with the homelands from the perspective of the black residents and explains how they manage within and beyond oppressive government controls.

Government initiatives to stabilize the black population in the rural areas is the theme of the third section. Resettlement efforts in Ciskei are the subject of a case study. Finally, leaders in the private sector, like Gavin Relly and H. F. Oppenheimer of Anglo-American, discuss the labor needs of South African business.

Some of the essays appear dated, because there have been many changes since the papers were delivered.

THE RISE AND FALL OF NIGERIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC, 1979-84. By Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere. (London: Zed Press, 1985. 290 pages, tables, notes, appendix, bibliography and index, \$30.95, cloth; \$12.24, paper.)

Nigerian historian Falola and political economist Ihonvbere spent 1983 in Nigeria doing field work for this book. They were fortunate to have studied and witnessed the economic and social conditions that led to the 1983 New Year's coup that toppled the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari.

The authors' perspective is Marxist. From an analysis of Nigeria's class structure and its modes of production, they conclude that the structural conditions that precipitated the fall of the Second Republic—Nigeria's dependence on its foreign-dominated oil sector, the government's neglect of the majority of its people, widespread corruption and the fascist nature of the police force—must be corrected or more military coups can be expected.

This is a well-researched account of the political economy of the Shagari presidency. The authors describe the conditions Shagari inherited from colonial and postcolonial military rule and the actions he took to control the country's wealth. ■

RACE POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 200)

cia Nacional Moçambicana (MNR), in open defiance of the Nkomati agreement, has become undeniable. In August, Mozambicans in cooperation with Zimbabwean military forces captured the MNR headquarters at Gorongosa in central Mozambique. Among the documents collected were a desk diary and several notebooks with minutes of meetings between top MNR officials and South African envoys, particularly military men. These documents revealed a deep division between SADF intelligence operatives and officials in South Africa's department of foreign affairs.¹⁷ After the disclosures, Chief of the Armed Forces General Constand Viljoen asserted on television that the military had willfully and without authority from the government violated the nonaggression agreement. On more than one occasion, the foreign minister had not been informed about SADF moves in Mozambique.¹⁸ General Viljoen was also critical of the department of foreign affairs.

Violent raids into Botswana (June, 1985) and Lesotho (December, 1985), December reports of incursions into Swaziland, further threats of action against Zimbabwe, and the economic blockade and pressures that contributed to the military coup in Lesotho in January, 1986, reveal a South Africa groping for a new regional order in which Pretoria can virtually dictate policy to neighboring states.¹⁹ This is the reemergence of a policy of destabilization and preemptive and retaliatory violence.²⁰ Economic pressures are a regular part of these tactics. Although this aggressive policy has no long-range hope of success, in the short run weak and insecure governments in the region may be forced to conform to Pretoria's dictates, at least insofar as their links with the ANC are concerned.

One might ask why South Africa seems to waver (as it has over the last half dozen years) in its approach to various black states? Is South Africa unsure of its goals? Are there rifts among the policymaking elites that in fact lead to two or more foreign policies? If so, what is the nature of those divisions? Where do the hawks and the normalizers (there are no doves) find support? Or is

¹⁷The notebooks are quoted at length in "Counting on Colonel Charlie," *Africa News*, vol. 25, no. 9 (November 4, 1985), pp. 8-12. For background and analysis see John S. Saul, "Mozambican Socialism and South African Aggression: A Case Study in Destabilization" (Paper read at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, New Orleans, November 25, 1985).

¹⁸*Africa Research Bulletin*, vol. 22, no. 10 (November, 1985), pp. 7815B-7816A.

¹⁹On the Lesotho coup see *The Star*, WAE, January 27, 1986, pp. 1, 3 and 7.

²⁰See Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), chap. 6.

²¹See "A Moment in History," *Leadership* (Johannesburg), vol. 4, no. 3 (1985), pp. 25-30.

²²Howard Barrell, "The Tactics of Talks: ANC and Business," *Work in Progress*, no. 39 (October, 1985), pp. 4-8.

South Africa consciously playing a "good guy/bad guy" routine in order to keep its neighbors off balance?

FIRST STEPS TOWARD RESOLUTION

Within South Africa, most leaders have few illusions about the extent and the probable impact of external relations on their own domestic future. They understand that interference from abroad can lighten or add to their burdens, but in the final analysis any changes will result from Pretoria's policies and from the initiatives and responses of the black populace and its leaders.

Some signs of movement are apparent. Most important for the white regime, some townships have become ungovernable. Throughout the country, "elected" town councillors have fled, have been assassinated or have resigned. In some areas, a general disorder prevails. In others, informal forms of local self-government have appeared. Thus a dyarchy of sorts is being established; there are some parts of South Africa where government officials dare not go unless they are accompanied by overwhelming force. This does not amount to effective government for Pretoria or for its opponents. Just how the existence of separate though unequal claimants to rule will be resolved is still unclear.

In addition, various white leadership groups have tried to open a dialogue with the ANC. On September 13, 1985, a group of seven business leaders traveled to Zambia for talks with Oliver Tambo and a team of ANC leaders.²¹ The PFP and liberal clergymen have also visited. In October, the government withdrew the passports of Afrikaner students from the University of Stellenbosch after they had sought to meet their "banned" ANC counterparts. Admittedly, these are just the first steps in what must, of necessity, be a long process of exchange. Talks are not negotiations. But they do open communications with what is officially regarded as the enemy, possibly to divide the belligerents and thereby to facilitate eventual compromise.²² The prospects of that happening look slim.

Within the NP, there is serious talk (as there has been for some time among the opposition) that President Botha is ill-suited to lead South Africa out of the current crisis. He is, the rumors suggest, too inflexible, too cautious, too unimaginative, and too clearly identified with interests not inclined to accept significant power shifts. The names of possible replacements are hardly more assuring—Gerrit Viljoen, minister of cooperation, development and education; Chris Heunis, minister of constitutional development and planning; R. F. "Pik" Botha, minister of foreign affairs; and F. W. de Klerk, Transvaal leader of the NP and minister of home affairs and of national education. Of course, the armed forces pose another alternative, although there is little evidence that the military desires to assume outright responsibility for the state.

These names emerge as if change at the helm, in itself, will open new avenues for resolution. This is not likely,

although without new leadership little will be altered. Other critics have suggested the creation of a government truly open to the participation of a variety of parties and interests, much like Great Britain's coalition War Cabinet. The current civil upheaval requires a national, total, cooperative effort. Unfortunately, those with real power do not seem inclined to support a collaborative effort that would, after all, require all parties to compromise a great deal.

Botha surely realizes that unmitigated repression is not working; but he also senses that thoroughgoing reform would lead the right to bring down his government. That is Pretoria's dilemma. ■

ZIMBABWE

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10 percent surcharge on imports. Some observers also suggest that an effective international embargo of South Africa's ports could cause incalculable short-term damage to Zimbabwe's economy and increase the risk of political destabilization and civil war. The option of alternative trade routes and markets is severely limited by the continuing civil wars in Angola and Mozambique and by the gross inadequacies of the transport lines across Tanzania to Dar es Salaam. Many Zimbabweans argue that the decision reached by President Ronald Reagan's administration to resume military aid to UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) will only delay the rehabilitation and reopening of the vital Benguela railway, which extends to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola.

The two new regional trade organizations, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), will provide viable alternatives to South African routes. But these alternatives require at least a decade and considerable infrastructure development. SADCC will need enormous infusions of external capital, equipment and technical expertise. These needs will surely loom large on the agenda of this year's annual meeting of the African Development Bank (ADB), which will be held in Harare. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe must preserve its existing trade routes in the face of escalating turmoil.

The growing presence of the guerrilla Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) in northern and central Mozambique has made access to coastal ports increasingly difficult and dangerous. The army is already guarding the vital oil pipeline and transport networks to Mozambique's port of Beira. The pipeline provides over 90 percent of Zimbabwe's oil and diesel requirements.¹⁶ The escalation of the civil war in Mozambique has forced Zimbabwe to deploy over 4,000 troops there and to shift to a more costly conventional offensive military posture.¹⁷ At a midyear summit meeting in 1985, Tanzania and Zimbabwe agreed to increase military and logistical sup-

port for Mozambique. Zimbabwean troops have been authorized to launch counterattacks against the MNR.

Zimbabwe's leaders are not in complete agreement on the issue of international economic sanctions against South Africa. Prime Minister Mugabe supports sanctions but warns that Zimbabwe cannot participate until a significant number of Western powers strictly enforce them. John Mkushi, president of the influential Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, has predicted a "total collapse" of Zimbabwe's economy if sanctions against South Africa were fully implemented. It is a painful reality that South Africa is still Zimbabwe's largest source of raw materials and the largest market for its exports. It could take many years to find alternative markets.

Overall, Zimbabwe's relations with neighboring black countries have improved. The growing realization of interdependence and the common threat of South Africa have injected a large dose of pragmatism into diplomacy. Border clashes between the Zimbabwe National Army and the Botswana Defense Force have practically ceased. Botswana is tightening control over Ndebele refugee camps; as a result, it has been more difficult for dissidents in Matabeleland to obtain arms from their comrades across the border. Security talks with Botswana in October, 1985, have led to better patrolling of the border areas. Relations with Zambia have also greatly improved. Food-deficit Zambia recently purchased substantial quantities of Zimbabwean maize. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda is expected to do everything possible to ensure that cordial relations are maintained and that southern Zambia does not become a haven for anti-Mugabe elements.

By contrast, Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa have steadily deteriorated. Mugabe has steadfastly refused to sign a nonaggression pact with South Africa, although he has made it clear to the ANC that its troops may not operate openly in Zimbabwe. South Africa favors a strong and politically stable regime in Zimbabwe only if it prevents its territory from becoming a guerrilla springboard. In December, 1985, Zimbabwe was threatened with direct South African intervention in the wake of a series of land-mine explosions just across the border in the Transvaal.

South Africa has begun to construct a high-voltage fence along its entire border with Zimbabwe to prevent future incursions. But the Zimbabwean leadership is aware that South Africa has the ability to throw its weight to the dissidents in Matabeleland, just as it has supported UNITA in Angola and the MNR in Mozambique. Such a development could lead Zimbabwe down the road to civil war and make national unity a utopian dream.

Zimbabwe's quest for national unity is fraught with many obstacles, including personality clashes, tribal rivalries, ideological cleavages, turmoil in neighboring countries, and the pressure of population on land. It is a quest that requires enormous courage, patience and compromise from Zimbabwe's leadership as well as from its

¹⁶Personal field notes, Mutare, Zimbabwe, March 16, 1985.

¹⁷*Washington Post*, June 13, 1985.

trading partners, East and West. Zimbabwe's human and physical resources and its economic infrastructure are without peer north of the Limpopo River. It is destined to play a dominant role in both the SADCC and the PTA and it is already a major force in the community of nonaligned nations. Nervous South Africans, black and white, are looking to Zimbabwe to see if different racial and ethnic groups can in fact coexist peacefully and productively under black majority rule.

Independence was won in Zimbabwe in 1980 after eight years of divisive guerrilla warfare.¹⁸ Since then, considerable progress has been made in fields like mass education and health. But in some respects Zimbabwe is still a nation waiting to be born. It has yet to achieve a national consensus. Its government is torn between the long-stated goal of publicly financed socialist development and the exigencies of finance capital, food and accelerated agro-industrial production.

Consequently, key decisions are made only to be retracted, modified or not widely enforced. As a result, many policies seem to be ambiguous and contradictory. Although such fluidity and ferment may be considered a healthy and inevitable part of the process of nation-building, it has nevertheless contributed to an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty that tends to stifle long-term investment and weaken international confidence.

Seven years ago in *Current History* this author noted that

a unified democratic . . . Zimbabwe will prevail only if and when the various black nationalist factions agree to submerge these differences for the cause of national unity. . . . [In a ZANU regime] Mugabe, in alliance with fellow Shona, may rob Nkomo of his Shona supporters, leaving ZAPU with a narrow ethnic base. Such a development could lead to a civil war, with bitter tribal overtones.¹⁹

Seven years have elapsed, but the danger remains, however remote, and should intensify the quest for national unity.

To establish a viable two-party system, the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU may have to emulate their nonpolitical counterparts and build a following along lines other than tribalism and ethnicity. Prime Minister Mugabe should learn from the late Mohammed Buhari regime in Nigeria and from the P. W. Botha government in South Africa that tranquillity and national unity cannot be achieved through preventive detention, press censorship or government raids on the homes and institutions of dissidents. National unity will not rise, like a phoenix, out of the forced merger of two political parties. It will take more than public declarations and flowery rhetoric to bring the people of Zimbabwe into a political whole. The bitter and sanguinary experiences of Uganda, Chad and countless other African countries should be ample proof.

¹⁸Richard W. Hull, *Southern Africa: Civilizations in Turmoil* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), p. 162.

¹⁹Richard W. Hull, "Rhodesia in Crisis," *Current History*, March, 1979, p. 138.

Zimbabwe has the capacity to lead Africa toward a more genuine, longer-lasting process of nation-building. Time has certainly not run out. ■

ANGOLA

(Continued from page 196)

and political alliance with Maoist China, severed long-standing ties with a Washington public relations firm headed by black power activist Florence Tate, and contracted for the services of a Republican-linked public relations firm, Black, Manafort, Stone, Kelly Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia.

Savimbi, whose Washington representatives distributed free copies of his battlefield poetry,¹² endorsed "democratic elections, freedom of religion and respect for tribal customs and languages," and appealed for antiaircraft (specifically Redeye and Stinger missiles) and antitank weapons with which he could repel an MPLA offensive.¹³

In early February, 1986, Savimbi carried his appeal to the United States. He was received by President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz, and he spoke to millions over television and to foreign policy elites gathered at places like the Council on Foreign Relations and Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies. Savimbi had the reported assistance of Saudi money and the energetic backing of conservative activists like Howard Phillips and Christopher Lehman. Previously known to few Americans, he covered the country with a remarkable "media barrage."¹⁴ Simultaneously, his supporters tried to mount a consumer boycott campaign against Chevron. They demanded that Chevron suspend the operations that generated \$580 million in taxes and royalties in 1985 for what they described as "Cuban-occupied Angola," and that provided "aid and comfort" to "America's Soviet enemy."¹⁵

On February 18, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Reagan administration had decided to provide UNITA with antiaircraft and antitank missiles. Such assistance, to be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, is expected to total approximately \$15 million. According to Crocker, American assistance already in "process" does not mean that the administration believes that a "military solution" is desirable or feasible in Angola. To the contrary, the American government will continue to seek a package of diplomatic agreements that will include both the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Additionally, it will press the MPLA government to negotiate a power-sharing

¹²Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, *Quando a terra voltara a sorrir um dia* (Lisbon: Perspectivas e Realidades, 1985).

¹³Jonas Savimbi, "Fighting for the Future of Angola," *Insight*, vol. 2, no. 3 (January 20, 1986), p. 79.

¹⁴See R. W. Apple, "Red Carpet for a Rebel, or How a Star is Born," *The New York Times*, February 7, 1986.

¹⁵*Los Angeles Times*, January 30, 1986.

agreement with UNITA, which is Jonas Savimbi's stated goal.

The Reagan administration is apparently arguing that although it has decided to aid the UNITA insurgency it has not really taken sides. The annual (1985) report on human rights practices issued by the United States Department of State in February, 1986, depicted intensified civil war that was causing great suffering and devastation in Angola. Each side, it noted, "accused the other of killing civilians and committing atrocities." Between 200,000 and 500,000 people had been driven from their homes. The deteriorating security situation had contributed to the demise of judicial safeguards and due process. And Angolan civilians had also been killed as a result of continued fighting between the forces of SWAPO and the SADF, with South Africa mounting several crossborder raids into Angola, including an unsuccessful May, 1985, commando attack on United States (Gulf/Chevron) oil facilities in Cabinda.¹⁶

But will the Reagan administration's decision to intervene in support of UNITA's insurgency make more attainable its goal of facilitating political rather than military solutions? Or is the opposite more likely, as many critics in the United States and West Europe have suggested? Writing in the Paris weekly *L'Express*, Alain Louyot expressed a widely shared view when he wrote:

In openly aiding UNITA, the United States closes the door to all hope for a negotiated settlement in southern Africa. With this act, its mediation efforts in quest of a departure of South Africa from Namibia in return for the withdrawal of some 35,000 Cubans from Angola are reduced to nothing.¹⁷

If Angolan officials respond as they threaten to do, this somber view may prove prophetic. In January, 1986, President dos Santos warned Crocker that if the United States assisted UNITA, Angola would solicit additional aid from its "traditional friends," the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries. He questioned whether such an American move would represent "a form of pressure" or a "declaration of war."¹⁸ As the American administration moves to implement a program of assistance to UNITA, however, the Luanda government has, at least initially, chosen not to perceive a state of war but rather to hire a conservative, Republican-linked public relations firm of its own, Gray and Company, to interpret its case to Washington.

Whether UNITA forces reinforced with American-supplied antitank and antiaircraft weapons will be strong

¹⁶The report's findings regarding Angola, South Africa and other regional states were given extensive coverage by the South African press. See *The Star* (Johannesburg), February 14, 1986.

¹⁷Alain Louyot, "Le casse-tête angolais," *L'Express*, no. 1805 (February, 1986), p. 12.

¹⁸Angop (Angolan News Agency), Lisbon, January 9, 1986.

¹⁹See analysis by Jill Joliffe in *The Sunday Times* (London), September 15, 1985.

²⁰John A. Marcum, "United States Options in Angola," *CSIS Africa Notes*, no. 52 (December 20, 1985).

²¹*The Economist* (London), February 1, 1986, p. 16.

enough to turn back a new MPLA offensive remains to be seen. The Angolan army has grown to a force of some 75,000 (not counting foreign personnel that include, in addition to approximately 30,000 Cubans, up to 3,000 other East-bloc and Yugoslav advisers and technicians). Portuguese counterinsurgency-specialists have upgraded the combat effectiveness of Angolan ground forces. And to all this must be added the planned expansion of Angolan airpower.¹⁹ The prospects for intensified fighting, conceivably extending to clashes between Angolan and South African forces, seem real.

The Reagan administration hopes, however, that these prospects will, in fact, give pause to a war-weary Angolan government. Already, the fall in world oil prices is slicing hundreds of millions of dollars from government revenues. In this context, Luanda authorities must decide how seriously to take United States government statements that Chevron and other American corporations should consider whether United States "national interests" dictates their withdrawal. (Some but not all observers think it likely that West European and Japanese business interests will step happily into any void occasioned by their departure.)²⁰ The MPLA and its Soviet and Cuban backers have to judge just how much the United States might be prepared to spend or to risk in order to deny the MPLA a decisive military victory.

In the process of such an agonizing reconsideration of its circumstances, might the MPLA conclude that a negotiated settlement with UNITA is desirable? The MPLA is embittered by years of fratricidal bloodshed, unsure of its own rural support (especially among traditional chiefs and uneducated peasants who have been cultivated by UNITA), and distrustful of Savimbi's political ambition, astuteness and close ties with South Africa. Until now, it has consistently and categorically rejected any idea of negotiation with Savimbi (as distinct from "genuine nationalists" within UNITA ranks). *The Economist* put its finger on the nub of the matter:

The ideal course would be an accommodation between [Savimbi] and the men in [Luanda]; but they know, and so does he, that once in the government he would eat his coalition partners, politically, for breakfast.²¹

If the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa or the government of Angola seriously underestimates the political resolve or military capacity of either its allies or adversaries in Angola, Angola may again, as in 1975, become a critical arena of global confrontation. Concerned observers can only hope that Washington's decision to resume military assistance to the "contras" of Angola will, in fact, facilitate, not destroy, diplomatic efforts to achieve negotiated solutions to internal and crossboundary conflict. They can hope that American intervention will not press Angola into an even greater dependence on Soviet and Cuban military support and reverse the course of economic reform that has been induced, in part, by profitable and liberalizing relations with American private enterprise.

In 1986, there is a danger that the United States may find itself confronted with an Angolan crisis choice similar to the choice it faced in 1975. It might have to suffer a second politically humiliating Angolan retreat or provide massive support to besieged and intertwined UNITA and South African forces, thus visibly allying itself with a South African government from whose racial policies it has been seeking to disassociate itself. One thing is certain. Angola has embarked on its second decade of independence still grimly locked in the debilitating grip of externally fueled civil war. ■

KENYA

(Continued from page 225)

African trend toward overvaluation. Since the late 1970's, Kenya has adopted a policy of flexible exchange rate adjustments.¹⁷ Between 1978 and 1981, for example, Kenya devalued its currency by approximately 40 percent from 7.4 Kenya shillings (Sh) per United States dollar to 10.3 shillings per dollar. Since then, the currency has been devalued an additional 50 percent and now stands at approximately 15 shillings to the dollar. The ultimate barometer of an exchange rate policy is the ratio between a country's official rate and the rate in "shadow" or unofficial markets. As a result of Kenya's policy of flexible adjustments, there is very little difference between the official exchange rate and the unofficial rate.

The maintenance of a realistic exchange rate has minimized the shift in internal terms of trade against the countryside by assuring rural producers a high level of purchasing power for their income; it has avoided a disruptive loss of foreign exchange to overseas accounts, thereby insuring foreign exchange to finance the import of inputs for the industrial and agricultural sectors; and it has helped sustain an adequate supply of consumer goods to avoid the emergence of informal markets for agricultural exports. Because Kenya's foreign exchange reserves have allowed it to repay foreign debts promptly, it enjoys an impeccable reputation for creditworthiness with the international donor community.

CONCLUSION

Kenya's principal agricultural policies—land, pricing and exchange rates—have enabled the country to emerge as a major participant in international agricultural trade. As a result, Kenya's agrarian economy is the envy of its immediate neighbors and a model for other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya currently ranks tenth in the quotas assigned by the International Coffee Organization and may soon overtake Uganda and Ethiopia, countries whose coffee exports are seriously constrained by political instability. Kenya ranks among the world's three largest tea exporters, alongside India and Sri Lanka, and enjoys

a substantial price premium because of the quality of its product.

One of the most important aspects of Kenya's agricultural success has been its ability to take advantage of short-term opportunities in the world market for agricultural goods. Thus, in 1984, Kenya took advantage of a momentary doubling in the world tea price that resulted from a decision by the government of India to impose a temporary ban on exports. Indeed, Kenya's additional earnings from tea made it possible for Kenya to pay commercial prices for the large volumes of food imports it required because of the drought and, nevertheless, to register a positive rate of economic growth in 1984. Kenya is now in an exceptionally strong position to take advantage of the booming market for coffee created by the Brazilian drought. Since the effects of this drought are expected to last for several years, Kenya may well enjoy a foreign exchange bonanza until the 1990's.

The coffee boom should have a major beneficial effect on Kenya's economy.¹⁸ Kenyan authorities are determined to invest the country's windfall in areas that will yield long-term economic dividends, including the further development of the agricultural and transportation infrastructures. An extended coffee boom will also permit the further expansion of the country's manufacturing sector, thereby helping to alleviate urban unemployment. In 1986, Kenya gives every indication of a society about to enjoy economic prosperity and political stability. ■

THE SUDAN

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been a problem in this Sudanese political grouping, and former followers of Azhari and Mirghani are open to appeals from other political groups.

Other organizations have been traditionally involved in Sudanese politics, but their positions have changed today. In the 1950's, the Sudan Communist party (SCP) and the Muslim Brotherhood were relatively small organizations, supported primarily by the educated classes. They presented clear, ideologically based platforms and were important but not large. The SCP became one of the largest and most effective Communist parties in Africa and provided strong initial support for Nimeiry. However, tensions soon developed, and an abortive leftist coup attempt in 1971 provided the rationale for Nimeiry's suppression of the SCP. The actual strength of the SCP in 1985–1986 is not clear, but it has reemerged as a political force under the leadership of Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud.

The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in the 1950's as the advocate of a fundamentalist Islamic program. Its goals are similar to those of the Muslim Brotherhoods in other parts of the Islamic world, but it is organizationally separate. In the 1950's and 1960's, it had limited influence and the Islamic Charter Front, which it established for the elections in the 1960's, was not a major force. However, its effective organization and growing influence

¹⁷Kenya, *Development Plans*, pp. 31–32.

¹⁸For a detailed consideration of the probable economic effects of this boom, see *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi), January 17, 1986, pp. 13–19.

among educated Sudanese made it a major force during the Nimeiry era. Under its leader, Hasan Turabi, the Brotherhood was active in opposition and was a major participant in the national reconciliation begun in 1977–1978.

Many observers believe that Nimeiry's Islamization program was the product of the Brotherhood's influence, although that program itself was different from Turabi's. The Brotherhood approved Islamization in principle but its opposition to Nimeiry's practice led to Nimeiry's suppression of the Brotherhood early in 1985. After the revolution in April, the Brotherhood and its political allies emerged as a well-organized force. Its early demonstrations showed a wide range of popular support that went beyond its former narrow base among intellectuals.

In the last years of Nimeiry's rule and in the open political atmosphere after his fall, new groups became more visible. It is difficult to judge their actual importance and influence. Some of them have associations with other governments or with movements outside the Sudan and this gives them added significance. The Arab Baath party, which has ties with other Baath groups in the Middle East, was active in opposition to Nimeiry through its publications but it does not appear to have a large following. Similarly, a structure of "Sudanese revolutionary committees" advocates a Libyan-style political system in the Sudan. Other parties present a variety of platforms and are more local. The National Congress party formed in January, 1986, for example, was described by its founders as a "national moderate party which represents the silent majority."⁴

The alliance of professional associations, unions and political parties that was formed during the events leading up to the overthrow of Nimeiry is a large organization. It provided effective coordination for the opposition and was important in the negotiations leading to the formation of the Cabinet in late April, 1985. However, its constituent parts are political competitors, and although it has maintained its organizational existence, its function is now unclear. It is likely to remain in existence only until its leaders feel that the goals of the original alliance have been achieved.

The single most important power group in the Sudan is the military, and in times of political disorganization military officers have taken control. Despite the high level of civilian involvement in the events that led to the fall of the Nimeiry regime, it was military officers who actually overthrew Nimeiry and who ruled the country thereafter. The new military rulers formally committed themselves to eventual civilian government but resisted calls from groups like the SPLM to withdraw from the political arena immediately.

Despite the close ties of all levels of the military to important social, religious and ethnic groups in the Sudan, soldiers as a group belong to the one nonsectarian, nonclass, nonethnic institution in the Sudan. This has

given military leaders an initial political advantage. The Sudanese people are apparently willing to accept some strong control from military leaders, although they would not accept similar control from a civilian identified with one of the major political, social or religious groupings. At the same time, when military leaders overstep certain limits, civilian groups can overthrow a military regime, as they did in 1964 and 1985.

No single civilian political organization appears to have the support of a Sudanese majority. As a result, in the near future some form of civilian government will probably operate in the context of a number of relatively evenly matched groups competing and joining in temporary alliances. The balance of power will probably be maintained by the continued, possibly indirect, involvement of the military. The political coalitions that emerge will be based more on rivalries than on common interests. As a result, there will be a struggle for the middle of the political spectrum and an era of compromise and coalition politics. The Sudanese will turn again to strong individual leadership only if this approach fails to resolve the Sudan's major problems. However, the civilian leaders will have to be more cooperative than they have been in the past if the old cycle is not to be repeated in the Sudan. ■

UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

(Continued from page 208)

mixed messages to southern Africa by supporting South African-backed UNITA forces. On July 11, 1985, the Democrat-controlled House voted to repeal the Clark Amendment, which had eliminated covert aid to Savimbi's UNITA, while the Republican-controlled Senate voted for sanctions against South Africa.²⁰ Conservatives who had pressed for increased pressure on South Africa as well as on Angola and Mozambique believed that anti-apartheid and anti-Communist stands were compatible. They were supporting struggles for freedom against racism and communism.

In the Angolan debate, the administration revised its Angolan policy by agreeing to supply UNITA covertly with \$15 million in military equipment. Two Reagan policies were involved—the globalist "Reagan doctrine," which calls for aid to third world "freedom fighters" against Communist domination, and the more regional policy of constructive engagement. Global strategists contended that aiding Savimbi would "roll back communism," demonstrate revived American resolution to American allies and to the Soviet Union, and encourage the Angolan government to incorporate UNITA into a government of national reconciliation.

²⁰Repeal of the Clark Amendment permitted U.S. aid, but several congressmen, notably Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.), who voted for the repeal, stated that repeal of the Clark Amendment should not be construed as a congressional endorsement of military aid to Savimbi.

⁴Ibid., January 10, 1986, p. Q15.

Conservatives were concerned about a growing Soviet presence in Angola. The Soviet Union had supplied Angola with over \$2 billion in military supplies and some 1,000 advisers since December, 1983. In July, 1985, a concerted Soviet-supplied Angolan drive to capture Savimbi's headquarters at Jamba was thwarted only with the aid of the South African military.

Opponents of aid to UNITA argue that such aid would appear inconsistent with the distancing from South Africa and would suggest that the United States regarded communism as a more dangerous enemy than racism. Aid to UNITA would also endanger American credibility as an honest broker and would encourage the South African government to destabilize the region by armed force. Other observers speculated that United States assistance might not attract continued public support and that, while insufficient to secure a Savimbi takeover, it would prompt increased Angolan reliance on the Soviet Union and Cuba. Increased Soviet and Cuban assistance would make linkage of a joint Cuban and South African troop withdrawal more difficult. Finally, aid to UNITA would work against American business, notably Chevron/Gulf in Angola.

The Reagan administration divided sharply over aid to Savimbi. The State Department, especially Chester Crocker and the African Bureau, felt that such aid would align the United States with South Africa, Savimbi's strongest supporter, while lessening the chances for a Namibian settlement. State Department officials also worried that aid to Savimbi would cripple any American attempt to secure a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Two days after Congress repealed the Clark Amendment, Angola postponed both Cuban troop withdrawal and talks with the United States on Namibia for three months. Thus Secretary of State Shultz wrote to Congressman Robert Michel (R., Ill.) in October, 1985, that aid to UNITA was "ill timed" and "will not contribute to the settlement we seek."²¹

Yet UNITA enjoyed increasing support not only in Congress but also from the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (curiously, only the DIA believed that Savimbi could win a guerrilla war). And at the United Nations in late October, 1985, President Reagan included Angola as one of the five nations "at war with their own people."

Faced with the strong probability of United States aid, Secretary Shultz effectively lobbied to shrink the aid from \$30 million to \$15 million and to delay disbursement of the aid to foster the talks on Namibia that were resumed in November, 1985. The administration had tentatively

²¹"Shultz Privately Asked Michel To Bar Rebel Aid," *Washington Post*, October 23, 1985.

²²This legislation was introduced by Senator Malcolm Wallop (R., Wy.) and Representative Dan Burton (R., Ind.).

²³In early 1986 MNR guerrillas recaptured their headquarters in the Gorongosa Mountains. The Mozambican soldiers reportedly offered a weak defense.

agreed in early December to aid UNITA, and it began disbursing the "covert" aid, via CIA discretionary funds (reportedly for antiaircraft and antitank missiles), in mid-February, 1986.

In 1986 a key question will be whether, if faced with increased Soviet and Cuban military assistance to Angola, the Reagan administration will press for greater assistance for Savimbi. A possible consequence of United States aid to UNITA is Angolan retribution against Zaire. A rich, pro-Western nation that borders Angola, Zaire reportedly will permit the transit of UNITA aid into Angola.

In 1986, conservative congressmen will monitor the effectiveness of the administration's covert aid to Savimbi while pressing for restrictions on American economic aid to the Angolan government. In early February, 1986, a group of conservative congressmen sued the United States Export-Import Bank to block \$96 million in guarantees and loan credits.

Congressional conservatives also scored significant victories with regard to Mozambique. In 1984, the administration helped persuade Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Pact of Nonaggression which, inter alia, banned South African support of the MNR, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement. Most observers credited the Nkomati accords as a victory for constructive engagement. The administration also hoped that American military and food aid would encourage Mozambique to strengthen its ties to the West while discouraging MNR activities.

In 1985, Congress successfully defeated administration plans for \$3.2 million in military assistance, seriously considered restricting economic assistance and, during President Machel's state visit to Washington, introduced legislation to provide \$5 million in United States military aid to the MNR.²²

United States support for Mozambique will continue to face strong congressional scrutiny in 1986. Conservatives will continue to oppose "bailing out" a Marxist-Leninist state, and critics of Machel's Mozambique will probably argue that, in light of aid to UNITA, the administration's anti-Communist policy should be consistent. The future of the Mozambique government is also uncertain in view of the continued military successes of the MNR.²³

While the administration retains many of its regional goals in southern Africa, the events of 1985 made them harder to achieve. In May, South Africa sent a commando team to blow up American oil installations in Angola despite the United States-supported 1984 Lusaka Agreement, which mandated a South African-Cuban disengagement. In June, South African troops raided ANC headquarters in Botswana, which provoked the Reagan administration to recall Herman Nickel, its ambassador, and to delay accreditation to South Africa's new ambassador, Herbert Beukes. Additionally, South Africa admitted that it had continued to assist Mozambique's MNR

despite the Nkomati accords. Disenchantment with constructive engagement also arose from optimistic earlier predictions by the Reagan administration about settlements in Namibia and Angola.

By early 1986, several unknowns were clouding the horizon. Would South African violence continue at the same level and would South Africa's media restrictions continue to be effective in lessening American coverage? In light of its preoccupation with the United States deficit, would Congress devote substantial attention to United States policy toward southern Africa? Finally, what would be the possible effects of the long-rumored departures from office of South Africa's President Botha and United States Assistant Secretary of State Crocker?

Yet despite these questions, an evolving American policy toward southern Africa is taking shape, and several important and possibly irreversible trends can be discerned. First, while the levels are impossible to predict, black violence has acquired a self-sustaining force that the South African government appears unable to control. Second, while media coverage of this violence remains inadequate, increasing numbers of Americans strongly sympathize with the black struggle. Finally, since the United States adopted a sanctions package in September, an increasingly aggressive policy toward the South African government seems certain. ■

DROUGHT AND DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA

(Continued from page 220)

organizations has brought representatives of the central authority to rural areas. The WPE was officially launched in 1984, but attempts to organize a party had started in 1975. The WPE is a small, vanguard-type organization with about 30,000 members nationwide. Many are cadres trained carefully with Soviet and East German help; all recent reports from Ethiopia agree that the presence of the cadres is strong everywhere, even in remote rural areas. The mass organizations, with several million members, further strengthen the presence of the government.

Villagization, collectivization and resettlement are logical complements to the trend toward centralization. Party officials can control villages more easily than isolated homesteads, and the Agricultural Marketing Corporation can impose delivery quotas on collective farms more easily than on individual peasants. And while resettlement per se does not increase government control, resettlement on collective farms undoubtedly does.

In 1986, the Ethiopian government appears to have a clear economic policy, although it is more likely to lead to disaster than to development, at least in the short run. It has made significant progress in creating political institutions and in increasing its political control. However, it has made no progress and has not even formulated a policy with regard to the so-called problem of the nationalities, which includes the ethnic liberation movements in Eritrea and Tigray.

ETHNIC MOVEMENTS IN ERITREA AND TIGRAY

Italian colonization gave Eritrea a separate identity and led to strong ethnic movements there and in Tigray. In both these regions, the Tigreans constitute the major ethnic group (the Amharas dominated Haile Selassie's regime and may come to dominate the Mengistu regime). The major liberation movement in Eritrea is the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Forces), a secessionist movement with a radical Marxist ideological orientation. The EPLF has received aid from the more radical Arab countries, but it has been looked at with suspicion by the moderate or conservative Arab states because of its Marxist leanings. There are other Eritrean movements, including the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the ELF-EPLF, but they are badly splintered and ineffective as fighting forces.

In Tigray, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) is the only significant movement. Now avowedly secessionist—its program emphasizes regional autonomy rather than independence—the TPLF has received considerable aid from the EPLF, which welcomes the fighting in Tigray because it pins down part of the Ethiopian army and provides a buffer between Eritrea and government-controlled Ethiopia. The ideological orientation of the TPLF is not clear, although the movement is generally considered leftist.

The Mengistu regime has tried unsuccessfully to deal with the EPLF and the TPLF by force. A stalemate now exists. The liberation movements are incapable of winning a military victory because they cannot capture the major towns, and the government's periodic offensives have not dislodged the liberation movements from rural areas. The war is sapping the country's economy, and it may cause unrest in the army. The military's morale is reported low, and while this should not be taken as a sign of an impending revolt—morale in the military has been reported low for the past ten years—the situation is dangerous for the government.

However, the regime has not been willing, or able, to find a political solution. It argues that the problem of the nationalities has to be discussed and solved as a whole and that this entails some local autonomy and respect for the different cultures. An Institute of the Nationalities has been created to study the issues, but no proposal has been published. Indeed, all the policies of the Mengistu regime are directed at encouraging centralization and government control, and discouraging both decentralization and local autonomy.

More fighting and food shortages are likely in 1986. The refugee camps in the Sudan and Somalia will see a renewed influx of refugees from war, famine and government policy, and the population will continue to suffer. The government will increase its control over the country as both political and economic institutions become better organized. While Ethiopia's problems are staggering, it would be wishful thinking to conclude that the Mengistu regime cannot survive them. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1986, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

March 25—The League condemns what it calls U.S. "aggression" in the fighting between Libya and the U.S. in the Gulf of Sidra; a Libyan demand for sanctions against the U.S. is rejected by the League.

Arms Control

(See also *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 4—Talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons recess in Geneva; no progress is reported.

March 20—The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna recess; no progress is reported.

March 29—Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev suggests a meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan anywhere in Europe "in the near future" to negotiate an end to nuclear testing.

European Economic Community (EEC)

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Iran-Iraq War

(See also *Lebanon*)

March 5—Teheran radio reports that government forces shelled the Iraqi air base at Shuaiba.

Iraqi sources report that Jordan's King Hussein made a surprise visit to Baghdad today and expressed his support for Iraq.

March 14—A United Nations (UN) team reports that Iraq has used chemical weapons "on many occasions" during the Iran-Iraq War.

March 17—A Cypriot oil tanker in the Persian Gulf is reportedly set on fire after a missile attack is staged by Iraqi airplanes.

Middle East

March 8—In Tunis, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) issues a formal statement accusing the U.S. of causing the collapse of peace talks last month between the PLO and King Hussein of Jordan.

March 18—Salah Khalaf, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat's second in command, says that PLO forces have reassembled in southern Lebanon.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *Spain*)

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

March 24—An extraordinary 9-day meeting of oil ministers ends without an agreement on measures to stabilize OPEC's share of the world oil market. A new session is scheduled for April 15.

Paris Club

March 7—The 17 Western nations of the so-called Paris Club agree to allow Poland an additional 10 years to repay \$1.9 billion in foreign debt due to Western governments.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Switzerland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 11—Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar advises the U.S. to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. about the March 7 U.S. order that the Soviet Union reduce the size of its UN mission.

Diplomats in Paris report that 26 Western nations in the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are trying to block the reelection of UNESCO Director Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow.

March 14—The 43-member UN Human Rights Commission calls on Chile to halt human rights abuses; the U.S. is sponsoring the resolution.

March 24—The World Bank announces that it is approving \$1.5 billion in loans to Latin American nations in order to help the largest Latin American debtor nations increase their economic growth.

AUSTRIA

March 5—Former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, who is running for President in Austria, says that his involvement with the German army in World War II is being misrepresented; yesterday, *The New York Times* reported that Waldheim served with a German military unit in Yugoslavia that was responsible for deporting Greek Jews to Nazi death camps.

BANGLADESH

March 22—The military government abolishes martial law administration. It says it is also abolishing 150 military courts and announces that parliamentary elections scheduled for April 26 will be held May 7.

BRAZIL

March 2—A group of international bankers meeting in New York agrees to restructure \$31 billion of the \$104 billion in foreign debt held by Brazil.

March 17—The Foreign Ministry asks the U.S. to clarify charges made by U.S. President Ronald Reagan that Nicaragua is supporting guerrillas in Brazil; the Brazilian government says it has no evidence that Nicaragua is supporting a guerrilla movement in Brazil.

BULGARIA

March 22—The official press agency reports that yesterday the Parliament named Politburo member Georgi Atanasov Prime Minister.

CANADA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 18—In Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announces that Canada and the U.S. have signed a 5-year extension of a mutual air defense agreement.

CHAD

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 7—Foreign Minister Gourara Lassou says that government forces have killed 864 Libyan-backed guerrillas in northern Chad in the last 2 days.

CHILE(See *Intl, UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)**CHINA**

March 21—In Beijing, an agreement on the exchange of engineers and technicians is signed with the Soviet Union.

COLOMBIA

March 10—In elections for the National Assembly and 23 state legislatures, the Liberal party wins 49 percent of the vote; the governing Conservative party receives 38 percent. Leftist guerrillas who took part in the elections receive 1.5 percent.

ECUADOR

March 7—President León Febres Cordero dismisses the head of the air force, Lieutenant General Frank Vargas Pazos; Vargas has refused the government's request that he retire.

March 8—Vargas takes over the air force base at Manta; he agrees to leave the base later in the day.

March 14—The government says it has recaptured the air force base near Quito that Vargas took over yesterday. Vargas is arrested.

EGYPT

March 4—Interior Minister Zaki Badr says Muslim fundamentalists and political opposition groups may have been responsible for last week's paramilitary police rebellion.

EL SALVADOR

March 4—President José Napoleón Duarte sends a proposal to Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra suggesting that both leaders open simultaneous negotiations with guerrillas operating in their countries.

March 15—A government-organized march of 20,000 parades through San Salvador to support Duarte's economic austerity measures.

FRANCE(See also *Lebanon*)

March 1—In Paris, President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl sign a military cooperation pact that includes a French promise to consult with Germany before firing tactical nuclear weapons.

March 5—The Defense Ministry reports that the military has successfully tested a new multiple-warhead missile that has a distance of 6,000 kilometers (3,720 miles).

March 16—A coalition of 2 conservative parties, the Rally for the Republic and the Union for French Democracy, wins 41 percent of the vote and 277 seats in the National Assembly in today's legislative elections. The Socialist party wins 32.5 percent of the vote; it will receive 215 seats in coalition with allied leftist parties. The Communist party suffers a decline, winning about 10 percent of the vote and 35 seats. The ultraright-wing National Front wins about 10 percent of the vote and 33 seats.

March 17—President Mitterrand accepts the resignation of his Socialist Prime Minister, Laurent Fabius.

March 18—Mitterrand names conservative Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac Prime Minister.

March 20—Chirac becomes Prime Minister; he names a new government.

March 21—An Arab terrorist group, the Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners, claims responsibility for the bombing in Paris yesterday that killed 2 people and wounded 13.

GERMANY, WEST(See also *France*)

March 19—Chancellor Helmut Kohl and visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announce that they have reached agreement on West Germany's participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or Star Wars).

HAITI

March 5—The government orders a general amnesty for all prisoners.

March 7—Exiled Haitian President Jean-Claude Duvalier moves to Grasse in the French Riviera.

March 10—The Roman Catholic Church announces that it is beginning a drive to make "3 million people literate in the next five years."

March 20—Gérard Gourgue, the justice minister and a longtime opponent of Duvalier's, resigns because he has been unable to prosecute members of Duvalier's secret police.

March 21—Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, the head of the government, announces the resignation of 2 members of the ruling council and the council's counselor; the 3 men were linked to Duvalier.

March 24—Thousands of people march through Port-au-Prince to demonstrate for a civilian government. Later, Namphy announces a Cabinet reorganization.

HONDURAS(See *Nicaragua; U.S., Foreign Policy*)**INDIA**(See also *U.S., Labor and Industry*)

March 7—Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi orders the Congress party to withdraw support from Kashmir state chief minister Ghulam Mohammed Shah's government; Shah resigns.

March 24—The government rejects a proposed \$350-million settlement by U.S.-based Union Carbide for victims of the 1984 gas leak at Union Carbide's plant in Bhopal.

March 26—Police kill 9 Sikhs who attacked a meeting attended by the Punjab state chief minister.

March 31—Three people are killed by Sikh extremists in Punjab state; since March 26 at least 36 people have been killed in Sikh-related violence.

IRAN(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)**IRAQ**(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)**IRELAND**

March 5—Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald says he will not suspend or delay an agreement with Great Britain that gives Ireland a consultative role in Northern Ireland.

ISRAEL

March 2—The Israeli-appointed mayor of Nablus, Zafer Masri, is assassinated; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claims responsibility.

The Magistrate's Court in Jerusalem formally charges John Demjanjuk with executing "hundreds of thousands of civilians" at the Treblinka concentration camp in 1942 and 1943; Demjanjuk was deported from the U.S. last month.

March 13—At the Herut party's congress in Jerusalem, a dispute breaks out between supporters of party leader Yitzhak Shamir and supporters of party members Ariel Sharon and David Levy; Sharon and Levy want to remove Shamir as head of the party.

ITALY

March 29—Because of ambiguous evidence against them, 3 Bulgarians and 3 Turks are acquitted of conspiring to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1983.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 31—Homemade rockets explode at the Akasaka Palace; 1 policeman is injured. In the last 7 days there have also been rocket attacks against the U.S. embassy and the Imperial Palace; no group has taken responsibility.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

KAMPUCHEA

March 17—In Beijing, the non-Communist coalition of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan offers to form a coalition government in Kampuchea with the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrin.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *U.S., Labor and Industry*)

March 9—South Korea's Roman Catholic Primate, Stephan Cardinal Kim Sou Hwan, asks President Chun Doo Hwan to allow direct presidential elections in 1988.

March 23—In Pusan, about 20,000 people demonstrate to ask for direct presidential elections.

March 30—In Kwangju, 50,000 people stage a peaceful anti-government protest. After the protest, student demonstrators clash with police; 50 students are arrested.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

March 5—The Islamic Holy War terrorist group says it has executed Michel Seurat, 1 of the 4 Frenchmen it has been holding hostage because France supports Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.

March 8—A French television crew is kidnapped in Beirut.

A car bomb explosion in East Beirut near the offices of President Amin Gemayel's Phalange party kills 5 people and wounds 30.

March 14—Islamic Holy War tells France that it has one "last chance" to negotiate the release of 3 French hostages held by the group.

March 26—At least 10 people are killed and 86 are wounded when a car bomb explodes near Phalange party headquarters in East Beirut; no group takes responsibility.

March 28—The executive committee of the Lebanese Forces militia, the Phalange party and the National Liberal party (all Christian), asks Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon.

LIBERIA

March 6—President Samuel Doe lifts a ban on the political activities of the press, students and teachers.

LIBYA

(See also *Chad; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 24—Libyan ground forces fire surface-to-air missiles at planes from the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Gulf of Sidra.

March 26—Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi meets with Maltese Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, who is trying to end the conflict between the U.S. and Libya over the Gulf of Sidra.

Libyan newspapers continue to claim that 3 U.S. planes were shot down in fighting between U.S. and Libyan forces

in the last 3 days; there has been no mention of Libyan casualties or the sinking of 2 Libyan patrol boats.

March 27—In Tripoli, hundreds rally to celebrate Libya's "victory" over the U.S. 6th Fleet.

March 28—Qaddafi claims that his forces have been victorious over the U.S. in the fighting in the Gulf of Sidra. He says Libyan forces will attack U.S. warships at NATO bases "in the future."

MALAYSIA

March 15—The police announce that they are deporting 706 foreigners from the eastern state of Sabah as part of a security program to stop a series of bombings. There have been 12 bombings in Sabah in the last 3 days.

MALTA

(See *Libya*)

NAMIBIA

(See *South Africa*)

NICARAGUA

(See also *El Salvador; U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

March 8—The Superior Council of Private Enterprise issues a statement criticizing the government for verbal attacks on the group; on February 21, President Daniel Ortega Saavedra said that the council was partly responsible for the country's problems.

March 14—The security police report that they have arrested 3 Nicaraguans who tried to infiltrate the Interior Ministry under orders from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

March 24—The army says its forces killed 115 anti-government guerrillas (contras) in northern Nicaragua between March 11 and March 17; no government casualty figures are given.

March 25—The Foreign Ministry denies U.S. and Honduran reports that Sandinista troops have crossed the border into Honduras and are attacking 2 contra camps there.

March 28—Ortega warns that U.S. helicopters and U.S. advisers ferrying Honduran troops to the Honduran-Nicaraguan border face "the same risk" as the contras.

PAKISTAN

March 23—The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy says 60,000 people took part in today's anti-government rally.

PANAMA

March 20—President Eric Arturo Delvalle announces that for security reasons Panama will not grant asylum to former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos.

PERU

March 19—It is reported in Lima that President Alan García will force more than 200 top-ranking police officers into retirement as part of his "moralization" campaign.

PHILIPPINES

(See also *Panama; Spain; Switzerland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 2—President Corazon Aquino issues a public declaration restoring the writ of habeas corpus.

March 4—The government says former President Ferdinand Marcos has been linked to foreign property holdings worth between \$5 billion and \$10 billion.

March 5—Despite objections from the military, 4 Communist leaders, including the head of the Philippine Communist party, are released from prison.

All but 2 or 3 of the 13 Supreme Court justices offer their resignations to Aquino.

March 6—*The New York Times* reports that Marcos received \$80 million from the U.S.-based Westinghouse Corporation 10 years ago after he awarded Westinghouse a contract to build a still uncompleted nuclear power plant.

March 12—Aquino freezes the Philippine assets of Marcos, his wife and their associates.

March 19—Aquino orders a 9 percent decrease in fuel prices.

Government officials report that the budget deficit may reach \$950 million in 1986, almost \$600 million more than the 1985 budget deficit.

March 22—Late today, Filipino workers at the U.S. air force and naval bases go on strike over wages.

March 24—Communist guerrilla leaders say they are willing to negotiate a cease-fire; on March 22, Aquino called on the guerrillas to end their insurgency and rejoin "the nation."

March 25—Aquino abolishes the National Assembly and announces an interim constitution that gives her legislative and executive powers until a new constitution is written; she promises to restore democratic government within a year.

POLAND

(See also *Intl, Paris Club*)

March 16—Prices are raised on bread, milk, sugar and alcohol.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

SOUTH AFRICA

March 3—The police report that they killed 7 black African National Congress guerrillas in an early morning ambush near Cape Town.

March 4—The government offers to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435 on August 1; the resolution calls for the independence of Namibia. However, the government says Namibian independence requires the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

March 5—At least 25,000 people attend a funeral for 17 blacks killed by the police last month. Diplomats from the U.S. and other Western nations attend the funeral.

March 7—The government ends its 7-month-old state of emergency. It says it has released the last 327 of 8,000 people detained during the emergency. The filming and photographing of violent protests is no longer banned.

March 11—The government reverses itself and says 3 reporters for the U.S. CBS news organization who filmed the March 5 funeral may stay in South Africa.

March 26—Police kill 30 blacks in incidents throughout the country; 10 are killed in the "tribal homeland" of Bophuthatswana when police fire on a crowd protesting the detention of blacks, and 10 others are killed near Port Elizabeth.

March 31—About 20,000 blacks defy a government ban and attend a memorial service near Port Elizabeth for an exiled Communist party leader; no violence is reported.

SPAIN

March 12—In today's referendum, nearly 53 percent of Spanish voters agree to retain Spain's membership in NATO.

March 16—The Foreign Ministry says Spain will not grant asylum to former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos.

SWEDEN

March 3—Acting Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson is confirmed as head of the ruling Social Democratic party; he takes the place of assassinated Prime Minister Olof Palme.

March 12—Parliament confirms Carlsson as Prime Minister.

SWITZERLAND

March 16—A government-sponsored referendum on whether Switzerland should join the UN is defeated by a 3-to-1 margin.

March 25—The government freezes all financial holdings of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos; Marcos has at least \$800 million in Swiss bank accounts.

THAILAND

March 24—Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda orders General Arthit Kamlang-ek, the head of the armed forces, to retire. Arthit says he will accept the decision.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control, UN; China*)

March 5—The Communist party congress in Moscow approves a resolution calling for "truly revolutionary changes" in the economy. The congress also selects a new party Central Committee.

March 6—At the last session of the congress, Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin is named a national party secretary and a full member of the Politburo. Four other new party secretaries and Politburo members are announced, including the 1st woman member since 1961.

March 9—Vega 2, the 2d Soviet unmanned mission to Halley's comet, flies within 5,200 miles of the comet. On March 6, Vega 1 transmitted the 1st pictures of the comet's core.

March 11—The government says that if the Soviet Union is required to reduce its UN staff under a U.S. order, "direct damage" will be done to U.S. and Soviet relations.

March 13—The government allows live television coverage of the lift-off of 2 cosmonauts, who will dock with a Soviet space station.

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev extends the nuclear test ban formerly set to expire March 31; Gorbachev repeats his proposal to allow on-site verification of a test ban.

March 14—The government orders the expulsion of a U.S. diplomat for spying.

March 23—The Communist party newspaper *Pravda* criticizes the U.S. for conducting an underground nuclear test yesterday.

March 25—The official press agency Tass condemns U.S. military actions against Libya in the Gulf of Sidra as acts of piracy; nonetheless, there has been no Soviet military intervention on Libya's part mentioned.

March 26—Gorbachev proposes that the U.S. and the Soviet Union remove their naval fleets from the Mediterranean Sea.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See *Ireland*)

Northern Ireland

March 3—A general strike to protest the British-Irish agreement (which gives Ireland limited consultative status in Northern Ireland) closes most businesses and stops transportation; some violence is reported.

March 31—Protestants in Portadown clash with police after the government bans a Protestant march; 49 people are injured.

UNITED STATES

Administration

March 3—In a final 1,000-page report on drug enforcement, the President's Commission on Organized Crime recommends the testing of federal employees for drugs.

- March 11—President Ronald Reagan releases \$750 million in emergency and other funds to the Farmers Home Administration to meet the heavy demand for farm loans.
- March 13—The Commerce Department rules that Japanese companies are selling current generation computer chips to U.S. concerns at below production-cost prices.
- March 18—The Treasury Department announces that paper money used in the U.S. has been redesigned to make the bills more difficult to counterfeit; this is the 1st major change in U.S. paper money since 1929.
- March 21—The Justice Department announces new regulations regarding the power of federal agencies to consent to court decrees that settle lawsuits against the U.S. without further litigation.
- March 25—The surgeon general of the U.S., C. Everett Koop, warns that snuff or chewing tobacco "is not a safe substitute for smoking a cigarette" because it can "cause cancer and a number of noncancerous oral conditions. . . ."
- March 31—The Department of Housing and Urban Development orders local housing authorities to refuse federal housing aid to all illegal aliens and to evict them if they fail to pay unsubsidized rents.

Economy

- March 4—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators declined 0.6 percent in January.
- March 7—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 7.2 percent in February, the largest monthly rise in nearly 6 years.
- The Federal Reserve Board cuts its discount rate to 7 percent, the lowest rate in 8 years; most major banks lower their prime rate to 9 percent.
- March 13—President Reagan nominates former Republican congressman from New York Barber Conable Jr. as president of the World Bank.
- March 14—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index fell 1.6 percent in February, the largest drop since it was introduced in 1947.
- March 17—The dollar reaches its post-World War II low against the Japanese yen: 174.50 yen to the dollar.
- March 18—The Commerce Department reports a record U.S. foreign trade deficit of \$117.7 billion in 1985.
- March 21—Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Preston Martin resigns, effective April 30.
- The Treasury Department announces a federal budget deficit of \$24.58 billion in February.
- March 25—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index fell 0.4 percent in February.
- March 27—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones industrial average of 30 stocks rises to a new record high of 1,821.72.
- The Commerce Department reports a U.S. foreign trade deficit of \$12.49 billion in February.
- March 28—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.7 percent in February.

Foreign Policy

- (See also *Intl, Arms Control, Middle East, UN; Brazil; Canada; Germany, West; Japan; Libya; Nicaragua; U.S.S.R.*)
- March 1—Former President Jimmy Carter says that President Reagan "habitually misstates the record of United States military modernization programs" and that he is "following an agenda for national security that [has] little chance of success."
- March 4—Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill (D., Mass.) suggests that instead of escalating the fighting in Central America, President Reagan should "ally with the

democratic nations in the region who are committed to a peaceful resolution of the region's conflicts."

- March 6—Meeting with House Republicans on aid to the Nicaraguan contras, President Reagan says that members of Congress must choose between supporting him or the Communists in Nicaragua.
- March 7—U.S. and Soviet negotiators complete 2 days of talks on ways to halt the spread of chemical weapons.
- The U.S. mission to the UN says that President Reagan has ordered the Soviet missions (Soviet, Ukrainian and Byelorussian) to the UN to reduce their personnel by one-third; the reduction is to be effected by April 1, 1988. The U.S. charges that because of espionage, the missions are "a threat to national security."
- President Reagan names Philip C. Habib as a special U.S. envoy to Central America.
- March 8—In Tokyo, U.S. and Japanese negotiators agree on a fishing accord in Alaskan waters that will halt Japan's salmon fishing there by 1994.
- March 11—President Reagan notifies Congress that he plans to sell \$350-million worth of antiaircraft and antiship missiles to Saudi Arabia.
- March 12—In an unusual reversal of policy, the U.S. calls on other countries to support its UN resolution expressing "deep concern" over the "troubling human rights situation in Chile."
- March 13—The State Department reports that the President has agreed to a Chadian request and will supply that country with \$10 million in military equipment.
- March 16—President Reagan tells Congress that in the future the U.S. will oppose dictatorships of the anti-Communist right as well as of the pro-Soviet left.
- In a nationally televised speech, President Reagan asks the American people to ask Congress to support his request for \$100 million in aid for the contra rebels in Nicaragua; he calls Nicaragua a "cancer" posing a direct threat to the U.S.
- March 17—The State Department prepares to turn over copies of 1,500 documents brought to the U.S. by former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos to the present Philippine government.
- March 18—The Defense Department reports that last week 2 U.S. warships entered Soviet territorial waters in the Black Sea as a test of the right of "innocent passage."
- March 19—On the 2d day of his meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in Washington, D.C., the President joins Mulroney to endorse a joint report on the problem of acid rain.
- March 22—The State Department confirms that in January, U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican William A. Wilson held an unauthorized meeting with Libyan officials.
- March 24—The Defense Department reports that today U.S. and Libyan forces clashed in the Gulf of Sidra (claimed by Libya as part of its territorial waters); Libyan ground batteries fired on U.S. planes, which subsequently attacked the missile sites and set 2 Libyan vessels on fire; the U.S. 6th Fleet is engaged in military exercises in and around the disputed gulf.
- March 25—The Defense Department reports that in a 2d strike, American planes destroyed a missile site and sank 2 Libyan vessels.
- Reacting to reports of an incursion of Nicaraguan forces chasing contra rebels into Honduras, President Reagan calls for emergency military aid for Honduras.
- March 27—The U.S. announces that its naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra have ended; after 188 sorties, planes and ships of the 6th Fleet move north of the gulf.
- U.S. Army helicopters are reported to have completed ferrying 500-600 Honduran troops to a point near the Nicaraguan border.

March 30—In Washington, D.C., after a trip to France, Greece, Turkey and Italy to convince allies that U.S. policy against Libya was correct, Secretary Shultz asks the U.S. and the Soviet Union to return to regular secret diplomacy and to avoid public diplomacy.

March 31—President Reagan warns the nations of the European Economic Community (EEC) that the U.S. will raise trade barriers against the EEC on July 1 if the EEC maintains restrictions on agricultural imports.

Labor and Industry

(See also *India; Philippines*)

March 4—A 16-day strike against 4 of the nation's largest can makers is settled when the United Steelworkers of America accepts a 3-year agreement for a new wage and benefit package.

March 17—After a 6-year effort, the United Automobile Workers ends its campaign to represent workers at the Japanese-owned Honda Motors plant in Ohio.

A spokesman for Hyundai Motor America Inc. announces that all South Korean-made Hyundai Excel subcompact cars sold in America are being recalled because of a missing or damaged part that may cause total brake failure. Some 4,000 cars are involved.

March 18—The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reduces to \$4,400 Union Carbide's fine for 5 "serious" violations of federal regulations; the violations led to a chemical leak that hospitalized 6 workers and injured 1,345 others in Institute, West Virginia. The company has agreed to correct the violations immediately.

Legislation

(See also *Foreign Policy*)

March 6—Voting 283 to 97, the House completes congressional action on a bill modifying the Farm Act of 1985, passed only 2 months ago; the bill, passed in the Senate yesterday, goes to the White House.

March 10—The General Accounting Office reports that several billion dollars in extra funds will be available to the Department of Defense because it overestimated inflation rises.

March 14—Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger refuses a congressional request for information on the cost of the Stealth bomber.

March 19—President Reagan offers to suspend \$70 million of the \$100 million in additional aid he has asked Congress to approve for the Nicaraguan rebels (contras) for 90 days while the administration renews efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with Nicaragua.

March 20—The House votes 222 to 210 to defeat the President's request for \$100 million in aid for the contras in Nicaragua.

With a 230-154 vote, the House completes congressional action on a compromise bill to cut \$18 billion from the federal deficit over 3 years.

March 21—The Senate completes action on stopgap legislation which provides \$150 million through May 31 to save the toxic waste cleanup program; the program is almost out of funds.

March 27—The Senate votes 53 to 47 to approve the administration's request for \$100 million in aid for the contras.

Military

March 4—Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, head of the Strategic Defense Initiative organization, asks for the establishment of a federally financed research group free of any commercial interest to give advice on the design and operation of space-based defenses.

March 13—The General Accounting Office charges that because of poor military bookkeeping and management, the Defense Department cannot tell how much military equipment is lost or stolen.

March 22—The U.S. detonates an underground nuclear explosion for the first time since December 28, 1985, despite a unilateral Soviet halt to nuclear testing.

March 25—Defense Secretary Weinberger says the Soviet Union's modernization of its weapons arsenal is "challenging the U.S. technological edge."

Politics

March 8—Meeting in Washington, D.C., the Democratic National Committee approves new nominating rules for the 1988 presidential election.

March 18—In the Illinois Democratic primary, 2 representatives of Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr.'s far right Labor party win nominations as Democrats to run for lieutenant governor and secretary of state along with Adlai E. Stevenson 3d, Democratic candidate for the Illinois governorship.

March 20—Stevenson says he will not run on any ticket with supporters of Lyndon LaRouche.

Science and Space

March 6—James C. Fletcher is named by the President as head of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA); this is the 2d time he has held the post.

March 8—John W. Young, head of the NASA astronaut's office, declares that in order to meet a high-pressure launching schedule, the agency exposed astronauts to many potentially "catastrophic" hazards. The internal memorandum released today is dated March 4.

March 11—NASA officials confirm that they will shift to a fleet composed of shuttles and unmanned rockets for the launching of earth satellites; this is a major revision of NASA's space plans.

March 21—A presidential investigating commission is informed by NASA officials that the destruction of the space shuttle *Challenger* was probably caused by a failed joint on a solid-fuel booster rocket.

Supreme Court

March 3—The Supreme Court agrees to consider a case involving President Reagan's pocket veto of a 1983 bill making military aid for El Salvador conditional on human rights progress there. The President maintains that by not signing the bill he vetoed it.

March 4—The Court rules unanimously that public employee unions must account in detail to nonmembers for all union finances.

March 5—The Court rules 7 to 2 that police officers are liable for damages for clearly unreasonable arrests and searches even if they have obtained warrants beforehand.

March 10—In a 6-3 ruling, the Court decides that police may lie to a criminal suspect's lawyer in order to keep the defense lawyer away during interrogation of the suspect.

March 25—The Court rules that the Air Force may forbid members of the military to wear a yarmulke (skullcap) and other headcoverings indoors while in uniform.

VATICAN


(See also *Italy*)

March 17—The Vatican announces Pope John Paul II will visit the central synagogue in Rome on April 13; this will be the first time a Pope has ever visited a synagogue.

VIETNAM

(See *Kampuchea*)

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